VERNELL CARROLL, PETITIONER,
v.
GLEN A. CARROLL, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court upheld a venue ruling in a dissolution of marriage case, holding that venue is proper in the county where the marriage last existed as an intact union, not where the alleged irretrievable breakdown occurred. The decision resolved a conflict between district courts on the proper venue standard for dissolution proceedings.
Venue in a dissolution proceeding is proper in the county where the marriage last existed as an intact union—that is, where both partners were last present with a common intention to remain married—not in the county where the alleged irretrievable breakdown occurred. The First District's decision was approved and the petition for writ of certiorari was denied.
[1] The cause of action for dissolution of marriage arises in the county where the marriage was last intact and both partners intended to remain married.
[2] A spouse's subjective recognition of an irretrievable marriage breakdown in a particular county does not, by itself, establish venue in that county.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To protect the beneficial purposes of both the marriage dissolution legislation and the venue statute, we are required to look, not for the county or the scattered counties where the breach may be said to have occurred, but to the single county where the marriage last existed.”
Establishes the core holding that venue is determined by where the marriage last existed intact, not where irretrievable breakdown occurred
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe petitioner and respondent married in Alabama in 1972 and returned to Florida, living in Holmes County for eight months. Petitioner moved to Okaloo…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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OVERTON, Chief Justice.
This is a petition for writ of certiorari seeking reversal of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal reported at 322 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). As acknowledged by the First District, that decision conflicts with Arnold v. Arnold, 273 So. 2d 405 (Fla.2d DCA 1973). We have jurisdiction.1
This case involves a dispute over venue in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. On April 8, 1972, respondent and petitioner travelled to Alabama to be united in marriage as husband and wife. They returned to Florida and lived in Holmes County for about eight months when petitioner left her husband and moved to Okaloosa County. She remained there for about a year but then rejoined her husband in Holmes County. This second and last attempt to cohabit as husband and wife endured no longer than the first, and petitioner returned to Okaloosa County in July of 1974.
According to petitioner, four days after she resumed residence in Okaloosa County she was visited by her husband who angrily demanded the keys to their automobile. Petitioner yielded, giving the keys to respondent. It was at this point, petitioner contends, that she realized their marriage was irretrievably broken and that she decided to seek its dissolution.
Three months later petitioner filed in Okaloosa County a petition for dissolution of their marriage. Respondent objected to petitioner’s choice of forum and filed a “plea of privilege,” which, as noted by the First District,
“ . . . was properly treated as a motion to dismiss for improper venue or to transfer. Rule 1.140 R.C.P.; Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McDaniel, 78 So. 2d 100 (Fla.1955).” 322 So. 2d at 54.
The trial judge denied respondent’s motion.
Respondent took an interlocutory appeal to the First District Court of Appeal, contending that venue was improper under Section 47.011, Florida Statutes.2 The issue before the First District was whether the cause of action in this dissolution proceeding arose in Okaloosa County because petitioner alleges that it was in that county their marriage became irretrievably broken. The First District answered in the negative, ruling as follows:
“To protect the beneficial purposes of both the marriage dissolution legislation and the venue statute, we are required to look, not for the county or the scattered counties where the breach may be said to have occurred, but to the single county where the marriage last existed. In that county the intact marriage was last evidenced by a continuing union of partners who intended ... to remain married, indefinitely if not permanently. Ordinarily the court will recognize that county naturally, as do the parties themselves, and the venue problem will be no more difficult than finding where the marriage partners called home. Courts have long asked that simple question when determining the domicile of succession. Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 81, 97-101, 154-59 (1857), reh. den. 7 Fla. 180. The harder cases inevitably arising in this day of atomic families and separate residence [Judd v. Schooley, 158 So. 2d 514 (Fla.1963)] will respond to a test like that employed to resolve domiciliary controversies in other contexts. See Wade v. Wade, 93 Fla. 1004, 113 So. 374 (1927), invoking the Roman doctrine, and Perez v. Perez, 164 So. 2d 561 (Fla.App.3rd, 1964). In what county were both partners last present with a common intention to remain married and in that place? There the marriage was broken, although recognition of the breach was postponed; there the cause of action for dissolution arose, within the meaning and application of § 47.011. ...” 322 So. 2d at 57.
We agree with the reasoning of the First District Court of Appeal and adopt it as our own. The decision of the First District is approved and the petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and ROBERTS (Retired), JJ., concur. . Art. V, §'3(b)(3), Fla. Const. . “Where actions may be begun. — Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. This section shall not apply to actions against nonresidents.” [Emphasis supplied.]
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (21 total)
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Crawford v. Marianna Protsman Crawford, 415 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…the single county where “the intact marriage was last evidenced by a continuing union of partners who intended to remain and to remain married, indefinitely if not permanently.” Carroll v. Carroll, 322 So. 2d 53, 57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. denied 341 So. 2d 771 (1977). Considering the undisputed facts elicited at an evidentiary hearing below, we must conclude that Leon County is the last place where the intact marriage existed. Upon losing her prior job, Marianna Prots-man Crawford moved to and obtained an…
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Smith v. Smith, 430 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…e a cause of action accrued in a marriage dissolution case, the trial court is required to look to the single county where the parties last lived with a common intent to remain married. Carroll v. Carroll, 322 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), affirmed 341 So. 2d 771 (Fla.1977). See also Hoskins v. Hoskins, 363 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Barr v. Barr, 343 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). In our opinion, Carroll is dispositive of the venue issue in this case. The husband stated in his affidavit that the parti…
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Storer v. Storer, 346 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1977)…2d 212 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975), the District Court held that the non-residence of the defendant precluded any possibility of a valid personal judgment in Wyoming which would be entitled to full faith and credit. [*996] This Court in Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So. 2d 771, opinion filed January 13, 1977, in discussing venue, approved a decision of the First District Court which held that venue should be in that county in which the marriage was last evidenced by a continuing union of partners who intended to remain ma…
Previewing 3 of 21 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Lottie McDANIEL, 78 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1955)
- Wade v. Wade, 93 Fla. 1004 (Fla. 1927)
- Smith and Armistead v. Croom, 7 Fla. 180 (Fla. 1857)
- Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 81 (Fla. 1857)
- Carroll v. Vernell Carroll, 322 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Kimi T. Judd v. Schooley, 158 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1963)
- Beach v. Farrior, 164 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- In re The Marriage of Hopie Arnold v. Arnold, 273 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)