CHARLES EDGAR LONG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the information charging the defendant under the RICO Act was insufficient, even with a bill of particulars, because it failed to specify the underlying crimes.
The defendant was convicted of racketeering under Florida's RICO Act. The state's information was identical to those previously held insufficient in o…
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SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge.
In this appeal defendant, Charles E. Long, challenges his convictions for trafficking in cocaine, delivery of methaqualone, racketeering, and three counts of conspiracy to traffic in cannabis. We have examined each of defendant’s contentions and find merit only to his challenge to his conviction for racketeering.
Defendant was charged with violating Florida’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization [RICO] Act, section 943.462, Florida Statutes (1979). The state’s information charging him with the offense is the same information we held insufficient in Beatty v. State, 418 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), and Bowers v. State, 418 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). The state argues that the instant case is not controlled by Beatty and Bowers because here a bill of particulars was incorporated into the information, thereby effectively curing the insufficiency noted in those recent decisions.
We do not reach this argument. Even if a bill of particulars could amend the information, the bill of particulars here would not cure the problem addressed in Beatty as it failed to designate which of the myriad crimes proscribed by chapter 893 the defendant was charged with conspiring to commit. See Beatty. Therefore, Beatty is controlling and the trial court’s judgment of guilt under the RICO statute must be reversed.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of convictions and sentences in case nos. 79-706CF-B, 79-765CF, 79-802CF-Q, 79-803CF-M, and 79-804CF-J, but we vacate the conviction and sentence in case no. 79-799CF-L, and remand for further proceedings in the event the state wishes to renew prosecution.
CAMPBELL and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Monroe Butler v. State, 456 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…ficient in Gillen v. State, 421 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Whitehead v. State, 421 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Beatty v. State, 418 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Bowers v. State, 418 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2d [*546] DCA 1982); and Long v. State, 418 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). We have carefully considered appellant’s remaining points and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s convictions for conspiracy but reverse the judgment of guilt under the RICO statute and remand th…
Authorities Cited
- Beatty v. State, 418 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Bowers v. State, 418 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)