LEON ELMORE POWE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Leon Elmore Powe was convicted of trafficking in methaqualone, but the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed because the trial court improperly restricted his cross-examination of a prosecution witness regarding potential bias and motivation for testifying, particularly regarding plea bargaining and mandatory sentencing knowledge.
The trial court clearly abused its discretion by unduly limiting cross-examination of the witness. A defendant has the right to fully cross-examine a State's witness to reveal bias and improper motives, and this right extends to questioning a prosecution witness recently under threat of criminal charges about circumstances that may have impacted the plea-bargaining agreement and motivation to testify.
[1] A criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses includes the right to cross-examine a key prosecution witness regarding the full extent of their plea a…
[2] Evidence of a witness's potential sentence, which they avoided through a plea agreement in exchange for testimony, is relevant to demonstrating bias and motive.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It has long been the policy of the law that testimony of an accomplice is regarded with disfavor; is subject to close scrutiny; and, should be received with caution by the jury. The reason for the rule arises from the willingness of some persons charged with or convicted of a crime to wrongfully implicate others if by doing so, they may mitigate the penalty against themselves”
Establishes the foundational policy against accomplice testimony and the basis for broad cross-examination rights
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePowe was charged with trafficking in methaqualone and possession of cocaine. At trial, the State presented testimony from Roy Michel, who drove a vehi…
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SHIVERS, Judge.
Powe seeks review of his conviction for trafficking in methaqualone asserting as error the trial court’s restriction of appellant’s cross-examination of a State’s witness. We find the trial court unduly restricted defense cross-examination and reverse.
On October 16, 1980, appellant was charged by information with trafficking in methaqualone and with possession of cocaine. The first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, the State presented the testimony of Roy Michel who drove an automobile instrumental in the drug transaction underlying the charges against Powe.
On cross-examination, the defense counsel inquired about any plea bargaining Michel had entered into in return for his testimony. Michel testified that the State dropped a charge of trafficking in methaqualone, that he entered a plea of guilty to a charge of possession of cocaine, and that he was sentenced to five years probation and required to pay a $500 fine. Defense counsel asked several times whether Michel was informed or aware that a conviction for trafficking in methaqualone carried a minimum mandatory five year sentence. The prosecution objected on each occasion to the relevancy of the question and the trial court sustained the objections.
In Wolfe v. State, 190 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) we stated: It has long been the policy of the law that testimony of an accomplice is regarded with disfavor; is subject to close scrutiny; and, should be received with caution by the jury. The reason for the rule arises from the willingness of some persons charged with or convicted of a crime to wrongfully implicate others if by doing so, they may mitigate the penalty against themselves, (footnote omitted)
Great latitude should be allowed in the cross-examination of an accomplice who testifies for the prosecution. Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447, 147 So. 897 (1983). 2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, (1972), Sec. 425, p. 323.
The courts have repeatedly held that a defendant has the right to fully cross-examine a State’s witness to reveal bias and any improper motive the witness may have had in testifying against the defendant. Simmons v. Wainwright, 271 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); McDuffie v. State, 341 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). This right has been specifically extended to defense interrogation of a prosecution witness who was recently under the threat of criminal charges. Rolle v. State, 386 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). We find that whether Michel knew of the minimum mandatory penalty for a conviction of trafficking in methaqualone may have impacted significantly on the plea-bargaining agreement and on Michel’s willingness to testify against Powe. We recognize that control over the scope of the cross-examination properly lies with the trial court and is not subject to review except for a clear abuse of discretion. Ho Yin Wong v. State, 359 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Here, the trial court clearly abused its discretion by unduly limiting the defense interrogation of Michel. Accordingly, we reverse Powe’s conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ERVIN and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Washington v. State, 737 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…347 (1974). A criminal defendant’s constitutional protections cover the right to pursue a full cross-examination of a State witness to expose any bias or improper motive that the witness may have in' testifying against the defendant. Powe v. State, 413 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Chatman v. State, 687 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Taylor v. State, 623 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). The Florida Evidence Code reinforces the principle that adequate cross-examination presupposes the right to address…
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Lavette v. State, 442 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…on was that Boyd merely told police what they wanted to hear — that appellants were involved. This court has stated that “[gjreat latitude should be allowed in the cross-examination of an accomplice who testifies for the prosecution.” Powe v. State, 413 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). [*268] The defense should be allowed wide latitude .to demonstrate bias or possible motive for a witness’s testimony, Nelson v. State, 395 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Harmon v. State, 394 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Blai…
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Yolman v. State, 469 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…ess to reveal any bias, prejudice or improper motive the witness may have had in testifying against the defendant. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Watts v. State, 450 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Powe v. State, 413 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); McDuffie v. State, 341 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). It is not necessary for matters tending to show bias or prejudice to have been within the scope of the direct examination to be proper cross-examination. Pollard v. State, 44…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447 (Fla. 1933)
- Simmons v. Louie L. Wainwright, 271 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- McDUFFIE v. State, 341 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- HO YIN Wong v. State, 359 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Wolfe v. State, 190 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)
- Rolle v. State, 386 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)