CATHERINE JOHNSON, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE ARTHUR I. SNYDER, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, RESPONDENT
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The Florida District Court of Appeal held that an indigent criminal defendant who has been declared insolvent is entitled to have reasonable discovery costs paid by the county, even if private counsel has been retained by family members rather than the public defender. The court rejected the trial court's condition that the defendant must accept public defender services to receive discovery cost assistance.
An insolvent defendant is entitled to have reasonable discovery costs paid by the county regardless of whether private counsel or the public defender represents her. The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in conditioning discovery cost assistance on the defendant's acceptance of public defender services.
[1] A defendant adjudged insolvent is entitled to reasonable discovery costs, even if family members have retained private counsel.
[2] The definition of "indigent" includes the inability to pay for costs of investigation without substantial hardship.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“"Indigent" as used herein shall mean a person who is unable to pay for the services of an attorney, including costs of investigation, without substantial hardship to himself or his family”
Establishes the statutory definition of indigency that encompasses investigation costs, the basis for defendant's entitlement to discovery cost assistance
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCatherine Johnson was charged with first-degree murder. During the pendency of proceedings, the trial court declared her insolvent, finding she met th…
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BASKIN, Judge.
During the pendency of proceedings on charges of first-degree murder, the trial court declared defendant Catherine Johnson insolvent. The court ruled that, although she met the criteria for appointment of the public defender, defendant Johnson was not entitled to discovery costs because her family had obtained private counsel to represent her. Defendant Johnson filed a petition for writ of mandamus or common law certiorari asking this court to review the trial court’s ruling.
Treating her petition as one seeking a writ of certiorari, Robbins v. Pfeiffer, 407 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Robinson v. Gale, 380 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); see Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(c), we hold that the trial court departed from essential requirements of law. We therefore grant the writ.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(b)(4) states:
“Indigent” as used herein shall mean a person who is unable to pay for the services of an attorney, including costs of investigation, without substantial hardship to himself or his family; “partially indigent” as used herein shall mean a person unable to pay more than a portion of the fee charged by an attorney, including costs of investigation, without substantial hardship to himself or his family, (emphasis added).
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(k) provides:
Costs of Indigents. After a defendant is adjudged insolvent, the reasonable costs incurred in the operation of these rules shall be taxed as costs against the county. Rules of procedure and related cases contradict respondent’s contention that an insolvent defendant must accept the services of the public defender in order to obtain reasonable costs for discovery. Similar questions have been decided adversely to respondent’s assertions. For example, appellate costs have been provided for insolvent defendants regardless of the fact that friends or relatives have paid related costs, United States ex rel. Reis v. Leppig, 256 F.Supp. 881 (1966), aff’d sub nom. Buchanan v. United States ex rel. Reis, 379 F. 2d 612 (5th Cir. 1967); Rastralli v. State, 76 So. 2d 270 (Fla.1954); Lawrence v. State, 76 So. 2d 271 (Fla.1954); or that a defendant has no remaining funds, Arline v. State, 277 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); see also Baker v. State, 42 So. 2d 768 (Fla.1949).
Respondent’s contentions have been rejected in other jurisdictions as well: e.g., People v. Worthy, 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 167 Cal.Rptr. 402 (1980) (experts); Anderson v. Justice Court of San Benito County, 99 Cal.App.3d 398,160 Cal.Rptr. 274 (1979) (investigators and experts); Puett v. Superior Court, 96 Cal.App.3d 936, 158 Cal.Rptr. 266 (1979) (necessary investigative services); English v. Missildine, 311 N.W. 2d 292 (Iowa 1981) (investigative services); see also Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 Minn.L. Rev. 1054 (1963). Defendant Johnson’s needs fall within the clear provisions of the rules and case law requiring the trial court to allow reasonable discovery costs. For these reasons, we quash the order and remand the cause for a determination as to the amount of reasonable discovery costs to be granted to defendant Johnson.
Writ granted; order quashed; remanded with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Behr v. Gardner, 442 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…Rules of Criminal Procedure which would prevent such a practice. We note that a better solution to the problem presented by this fact situation might be for privately retained counsel to secure discovery costs from the county. See Johnson v. Snyder, 417 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Saintil v. Snyder, 417 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); and Price v. Mounts, 421 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Nonetheless, since the action of the trial court falls within the applicable statutes and rules, we cannot say that th…
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Price v. The Honorable Marvin U. Mounts, Jr., 421 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…s of this petition is influenced by the recent ruling of the Third District holding that an insolvent defendant is not required to accept the services of a public defender as a prerequisite to obtaining reasonable discovery costs. Johnson v. Snyder, 417 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, sections 3.111(b)(4) and 3.220(k) make the state’s payment of the costs of discovery contingent only on defendant’s indigency; that is, the inability to pay these costs without substantial…
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GUY v. State, 473 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…efendant does not deprive him of his right to be declared indigent in order that costs may be taxed against the county under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(K). See Price v. Mounts, 421 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), and Johnson v. Snyder, 417 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The trial court should rule on petitioner’s motion to be declared partially indigent based upon his own financial ability to pay. Petition for writ of certiorari GRANTED. DANAHY and LEHAN, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Robbins v. The Honorable Frederick Pfeiffer, 407 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Nilza Kallos, M.D. v. Blouin, 380 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- City of Bartow v. Fla. Rd. Pub. Utils. Comm., 42 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1949)
- Buchanan v. United States ex rel. Lillian Reis, 379 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1967)
- Rastralli v. State, 76 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1954)
- Lawrence v. State, 76 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1954)
- Arline v. State, 277 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)