BRUCE ALLEN DAVIDSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A probationer challenged the revocation of his probation for failing to complete a required Teen Challenge Program after his termination was authorized by the program supervisor and probation officer. The appellate court reversed the revocation, holding that a probation violation must be willful and the probationer responsible, and that Davidson reasonably believed his departure was approved.
A probation violation must be willful and substantial, and the probationer must be responsible for the violation. The trial court's revocation of Davidson's probation was reversed because Davidson reasonably believed his departure from the program was authorized, and there was no evidence of willful intent to violate his probation conditions.
[1] A violation of probation must be willful and substantial to trigger revocation.
[2] A probationer must be responsible for their failure to continue a program that is a condition of probation before probation may be revoked.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The violation triggering a revocation of probation must be willful and substantial.”
Establishes the legal standard that probation violations must meet before revocation is appropriate.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavidson pleaded guilty to uttering a forged instrument and was placed on probation for three years with a condition to successfully complete the Teen…
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CLARKE, THOMAS L., Jr., Associate Judge.
After pleading guilty to uttering a forged instrument, Bruce A. Davidson was placed on probation for three years. As a condition of probation the court ordered him to successfully complete the Teen Challenge Program. After being enrolled in the program for several months, Davidson was suspended for thirty days for leaving the premises where the program was located. After his suspension ended he returned, and the program supervisor asked him whether he wanted to be there or not. Davidson advised that he did not want to be there, whereupon on October 2, 1981, the program supervisor, with the approval of Davidson’s probation officer, told him to go home. A travel permit was issued by the probation officer permitting Davidson to go to Georgia to live with his parents. He thereafter obtained employment and maintained contact with his probation officer as required. Upon making a required call to his probation officer on October 16, 1981, Davidson was advised that the sentencing judge had directed that a violation of probation charge be filed due to Davidson’s failure to successfully complete the Teen Challenge Program. A warrant charging the violation was executed on October 26, 1981, and a hearing followed on November 2, 1981.
At the hearing it was clearly established that Davidson had not completed the program; however, Davidson himself offered the only direct testimony concerning his termination. The trial judge found David son guilty of violating the condition of his probation regarding the Teen Challenge Program, revoked his probation, and sentenced him (pursuant to the Youthful Offender Act) to four years in prison followed by one year on probation.
Davidson contends that since his termination was with the consent and approval of the program supervisor and his probation officer, it did not constitute a violation of probation. He notes that he continued to comply with the other conditions of his probation (reporting, restitution, etc.). The record reflects that it was on October 16, 1981, when Davidson first realized that his termination of the program might result in a violation of probation charge.
The violation triggering a revocation of probation must be willful and substantial. Shaw v. State, 391 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Chatman v. State, 365 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
Before one’s probation may be revoked for failure to continue a program which is a condition thereof, the probationer must be in some way responsible for his failure. Curry v. State, 379 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
While it could arguably be said that Davidson was responsible for his failure to complete the program by advising the supervisor that he did not want to be there, it must be recognized that a probationer’s desires may often be inconsistent with his willingness to comply with a condition of his probation. Davidson testified at the hearing on November 2, 1981, that he honestly did not want to be in the program; he preferred being at home, employed, and restructuring his life. That may have also been his desire before he entered the program, but he entered it anyway. He appeared to be available and willing to continue the program when asked about his desire. After expressing his desire he was released. It appears reasonable for Davidson to have assumed that being given an opportunity to express his desire and being provided with a permit to go home and there being no suggestion he was jeopardizing his probation, that he left the program with the approval of those in authority. There was no testimony reflecting a willful intention by Davidson to contravene the conditions of his probation. Such must be shown before a revocation is in order. The decision of the trial court revoking Davidson’s probation is reversed, and the cause is remanded for reinstatement of the order placing him on probation.
GRIMES, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Savage v. State, 120 So. 3d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…lly and substantially violated probation. Del Valle v. State, 80 So. 3d 999, 1012 (Fla.2011) (citing State v. Garter, 835 So. 2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002)); see also McCumber v. State, 682 So. 2d 1214, 1215-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (citing Davidson v. State, 419 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)); Hanania v. State, 855 So. 2d 92, 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (using term “preponderance” of the evidence) (citing Stevens v. State, 823 So. 2d 319, 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)); Hightower v. State, 529 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (c…
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Drayton v. State, 490 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…te prison. This appeal timely followed. Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the revocation of his probation. We agree. The violation triggering a revocation of probation must be willful and substantial. Davidson v. State, 419 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). The probation officer testified that appellant violated condition (1) by failing to report to the probation office and submit his monthly report. In order to be timely, the report had to be submitted by the fifth day of January.…
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Molina v. State, 520 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…Helton, 313 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). We have previously held that any violation triggering a revocation of probation must be willful, and that the greater weight of the evidence must show that the violation is substantial. Davidson v. State, 419 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). This court has refused to find technical violations sufficient to justify revocation. When the revocation is based on failure to complete a program, we have required a showing…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Chatman v. State, 365 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Shaw v. State, 391 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Curry v. State, 379 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Robbins v. Blackstone Valley Nat'l Bank, 379 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)