KAREN SUE YOLMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Karen Sue Yolman was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in cannabis, but the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed her conviction because the trial judge improperly limited her cross-examination of the state's key informant witness regarding his bias and motive, violating her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.
The trial judge erred in limiting cross-examination because a defendant has the right to fully cross-examine an adverse witness to reveal bias, prejudice, or improper motive regardless of whether such matters were covered in direct examination, and this error was not harmless merely because the defendant's co-defendant testified to similar facts. Additionally, requiring the defendant to call the witness as her own witness would have wrongfully deprived her of concluding closing argument.
[1] A defendant has the right to fully cross-examine an adverse witness to reveal any bias, prejudice, or improper motive the witness may have had in testifying against the d…
[2] Matters tending to show a witness's bias or prejudice are proper cross-examination, even if they exceed the scope of direct examination.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well established that a defendant has the right to fully cross-examine an adverse witness to reveal any bias, prejudice or improper motive the witness may have had in testifying against the defendant.”
Establishes the fundamental constitutional right to cross-examine regarding witness bias, which is not limited by the scope of direct examination.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceYolman was tried alongside two co-conspirators, including her husband, for conspiracy to traffic in cannabis. The state's key witness was Ed Wall, a p…
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RYDER, Chief Judge.
Karen Sue Yolman appeals her conviction and sentence for conspiracy to traffic in cannabis. Of her four points on appeal, only one merits our consideration: whether the trial judge erred in limiting her cross-examination of the state’s key witness.
Appellant was tried with two alleged co-conspirators, one of which was her husband. The key witness implicating appellant in the conspiracy was Ed Wall, a self-professed “professional confidential informant,” who set up a so-called “reverse sting” which ultimately led to the arrest of appellant.
At trial, the judge refused to allow appellant to cross-examine Wall about a telephone call Wall allegedly made to appellant’s home after her arrest. Appellant proffered evidence that Wall, during the telephone conversation, suggested appellant employ a certain attorney so that nothing would happen to her, he promised to paint appellant “lily white” if she cooperated with him, and he suggested that they get rid of appellant’s husband and go off together. The judge ruled that this evidence was not proper cross-examination because it exceeded the scope of the direct examination. The judge also ruled that appellant would have to call Wall as her own witness to elicit this testimony. Appellant chose not to do so because of its effect on the order of closing argument. As a result, Wall was not questioned about the telephone conversation.
Appellant argues that the cross-examination should have been allowed because it tended to show Wall’s bias, prejudice or motive and was, therefore, proper, even though beyond the scope of the direct examination. Appellant also argues that forcing appellant to call Wall as her own witness would have wrongfully deprived her of the concluding closing argument. We agree and reverse.
It is well established that a defendant has the right to fully cross-examine an adverse witness to reveal any bias, prejudice or improper motive the witness may have had in testifying against the defendant. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Watts v. State, 450 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Powe v. State, 413 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); McDuffie v. State, 341 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
It is not necessary for matters tending to show bias or prejudice to have been within the scope of the direct examination to be proper cross-examination. Pollard v. State, 444 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); McDuffie. A full cross-examination is especially necessary when the witness sought to be examined is the key witness on whose credibility the state’s case rests. Watts.
The trial judge erred in not allowing appellant to cross-examine Wall about the telephone conversation because the evidence may have shown Wall’s bias, prejudice or improper motive for testifying against appellant.
The state argues, however, citing Morgan v. State, 415 So. 2d 6 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1055, 103 S.Ct. 473, 74 L.Ed.2d 621 (1982), that the error was harmless because another witness, appellant’s husband, testified to the contents of the telephone conversation. In Morgan, the trial judge limited the cross-examination of a witness on the ground of relevancy regarding certain factual evidence. The supreme court ruled that the error was harmless because later the same witness testified about substantially the same facts. Morgan, unlike the case at bar, did not involve cross-examination directed toward the witness’ bias.
We hold that the harmful error in limiting appellant’s right to cross-examine Wall concerning his bias or prejudice was not made harmless by the later testimony of appellant’s husband, who was also a co-defendant, and who had little credibility with the jury.
The trial court offered to allow appellant to call Wall as her own witness to elicit the testimony. If appellant had done so, she would have been wrongfully de prived of her concluding closing argument pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.250. This deprivation alone may have been reversible error. McDuffie; Lyttle v. State, 320 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. dismissed, 336 So. 2d 604 (Fla.1976).
Accordingly, we reverse appellant’s judgment and sentence and remand the cause for a new trial.
SCHEB and DANAHY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Washington v. State, 737 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…en previously convicted of a felony, it is not necessary that matters tending to show bias, prejudice, or improper motive be within the scope of direct for such questioning to be proper cross-examination. Nelson, 602 So. 2d at 552; Yolman v. State, 469 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (it was reversible error not to allow defendant to cross-examine witness about telephone conversation that allegedly would have shown witness’ bias, prejudice, or improper motive for testifying against defendant, even though matte…
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Wyon Dale Childers v. State, 936 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…d the premise of Davis v. Alaska to establish “that a defendant has the right to fully cross-examine an adverse witness to reveal any bias, prejudice, or improper motive the witness may have had in testifying against the defendant.” Yolman v. State, 469 So. 2d 842, 843 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). The rule takes on increased importance where a key witness is being examined. As the supreme court has stated: The right of a criminal defendant to cross-examine adverse witnesses is derived from the Sixth Amendment and due…
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Tomengo v. State, 864 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…at him. That a defendant has the right to fully cross-examine an adverse witness to reveal any bias, prejudice, or improper motive the witness may have in testifying against the defendant is a fundamental tenant of due process. See Yolman v. State, 469 So. 2d 842, 843 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). The right to a full cross-examination is especially necessary when the witness being cross-examined is the key witness on whose credibility the State’s case relies. Id. Evidence of bias, prejudice or interest is admissible…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1974)
- Knapp v. Cardwell, 459 U.S. 1055 (U.S. 1982)
- McDUFFIE v. State, 341 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Morgan v. State, 415 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1982)
- Powe v. State, 413 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- O'Neil v. Travelers Ins. Co., 450 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Watts v. State, 450 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Herschel N. Pollard, Jr. v. State, 444 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Lyttle v. State, 320 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)