CITY OF GAINESVILLE, APPELLANT,
v.
GNV INVESTMENTS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND WAYNE FANN AND CHARLES POWERS D/B/A SUN SKATE CENTER, APPELLEES
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No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that federal courts were without jurisdiction to entertain Lyons' claim for injunctive relief. The fact that Lyons had been choked once did nothing to establish "a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped. . .by an officer who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness." The Court held that in order to establish an actual controversy, Lyons would have to show either 1) that all Los Angeles police officers always choked citizens with whom they had encounters, or 2) that the City ordered or authorized officers to act in such a manner. Lyons was thus limited to suing the police and the city for individual damages.
[1] A Plan Board's authority to approve or deny site plans is limited to regulating the layout, design, and location of buildings on a property, and does not extend to contro…
[2] A municipality's attempt to suspend or amend existing zoning ordinances by resolution without providing the statutorily required notice and opportunity to be heard is inv…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1976, police officers of the City of Los Angeles stopped Adolph Lyons for a traffic code violation. Although Lyons offered no resistance, the offic…
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MILLS, Judge.
The City of Gainesville (City) appeals the trial court’s order finding that the City’s Plan Board unlawfully and arbitrarily denied approval of appellees’ site plan petition to construct a skate center on real property located within the City and holding that the City is estopped from enforcing a new, more restrictive zoning ordinance on appel- lees’ real property. The order also ordered the City to issue a building permit for construction of the proposed skating center. We affirm.
On 29 April 1980, appellee, Sun Skate Center, contracted to purchase real property from appellee, GNV Investment. The parcel was zoned “shopping center” which permitted use of the land as a skate center. Sun Skate Center prepared a site plan petition and submitted it to the City Plan Board. The plan met all “technical requirements” of the City’s ordinances, regarding site plan approval. Under the City’s ordinances, the Plan Board is delegated the authority to approve or deny site plans. The site plan merely regulates the layout of a piece of property, the design of the buildings, and the actual locations of the buildings on the site. The City’s zoning ordinances control the uses to which a particular piece of property may be put. The Plan Board, therefore, is not to be concerned with a particular use of a piece of property as long as it fits within the permitted uses of the City’s zoning ordinances.
The record amply supports the trial judge’s finding that the Plan Board unlawfully and arbitrarily denied Sun Skate Center’s petition for site plan approval. The Plan Board members voted to deny the petition because of the parcel’s intended use as a skate center, not because it failed to comply with the appropriate criteria for site plan approval.
During the site plan approval process, on 7 July 1980, the City Commission, without notice, declared a moratorium on any development of lands zoned “shopping center” until a rewrite of the City zoning ordinances could be accomplished. The City Commission’s minutes reveal that the Commission was specifically apprised of the proposed skating center on appellees’ land zoned “shopping center” prior to declaring the moratorium, and that the moratorium was an attempt to stop this development. The zoning rewrite was to contain a new zoning classification, “neighborhood shopping center,” which prohibited use as a skating center. The moratorium was also passed with the understanding that any shopping center parcel not neighborhood oriented could be brought to the Commission for review and referral to the Plan Board for special exception. On 9 July 1980, the Commission passed a resolution reaffirming and ratifying its earlier moratorium.
The City’s new zoning ordinance was enacted on 24 November 1980. On 12 January 1981, appellees’ property was rezoned to “neighborhood shopping center” which precluded use as a skating center, and the moratorium was lifted on shopping center development. Appellees’ same site plan, previously denied on 8 July 1980, was approved on 10 February 1981, although appellee could no longer construct a skating center under the new zoning classification.
We hold the moratorium and resolution, passed without notice, were an ineffective attempt to suspend and amend the City of Gainesville’s existing zoning ordinances. We find the City’s argument that it has the power, under its general home rule powers, to suspend zoning ordinances by resolution without notice to be without merit. Each case cited by the City in support of that proposition dealt with a situation where a municipality passed an interim zoning ordinance rather than resolution. In City of Miami Beach v. State, 108 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959), the court held that the authority to materially limit the use of property ought not to be inferred under a general grant of authority found in the City’s charter, especially when there was a specific grant of authority from the legislature concerning zoning which contained limitations on that power such as notice, public hearings, etc. The court went on to say that these limitations were designed to protect the public from hasty or ill-advised use of that authority. In this case, the City of Gainesville has a specific grant of power concerning zoning, Section 166.041(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), which contains specific limitations (notice, opportunity to be heard, etc.) on the use of that power. The attempted moratorium was, therefore, invalid and ineffective regarding appellees’ proposed development since the City failed to comply with the specific notice requirements regarding zoning ordinances. City of Miami Beach v. State, supra; Gulf and Eastern Development Corp. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 354 So. 2d 57 (Fla.1978); and generally Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 1196 (1970).
The remaining issues raised by the City are without merit. Since the City was not a party to the contracts between appel-lees, it may not raise any issue regarding the applicability of the statute of frauds to these contracts. Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Padrick Chevrolet, 196 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967).
Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.
WENTWORTH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
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McKINNEY-Green, Inc. v. Davis, 606 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…allegations indicates the parties to that agreement were unwilling to perform. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New York v. Padrick Chevrolet Co., Inc., 196 So. 2d 235, cert. den., 201 So. 2d 556 (Fla.1967); City of Gainesville v. GNV Investments, Inc., 413 So. 2d 770, 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Jones v. Howland, 369 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The gravamen of an action for tor-tious interference with a contractual relationship is the malicious interference by a third party, with a contract between other person…
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Daytona Leisure Corp. v. The City OF Daytona Beach, 539 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…if not strictly enacted pursuant to the requirement of section 166.041). Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 183 So. 2d 193 (Fla.1966); Fountain v. City of Jacksonville, 447 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); City of Gainesville v. G.N.V. Investments, 413 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Buntrock; Malley v. Clay County Zoning Commission, 225 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969). Where an ordinance substantially affects land use (substantially changes permitted use categories) or rezones specific parcels of private rea…
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Fountain v. City OF Jacksonville, 447 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…res passed in contravention of notice requirements are invalid. Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 183 So. 2d 193 (Fla.1966); Malley v. Clay County Zoning Commission, 225 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969); City of Gainesville v. GNV Investments, Inc., 413 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); City of Sanibel v. Buntrock, 409 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1981). . The city’s brief suggests, without fully developing an argument on the point, that since the evidence shows only that the ordinance affects appellants' propert…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gulf & E. Dev. Corp. v. City OF Fort Lauderdale, 354 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1978)
- City OF Miami Beach v. State of Fla. ex rel. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 108 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Commercial Union Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Padrick Chevrolet Co., Inc., 196 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)