THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT DANIEL LEAVITT AND HECTOR ORTEGA, APPELLEES
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The State appealed a trial court order granting defendants' motions to suppress evidence obtained from a residence used for drug distribution. The court affirmed the suppression as to Ortega, who had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his own residence, but reversed as to Leavitt, holding that mere possession of contraband and participation in a distribution scheme does not establish Fourth Amendment standing without additional evidence of a privacy expectation in the premises.
The court held that acknowledgment of possessory interest in contraband coupled with admitted participation in a distribution scheme, absent other factors demonstrating an expectation of privacy in the premises, does not constitute standing to litigate Fourth Amendment rights. Ortega, as the residence owner, retained standing to suppress the evidence.
[1] An acknowledgment of a possessory interest in contraband coupled with admitted participation in a scheme to distribute it, absent other factors, does not constitute stand…
[2] Possession of contraband and participation in a distribution scheme do not, in themselves, establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in a residence for Fourth Amendme…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an acknowledgment of a possessory interest in contraband coupled with an admitted participation in a scheme to distribute it, absent other factors, does not constitute standing to litigate fourth amendment rights”
Establishes the core holding that mere possession of contraband is insufficient for Fourth Amendment standing without evidence of privacy expectation in the premises
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice searched a residence owned by Hector Ortega that served as a base for a Quaalude distribution operation. Leavitt was involved in the distributi…
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JORGENSON, Judge.
The State appeals from a trial court order granting the defendants’ motions to suppress. For the reasons which follow we affirm in part and reverse in part.
We find no error in the trial court’s granting defendant Hector Ortega’s motion to suppress. See State v. Ramos, 405 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
We take a different view with respect to the defendant Robert Leavitt, who the trial court found had standing to raise a fourth amendment violation.
Leavitt acknowledged that he was part of the ongoing Quaalude distribution operation which had as its base the residence owned by Ortega. Leavitt further testified at the motion to suppress that he had a possessory interest in the contraband Quaa-ludes found secreted in the closets and garage of the residence. Other than an acknowledgment of his participation in the scheme to distribute the Quaaludes and his joint possessory interest in the contraband, Leavitt furnished no evidence that he had an expectation of privacy in the residence. He had no key to the residence, stored no personal possessions at the residence other than the contraband in question, established no ability to control the ingress and egress of others, nor did he have the ability to come onto the property at any time that he wished. If we have not made it sufficiently clear before, we hold today that an acknowledgment of a possessory interest in contraband coupled with an admitted participation in a scheme to distribute it, absent other factors, does not constitute standing to litigate fourth amendment rights. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Norman v. State, 379 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1980); see also Coster v. State, 392 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (Schwartz, J., dissenting on other grounds).1
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the trial court’s order granting defendant Ortega’s motion to suppress, reverse with respect to the defendant Leavitt and remand for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
. We join Judge Daniel Pearson and Judge Schwartz in disapproving of the statement in Coster that “even though there was evidence that [Coster] owned the house” and occupied the house searched he was required by Salvucci to otherwise establish an expectation of privacy in the premises. See State v. Barrow-dough, 416 So. 2d 47. 47 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
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Citator
Cited By
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Ysidro Y. DeLaPAZ v. State, 453 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…e he stored personal belongings. Such evidence sufficiently demonstrated his privacy interest in the Brown home for purposes of establishing standing to challenge the warrant. See Walker v. State, 433 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); State v. Leavitt, 427 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). We do not think a different result is required by the fact that DeLaPaz stayed at the Brown home only one to three days a week and lived with siblings on other days during the time period in question. See Walker, supra; Shade v.…
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Noel v. State, 526 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…only possessory interest in the victim’s apartment was his storage there of a change of clothing. This interest is insufficient to establish the required reasonable expectation of privacy necessary to challenge the search. Compare State v. Leavitt, 427 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (pos-sessory interest in contraband insufficient to establish standing to contest search where defendant did not store any personal possessions at residence, did not have key to residence, and did not have ability to control ingre…
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State v. Jules Spencer and Willie Ruff, 432 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…erred, however, when it granted Spencer’s motion to suppress. [*720] See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). See also State v. Leavitt, 427 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (acknowledgment of a possessory interest in contraband, absent other factors, does not constitute standing to litigate fourth amendment rights). Spencer has not demonstrated below or here how his fourth amendment interests were vi…
Authorities Cited
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (U.S. 1978)
- United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1980)
- Norman v. State, 379 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1980)
- Coster v. State, 392 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- State v. Ramos, 405 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- State v. Barrowclough, 416 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)