MORRIS LEE MILLER, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1984-12-06
No. 64505
BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur., OVERTON, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
460 So. 2d 373 Florida Supreme Court (1984) Caution
Cited by 39 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court held that statutory reclassification provisions for felonies involving weapon use apply even when a defendant is convicted of a lesser included offense rather than the offense expressly charged. Miller was convicted of attempted second-degree murder (a lesser included offense) after being charged with second-degree murder, and the trial court properly reclassified the conviction as a first-degree felony under section 775.087(1) because a handgun was used.


Holding

The reclassification provisions of section 775.087(1) apply to convictions of lesser included offenses. The phrase 'charged with a felony' in the statute encompasses felonies impliedly charged as necessarily included lesser offenses and attempts. Therefore, Miller was properly subject to reclassification because he was convicted of attempted second-degree murder, a lesser included offense of the charged second-degree murder.


Headnotes

[1] A felony may be reclassified to a higher degree offense under section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes, unless the use of a weapon or firearm is an essential element of the c…

[2] The "essential element" exception in section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes, refers to elements required by the substantive criminal law, not allegations contained within a…

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Key Quotes

“the phrase "charged with a felony," used in section 775.087(1), encompasses felonies which are impliedly charged as necessarily included lesser offenses and attempts”

Establishes the Court's interpretation that the statute applies to lesser included offenses, not just expressly charged offenses

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Facts & Procedural History

Miller was charged with second-degree murder for killing another person with a handgun. The jury, instructed on lesser included offenses, returned a v…

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Opinion of the Court
ALDERMAN, Justice.

ALDERMAN, Justice.

We review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Miller v. State, 438 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), which directly expressly conflicts with Carroll v. State, 412 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Since our acceptance of jurisdiction in the present case on the basis of conflict, the First District, in an en banc opinion, has expressly receded from its holding in Carroll. Cooper v. State, 455 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

Miller was charged with second-degree murder in that he killed another by shooting him with a handgun. The jury was instructed as to lesser included offenses and returned a verdict of attempted second-degree murder which is a second-degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed fifteen years. Because it was established that Miller had used a handgun during the commission of the crime, the trial court, at sentencing, reclassified attempted second-degree murder from a second-degree felony to a first-degree felony pursuant to section 775.-087(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), thereby enhancing the penalty from a possible sentence of fifteen years to a possible sentence of thirty years. The trial court then sentenced him to twenty years with the requirement of a minimum mandatory sentence of three years.

He appealed to the Fourth District and argued that only those offenses which are expressly charged in the information, as opposed to those offenses impliedly charged as a lesser included offense, may be reclassified pursuant to section 775.-087(1). The Fourth District disagreed with his contention and affirmed the trial court. It held that the phrase “charged with a felony,” used in section 775.087(1), encompasses felonies which are impliedly charged as necessarily included lesser offenses and attempts and that, therefore, Miller was subject to the operation of this statute.

Section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides in pertinent part:

(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, whenever a person is charged with a felony, except a felony in which the use of a weapon or firearm is an essential element, and during the commission of such felony the defendant carries, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts to use any weapon or firearm, or during the commission of such felony the defendant commits an aggravated battery, the felony for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: ...

The issue before us is whether the reclassification provisions of section 775.-087(1), Florida Statutes (1981), apply where the defendant is not convicted of the offense expressly charged in the information or indictment but instead is convicted of a lesser included offense.

The Fourth District held that the reclassification provisions do apply in this situation and affirmed the trial court. We agree and approve the decision of the district court.

It is so ordered.

BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. OVERTON, J., concurs specially with an opinion.

Concurrence
OVERTON, Justice, specially concurring.

OVERTON, Justice, specially concurring.

I concur with the majority that reclassification applies where the record clearly establishes that the defendant used a handgun while committing the crime for which he was convicted. I would note, however, that reclassification under this statute is not always applicable when a defendant is found guilty of a lesser included offense. For example, reclassification would be inappropriate when a defendant is charged with burglary with a dangerous weapon and is convicted of the lesser included offense of burglary, since the lesser included burglary conviction necessarily excludes the commission of that offense with a dangerous weapon.


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Citator

Cited By (20 total)

  • Connolly v. State, 172 So. 3d 893 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)
    …referred to in the charge of first-degree murder in Count 1 of the Indictment. Count 1 only specifically mentions the firearm used to murder Callahan and no other weapon. Connolly’s firearm is thus "uncharged." . The State cites to Miller v. State, 460 So. 2d 373 (Fla.1984), to support its argument that reclassification was proper. It is true that the primary charge in an indictment or information includes all lesser included offenses, for purposes of reclassification, but I cannot agree that Miller supports…
    1 / 2
  • State v. Whitehead, 472 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1985)
    …f the crime of attempted first-degree murder, defendant’s sentence was properly reclassified to a life felony. We thus upheld the sentencing enhancement, even when the three-year minimum mandatory had been imposed. More recently in Miller v. State, 460 So. 2d 373 (Fla.1984), this Court upheld the reclassification provision of section 775.-087(1), where the defendant was not convicted of the offense charged in the information or indictment but was convicted of a lesser included offense under circumstances whe…
  • Franklin v. State, 541 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
    …ormation did not specifically charge appellant with a felony for which the use of a weapon is an essential element, other factors present in this case worked together to effectively charge appellant with such a felony. First, under Miller v. State, 460 So. 2d 373 (Fla.1984), appellant’s second degree murder charge, for purposes of reclassifi [*1229] cation, included all lesser offenses. Thus, he was effectively charged with third degree murder. Second, although all third degree murder charges do not necessar…

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