LEONARD H. SCHWARTZ, APPELLANT,
v.
CAROL SCHWARTZ, APPELLEE
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In this marriage dissolution appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of a 30% interest in a vacation home to the wife as lump-sum alimony, but reversed a $300,000 lump-sum alimony provision and remanded for an award of periodic alimony instead, finding insufficient justification for the larger lump-sum payment.
The court affirmed the 30% interest in the vacation home as a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion in awarding lump-sum alimony based on the equities of the case, but reversed the $300,000 lump-sum alimony provision and remanded for an award of periodic alimony instead, as the larger lump-sum payment lacked sufficient justification.
[1] Lump-sum alimony is permissible when the evidence reflects a justification for such payment and the financial ability of the payor spouse to make the payment without subs…
[2] A wife's performance of normal household duties is generally insufficient to support an award of special equity in property acquired by the husband from sources unconnect…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“lump-sum alimony is permissible, in the discretion of the trial court when the evidence reflects (1) a justification for such lump-sum payment and (2) financial ability of the other spouse to make such payment without substantially endangering his or her economic status”
Establishes the two-prong test for awarding lump-sum alimony from Canakaris v. Canakaris
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe husband purchased a vacation home using funds from sources unconnected with the marital relationship. The wife contributed substantial labor and s…
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PER CURIAM.
These appeals and cross-appeals are from a final judgment of dissolution of a marriage which, in pertinent provisions, grants the wife a thirty-per cent interest in the vacation home, (2) denies wife the husband’s interest in the marital home, (3) awards child support, (4) grants lump-sum alimony to be paid over a period of time, (5) awards wife one-half of her attorney’s fees and costs.
The consideration for the vacation home was supplied by the husband from sources unconnected with the marital relationship. The wife’s claim for a special equity is based on a showing of performance of normal household duties insufficient to support the award. Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla.1980); Fiedler v. Fiedler, 375 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). We find that the award is within the court’s-discretion, however, as lump-sum alimony based on the equities of the case. Canakar-is v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980). In Canakaris, supra, the court held that lump-sum alimony is permissible, in the discretion of the trial court when the evidence reflects (1) a justification for such lump-sum payment and (2) financial ability of the other spouse to make such payment' without substantially endangering his or her economic status. Id. at 1201. Here there is no question of financial ability. The vacation home was purchased as a special home for the family, and the wife contributed substantial labor and services to making the vacation home suitable for family life. Under the total circumstances of this case, we cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a thirty-per cent interest in the vacation home be awarded to the wife. See, e. g., Canakaris, supra, Ro-sen v. Rosen, 386 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). See also McCall v. McCall, 386 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) and Collinsworth v. Collinsworth, 386 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
We reach the opposite conclusion with respect to the $300,000 cash payment. Rosen v. Rosen, supra. Like Rosen, supra, the husband’s assets were willed or given to him by his family and neither earned by him nor contributed to by the wife, there are small children precluding a definite end to the relationship, there is no indication that the lump sum is necessary to provide the wife with vested security against the ex-husband’s possible demise, nor is there any showing that the husband will be unable to make periodic payments. We are unable to justify the $300,000 lump-sum provision and remand the cause for an award of periodic alimony. Canakaris v. Canakaris, supra; Yandell v. Yandell, 39 So. 2d 554 (Fla.1949); Rosen v. Rosen, supra.
We find no error in the award of child support and in denying the wife the husband’s interest in the jointly owned marital home as partial lump-sum alimony.
Because we reverse the award of $300,000 lump-sum alimony, we set aside the award of attorney’s fees and remand for reconsideration of permanent periodic alimony and attorney’s fees.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Gardner v. Gardner, 452 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…Hessinger v. Hessinger, 378 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); [*984] Easterling v. Easterling, 358 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 884 (Fla.1978). . See Neumann v. Neumann, 413 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 396 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Rosen; Hessinger.…
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Schwartz v. Schwartz, 431 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…on. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Palmar v. Palmar, supra; Hartley v. Hartley, supra. These propositions require that we respect and [*718] affirm the rulings of the trial judge in this case. Affirmed. . Schwartz v. Schwartz, 396 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). . The order on appellant’s motion for directions was filed with the clerk’s office on December 7, and was recorded in the court’s official records on December 10, 1981. The order of recusal was signed and filed on December 8, 19…
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Neumann v. Neumann, 413 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…pe Coral property which was acquired by him through inheritance. See, e.g., Evans v. Evans, 398 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Rosen v. Rosen, 386 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), rev. denied, 392 So. 2d 1378 (Fla.1981). We find Schwartz v. Schwartz, 396 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) factually dissimilar. The wife’s cross-appeal urges error in the trial court’s failure to award permanent instead of rehabilitative alimony. We hold that the court abused its discretion by making the alimony award to the wife reh…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980)
- Ashleigh M. Moye v. Moye (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)
- Rosen v. Rosen, 386 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Chiappa v. State, 375 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- McCALL v. McCALL, 386 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Altamese Jackson v. State, 386 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Collinsworth v. Ilena W. Collinsworth, 386 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)