WILLIAM ARTHUR BEATTY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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William Beatty was charged with conspiracy to traffic in cannabis and RICO violations. He pleaded nolo contendere to both charges and was sentenced to concurrent eight-year prison terms. On appeal, the court found the RICO information legally insufficient for failing to specify which crimes under Florida's drug abuse statute were the predicate offenses.
The court held the RICO information was legally insufficient because it failed to designate which of the myriad crimes proscribed by chapter 893 the appellant conspired to commit. The accused must be apprised of what to defend against, and while predicate offenses underlying a RICO charge need not be alleged with the same particularity as if separately charged, they must be specified with sufficient particularity to inform the defendant.
[1] A criminal information must provide sufficient detail to apprise the defendant of the specific acts constituting the alleged offense, especially when charging conspiracy.
[2] An information that merely tracks statutory language may be insufficient if it remains vague or misleading to the defendant in preparing a defense.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“At the very least, the state should have designated which of the myriad of crimes proscribed by chapter 893 the appellant conspired to commit.”
Establishes the court's holding that the RICO information must specify which particular drug crimes under chapter 893 were the predicate offenses
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBeatty was charged in separate informations with conspiracy to traffic in cannabis and RICO violations. The alleged conduct occurred between June 16, …
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PER CURIAM.
The state charged appellant in separate informations with conspiracy to traffic in cannabis and violation of the RICO statute. Following pretrial proceedings, appellant pled nolo contendere to both informations, reserving the right to appeal the denial of certain motions. The court sentenced him to concurrent eight year prison terms.
The only point on appeal which merits discussion relates to appellant’s challenge of the sufficiency of the RICO information. This information alleged that various persons, including appellant,
At divers times between June 16, 1979, and August 1, 1979, and on a continuing basis, in Lee County, Florida, knowingly, willfully, feloniously, intentionally, and unlawfully, was employed by, or associated with, an enterprise as defined by F.S. 943.461, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in derogation of F.S. 943.462(3), and during said period of June 16, 1979-August 1, 1979, in Lee County, Florida, did engage in at least two incidents of racketeering conduct; to-wit: Conspiracies to Commit Violations of F.S. Ch. 893, relating to drug abuse prevention and control, the said conspiracies having the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise being interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and not being isolated incidents, and having occurred after the effective date of Sections 943.46 — 943.464, F.S., and the last of which such incidents having occurred within 5 years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct.
We agree with the appellant that the information was legally insufficient.
In order to be convicted for violation of the RICO statute, the defendant must have engaged in at least two incidents of racketeering activity. Dean v. State, 414 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Under section 943.461, Florida Statutes (1979), racketeering activity includes conspiring to commit a crime chargeable under enumerated provisions of the criminal law, one of which is “chapter 893, relating to drug abuse prevention and control.” The state attempted to allege the two predicate offenses only by tracking this statutory language.
An information charging a crime in the language of a statute may suffice if the statutory language adequately states the allegedly criminal acts. State v. Dilworth, 397 So. 2d 292 (Fla.1981). Yet, when the information remains vague or calculated to mislead the defendant in the preparation of his defense, it must be supplemented by appropriate allegations of the particular acts deemed to constitute the offense. State v. Covington, 392 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 1981). Informations which charge conspiracy are subject to special scrutiny. Goldberg v. State, 351 So. 2d 332 (Fla.1977). While it may be unnecessary to allege the predicate offenses underlying a RICO charge with the same particularity as if they were separately charged, the accused must be apprised of what to defend against. Here, at the very least, the state should have designated which of the myriad of crimes proscribed by chapter 893 the appellant conspired to commit.
The state’s contention that the information conforms to the standards set forth in State v. Whiddon, 384 So. 2d 1269 (Fla.1980), is not well founded. A careful reading of that case indicates that the court only concluded that the allegation of a RICO “enterprise” could be properly couched in the statutory language. The court did not pass on the sufficiency of the allegations of the predicate offenses. If there is any doubt about this, reference to United States v. Elliott, 571 F. 2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), cited by the supreme court as involving a similar indictment, reflects that the predicate charges were alleged with particularity.
We affirm the appellant’s conviction for conspiracy but reverse the judgment of guilt under the RICO statute and remand that case for further proceedings in the event the state wishes to renew prosecution.
GRIMES, A.C.J., and OTT and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.
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Cited By
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Bowers v. State, 418 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…PER CURIAM. These are companion cases to Beatty v. State, 418 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). As in Beatty, we affirm the appellant’s conviction for conspiracy but reverse the judgment of guilt under the RICO statute and remand that case for further proceedings. GRIMES, A. C. J., and OTT and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.…
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Long v. State, 421 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…ht to appeal the denial of several motions. Appellants Whitehead and Gillen argue that their RICO convictions must be reversed because the state’s information against them was identical to the one we deemed legally insufficient in Beatty v. State, 418 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). The state argues under the rationale of Dean v. State, 414 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), that the stipulation of a factual basis in connection with the entry of their pleas of nolo contendere cured the deficiencies in the infor…
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Long v. State, 418 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…arged with violating Florida’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization [RICO] Act, section 943.462, Florida Statutes (1979). The state’s information charging him with the offense is the same information we held insufficient in Beatty v. State, 418 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), and Bowers v. State, 418 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). The state argues that the instant case is not controlled by Beatty and Bowers because here a bill of particulars was incorporated into the information, thereby effectively c…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978)
- State v. Dilworth, 397 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1981)
- Mrs. Stanley (Joyce) Goldberg v. State, 351 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1977)
- State v. DeCarr D. Covington and Arthur Rodriguez, 392 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 1981)
- THE Florida BAR v. Byron, 384 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1980)
- Dean v. State, 414 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)