CHASE W. CRAWFORD, APPELLANT,
v.
MARIANNA PROTSMAN CRAWFORD, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage case, the husband appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to transfer venue from Duval County to Leon County, Florida. The appellate court reversed, holding that Leon County was the proper venue as the place where the intact marriage last existed, based on the parties' marital domicile, the husband's continued residence, and the location of marital property.
Leon County is the proper venue because it is the county where the intact marriage was last evidenced by a continuing union of partners who intended to remain married, and it is also where the marital domicile is located, where most marital property is situated, and where the husband continues to reside.
[1] Venue in a dissolution of marriage proceeding is proper in the county where the marriage was last intact, evidenced by a continuing union of partners with the intention t…
[2] The cause of action for dissolution of marriage accrues in the county where both partners were last present with a common intention to remain married.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court is to look to the single county where 'the intact marriage was last evidenced by a continuing union of partners who intended to remain and to remain married, indefinitely if not permanently.'”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for venue in dissolution of marriage actions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married and maintained their marital domicile in Tallahassee (Leon County) for eight years. In November 1980, the wife moved to Jacks…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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McCORD, Judge.
Chase W. Crawford (husband) appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to transfer venue in this dissolution of marriage action from Duval County to Leon County, Florida. We reverse.
Generally, the defendant’s privilege of venue permits him to object to an action being maintained in a county other than the one where he resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property and litigation is located. § 47.011, Fla. Stat. If he is sued in one of these three places, he may not object on the ground of “improper venue.” Board of Public Instruction v.
First National Bank, 111 Fla. 4, 143 So. 738 (1932), aff’d 111 Fla. 4, 149 So.
213.
However, in a dissolution of marriage action, the trial court is to look to the single county where “the intact marriage was last evidenced by a continuing union of partners who intended to remain and to remain married, indefinitely if not permanently.” Carroll v. Carroll, 322 So. 2d 53, 57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. denied 341 So. 2d 771 (1977).
Considering the undisputed facts elicited at an evidentiary hearing below, we must conclude that Leon County is the last place where the intact marriage existed. Upon losing her prior job, Marianna Prots-man Crawford moved to and obtained an apartment in her name alone in Jacksonville in November of 1980. Her purpose in moving to Jacksonville was to manage and operate a new business owned by her and her husband. He remained in Tallahassee, where the couple had spent the previous eight years of their marriage. Their marital domicile, owned by the entireties, was also located in Tallahassee.
The record establishes that the husband frequently journeyed to Jacksonville.
However, his stays there were of a temporary and minimal sort, for the unrefuted testimony indicates that he only was there for weekends, more frequently when his wife was ill, less frequently when she was well. She, in turn, made journeys to Tallahassee for weekend visits. Most of the personal possessions garnered during the marital relationship remained in their Tallahassee home. Further, while the testimony indicates that the couple had several spats in Jacksonville, the wife agreed that the precipitating event for her seeking a divorce was an alleged assault in Tallahassee. Considering the totality of these factors, we think that Leon County is the appropriate choice for venue in this matter. It is the place where the husband continues to reside, where the property in litigation, for the most part, is located and where the parties were last present with a common intention to remain married. Incidentally, though not controlling on venue, since the wife agreed that the precipitating event for her seeking a divorce occurred in Tallahassee, it would also appear that Leon County is the place where the marriage is alleged to have become irretrievably broken.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand with instructions that the cause be transferred to the circuit court in and for Leon County, Florida.
MILLS and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
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Kahlifi McGEE v. McGEE, 145 So. 3d 955 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…f marriage action, the trial court is to look to the single county where ‘the intact marriage was last evidenced by a continuing union of partners who intended to remain and to remain married, indefinitely if not permanently.’” Crawford v. Crawford, 415 So. 2d 870, 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (citing Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla.1977)). But a court may transfer any civil action “to any other court of record in which it might have been brought” for the convenience of the parties or witnesses or the…
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Butler v. Butler, 866 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…2d 1287, 1290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Nevertheless, here, Wife’s reliance solely on her assertion in court that she intended to return to Broward in the future, taken alone, is not sufficient to overcome the contrary evidence. See Crawford v. Crawford, 415 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)(holding trial court is to look to where “the intact marriage was last evidenced by a continuing union of partners who intended to remain and to remain married”). We have considered Beggs v. Beggs, 570 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1…
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Beggs v. Beggs, 570 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…her education. In short, there appears to be nothing in the record suggesting that the parties intended to break their marriage away from Madison and establish it in Leon County within the intent and holding of Carroll. Compare Crawford v. Crawford, 415 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Accordingly, the trial court’s order denying the husband’s motion to abate and transfer for improper venue is reversed and the cause is remanded for the court to grant the motion and transfer the cause to Madison County, Florid…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bd. Pub. Instruction LaFayette Cnty. v. First Nat'l Bank of Gainesville, 111 Fla. 4 (Fla. 1932)
- Carroll v. Vernell Carroll, 322 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Vernell Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1977)