THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES BARROWCLOUGH, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a suppression ruling in a Fourth Amendment case involving search and seizure. The court clarifies that homeowners and persons with legitimate possessory interests in premises have standing to challenge searches regardless of whether third-party consent might have been possible.
Yes. A person with a legally sufficient interest in a place, whether his own home or another location where he has permission, possession, or dominion and control, has Fourth Amendment standing to challenge an unreasonable search, regardless of whether third-party consent might have been theoretically available.
[1] A homeowner has a legitimate expectation of privacy in their home, and United States v. …
[2] A person can possess a legally sufficient interest in a place other than their own home, such as an apartment, to be protected by the Fourth Amendment from unreasonable g…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Jones not only had permission to use the apartment of his friend, but had a key to the apartment with which he admitted himself on the day of the search and kept possessions in the apartment. Except with respect to his friend, Jones had complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it.”
Establishes the circumstances under which a person has sufficient Fourth Amendment interest in premises where they do not own but have legitimate possessory rights.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe case involves a search of premises where the defendant had a possessory interest. The State argued that because a third party might have consented…
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. In this respect, we disapprove of the statement in Coster v. State, 392 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), that “even though there was evidence that [Coster] owned the house” and occupied the house searched, he was required by United States v. Salvucci, 4-48 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980), to otherwise establish an expectation of privacy in the premises. As Judge Schwartz’s dissenting opinion in Coster notes, Salvucci has not the slightest thing to do with a homeowner’s expectation of privacy.
. As the Supreme Court noted in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), Jones not only had permission to use the apartment of his friend, but had a key to the apartment with which he admitted himself on the day of the search and kept possessions in the apartment. Except with respect to his friend, Jones had complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it.
“Jones on its facts merely stands for the unremarkable proposition that a person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place.” Id. at 141^2, 99 S.Ct. at 429-30.
This aspect of Jones v. United States is totally unaffected by the overruling in Salvucci of Jones’ separate automatic standing rule.
. As one commentator has noted, the very contention made by the State here would produce “the bizarre result that if the facts would support a third party consent, then, even when no such consent has been given at all ..., the defendant lacks standing to object to a Fourth Amendment violation into the privacy of his personal effects.” 3 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.3(f) (1978 & Supp.1980).
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Citator
Cited By
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State v. Leavitt, 427 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…g of the statement in Coster that “even though there was evidence that [Coster] owned the house” and occupied the house searched he was required by Salvucci to otherwise establish an expectation of privacy in the premises. See State v. Barrow-dough, 416 So. 2d 47. 47 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).…
Authorities Cited (13 total)
- Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (U.S. 1960)
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (U.S. 1978)
- Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (U.S. 1969)
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (U.S. 1968)
- United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1980)
- Mancusi v. DeFORTE, 392 U.S. 364 (U.S. 1968)
- Norman v. State, 379 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1980)
- United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 450 U.S. 994 (U.S. 1981)
- Louisiana v. Gary W., 450 U.S. 994 (U.S. 1981)
- United States v. Gomez, 633 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980)