ROBERT NEUMANN, APPELLANT,
v.
DIANE NEUMANN, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed most of the trial court's property division but reversed the award of rehabilitative alimony, holding that permanent alimony was required where the wife could not be expected to become self-supporting at the standard of living established during the eighteen-year marriage.
The court affirmed the property division awards but reversed the alimony determination, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding rehabilitative rather than permanent alimony where there was no showing the wife could be expected to support herself in accordance with the standard of living established during the marriage. The court also reversed the denial of attorney's fees and costs to the wife.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding a spouse seventy percent of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home when a portion of the award represents…
[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding a spouse the other spouse's interest in certain real properties as alimony.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court abused its discretion by making the alimony award to the wife rehabilitative in character rather than permanent where as here, there is no showing that the wife could be expected to support herself in accordance with the standard of living established during the marriage”
States the core holding regarding when rehabilitative alimony is inappropriate and permanent alimony is required
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married in 1963; the husband adopted the wife's two children from prior marriages, and the parties adopted two additional children. D…
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PER CURIAM.
The husband appeals from the final judgment for dissolution of an eighteen-year marriage. The wife cross-appeals.
The parties were married in 1963, the marriage being the wife’s fourth and the husband’s first. The wife’s two children by prior marriage were adopted by the husband. Two more children were adopted by the parties. Of the four children, only one daughter is still a minor and is in custody of the husband with consent of the wife.
During the marriage the parties enjoyed a high standard of living. The husband has experienced some losses in his insurance business and now claims a substantially reduced level of income. Although the wife has both a real estate and insurance sales license, at age fifty-three, she has never earned a living from these occupations and has no college degree. At the time of the proceedings she was working as a sales clerk earning approximately $150.00 per week. She receives no fringe benefits and the position offers no advancement opportunities.
We find no abuse of discretion either in the award of seventy percent of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home to the wife — part of the award clearly being special equity due to the wife’s having contributed from her own trust funds to the down-payment and to renovation of the home and part being lump-sum alimony; nor is abuse of discretion shown in the award to the wife of the husband’s interest in the Levy County and Plantation Beach properties as alimony. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980).
We clarify the trial court’s finding in Paragraph eight of the final judgment providing for the equal division of the remaining property to reflect the court’s intent, as conceded by the parties, that such division is not to include interest in the husband’s business and the parties are to retain the same interest held by them prior to dissolution; the wife is not entitled to any interest in the husband’s present residence, nor is the husband entitled to any interest in the wife’s present residence; the husband is not required to pay the mortgage on those properties awarded to the wife. We also find that the wife is not entitled to any interest in the husband’s Cape Coral property which was acquired by him through inheritance. See, e.g., Evans v. Evans, 398 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Rosen v. Rosen, 386 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), rev. denied, 392 So. 2d 1378 (Fla.1981).
We find Schwartz v. Schwartz, 396 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) factually dissimilar. The wife’s cross-appeal urges error in the trial court’s failure to award permanent instead of rehabilitative alimony.
We hold that the court abused its discretion by making the alimony award to the wife rehabilitative in character rather than permanent where as here, there is no showing that the wife could be expected to support herself in accordance with the standard of living established during the marriage. If, after the award of permanent alimony, the wife should become adequately self-supporting, the husband could apply for modification of the judgment as to alimony on the basis of a change in circumstances. Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Gratton v. Gratton, 358 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
We reverse that part of the court’s order denying to wife any part of her attorney’s fees and costs. Creel v. Creel, 378 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1111 (Fla.1980).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Gardner v. Gardner, 452 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…, petition for review denied, 392 So. 2d 1378 (Fla.1980); Hessinger v. Hessinger, 378 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); [*984] Easterling v. Easterling, 358 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 884 (Fla.1978). . See Neumann v. Neumann, 413 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 396 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Rosen; Hessinger.…
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Lanier v. Lanier, 594 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…2; Wagers v. Wagers, 444 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We hold that the court abused its discretion by making the alimony award to the wife after August 1992 rehabilitative in character rather than permanent. See DeCenzo. As in Neumann v. Neumann, 413 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1982), there was no showing that the wife could be expected to support herself in accordance with the marital standard of living. If the wife should become adequately self-supporting after the award of permanent alimony, the husband co…
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Keller v. Keller, 521 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)…t DCA 1986); Noe v. Noe, 431 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). We find no abuse of discretion in the award of permanent, periodic alimony. See Laman v. Laman, 490 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 500 So. 2d 544 (Fla.1986); Neumann v. Neumann, 413 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). However, since all the items of distribution are interrelated, on remand the trial court may in [*277] its discretion revisit this award. See Rico v. Rico, 487 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Kuehn v. Orlosky, 470 So. 2d 831 (Fl…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Rosen v. Rosen, 386 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Creel v. Creel, 378 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Gratton v. Gratton, 358 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Schwartz v. Schwartz, 396 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Anne Wheeler Evans v. Loring P. Evans, Jr., 398 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)