PAUL LENTZ, APPELLANT,
v.
MELINDA LENTZ, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a child custody modification case, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order increasing the non-custodial parent's summer visitation from three to four weeks, finding that the custodial parent was denied due process by receiving no notice that such a modification would be considered and no opportunity to present evidence on the issue.
The court reversed the modification because the appellant was denied due process. The appellant received no notice that the earlier three-week stipulated order would be modified and had no opportunity to prepare and present evidence on that issue. The court rejected the argument that lack of surprise could substitute for fundamental due process protections.
[1] A trial court cannot modify an existing custody order by increasing a parent's visitation period without providing the other parent with notice and an opportunity to be h…
[2] A party's lack of surprise at a proposed modification does not cure a fundamental lack of due process resulting from the failure to provide notice and an opportunity to b…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the motion served on the appellant and heard by the trial court requested only that the court establish specific dates for the appellee's regular three-week summer visitation period”
Establishes that the motion did not seek modification of the three-week period
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties had entered into a stipulated order establishing a three-week summer visitation period for the appellee. The appellee filed a motion reque…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Child Custody Modification cases and more on FLexlaw
DANAHY, Judge.
In this child custody case the appellant, who is the custodial parent, challenges that portion of the order of the trial judge which modified an earlier order, entered upon the stipulation of the parties, by increasing the appellee’s summer visitation period from three to four weeks.
We reverse because the motion served on the appellant and heard by the trial court requested only that the court establish specific dates for the appellee’s regular three-week summer visitation period. The appellant contends that he received no notice that the appellee would seek, or that the trial court would consider, modification of the earlier order which established the three-week period and that he had no opportunity to prepare and present evidence relevant to that issue. Case law supports him. Cortina v. Cortina, 98 So. 2d 334 (Fla.1957); Wallace v. Wallace, 413 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Sardinas v. Sardinas, 401 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Connors v. Connors, 327 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Teta v. Teta, 297 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). We note the appellee does not argue that enlargement of the three-week summer visitation period was litigated with the implied consent of the appellant. Neither does she argue that an amendment to the pleadings to incorporate a request for an enlarged period was made or sought. Rather, she argues that the appellant should not have been surprised at the enlargement of the visitation period. Even if that is so, we do not agree that a lack of surprise alone can overcome fundamental lack of due process to the. appellant resulting from the failure to give him notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue decided against him in the order.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the order to the extent it increased the summer visitation period of the appellee from three to four weeks.
HOBSON, A. C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
-
Hart v. Hart, 458 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…nnolly v. Connolly, 448 So. 2d 641, 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (error to award alimony, child support, de facto child custody, and to determine visitation rights where there was no prayer, or other predicate requesting such relief). In Lentz v. Lentz, 414 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), the court reversed an order in a child custody case increasing visitation rights for one parent when the motion served on the other parent requested only that specific visitation dates be established for the moving parent. The co…
-
Kerrigan v. State, 711 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…581, 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (finding trial court erred in entering money judgment against appellant who was given notice only that appellee, appellant’s counsel, was seeking a charging lien against real property owned by appellant); Lentz v. Lentz, 414 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (reversing order increasing visitation rights where motion requested only specific visitation dates). As the court stated in Noonan-Judson, “[wjhere an issue is not presented by pleading or litigated by parties during a hearing, a…
-
McGLAMRY v. McGLAMRY, 608 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…ourt may actually remove his visitation rights outright, when neither he nor the wife had even requested such a modification. Section 61.131, Florida Statutes does entitle parties to reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. In Lentz v. Lentz, 414 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), the second district reversed a trial court order modifying child custody and visitation, to the extent that it increased the summer visitation period from three to four weeks, without prior notice to appellant that the court woul…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cortina v. Cortina, 98 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1957)
- McCONNELL v. Brumos Porsche Audi Corp., 297 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Dina Teta v. Teta, 297 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Elida Pauline Sardinas v. Sardinas, 401 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Connors v. Connors, 327 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Wallace v. Wallace, 413 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)