DAVID SCOTT, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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David Scott appeals his November 1979 conviction and sentence, which the trial court imposed after vacating and aggravating an earlier August 1979 sentence. The court reverses, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the completed August 1979 sentence and impose a harsher sentence based on alleged violation of plea conditions, as this violated double jeopardy protections.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate and aggravate the August 2, 1979 sentence. A final judgment of conviction and sentence is complete in itself and legally incapable of being subject to a condition subsequent; therefore, it cannot be later vacated for alleged failure to perform a future act in compliance with a plea agreement, as this violates double jeopardy rights.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to vacate and aggravate a previously imposed and complete judgment of conviction and sentence.
[2] Vacating and aggravating a previously imposed sentence constitutes a violation of a defendant's double jeopardy rights.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The August 2,1979 judgment of conviction and sentence was complete in itself and was legally incapable of being subject to a condition subsequent; it could not, therefore, be later vacated for an alleged failure to perform a future act in compliance with a plea negotiation agreement.”
Establishes the core holding that a final sentence cannot be made conditional and later vacated based on future non-compliance with plea conditions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceScott received a judgment of conviction and sentence on August 2, 1979, with the sentence stayed until a specified date. When Scott failed to appear o…
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PER CURIAM.
By this belated appeal, see Baggett v. Wainwright, 229 So. 2d 239 (Fla.1969), we are asked to review a final judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court dated November 5, 1979. We reverse on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter this judgment of conviction and sentence.
Our review of the record reveals that a prior judgment of conviction and sentence dated August 2, 1979 was imposed in this cause, which sentence was later orally vacated by the trial court and the present judgment and sentence entered. The latter sentence under review considerably aggravates the prior vacated sentence ostensibly on the basis that the defendant David Scott violated a plea negotiation condition by failing to appear in court on a certain date to begin serving his August 2, 1979 sentence which had been expressly stayed until that date. Without determining whether the defendant’s asserted violation of that plea condition was involuntary because his subsequent arrest on a non-support charge in another county made it impossible for him to appear in court as scheduled, we think it plain that the court had no jurisdiction, in any event, to vacate and aggravate the previously imposed August 2, 1979 sentence because to do so constituted a violation of the defendant’s double jeopardy rights. Troupe v. Rowe, 283 So. 2d 857 (Fla.1973); Gonzalez v. State, 384 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Flowers v. State, 351 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); see also Royal v. State, 389 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
The August 2,1979 judgment of conviction and sentence was complete in itself and was legally incapable of being subject to a condition subsequent; it could not, therefore, be later vacated for an alleged failure to perform a future act in compliance with a plea negotiation agreement. See e.g., Buckbee v. State, 378 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1118 (Fla.1980).
The judgment of conviction and sentence under review is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate the August 2,1979 judgment of conviction and sentence previously entered in this cause.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Gregorio Rodriguez v. State, 441 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…ying a sentence); Buckbee v. State, 378 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1118 (Fla.1980) (the court is without jurisdiction during a period of probation to modify the otherwise valid probation to add jail time); Scott v. State, 419 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (court had no jurisdiction to vacate and aggravate its previously imposed sentence on the basis of defendant’s subsequent violation of the condition of his plea agreement). Subject matter jurisdiction and double jeopardy are two d…1 / 2
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Clark v. State, 620 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…sically unable to surrender through no fault of his own. Defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief sets forth no such circumstances. The order denying post-conviction relief is therefore AFFIRMED.* * Defendant’s reliance on Scott v. State, 419 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), receded from, Rodriguez v. State, 441 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (en banc), review denied, 451 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1984), is misplaced. Defendant’s sentence is not like that imposed in Scott, and even if it were, Scott was reced…
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Pittman v. State, 478 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…he was subsequently apprehended, the agreed-to sentence was vacated and the maximum sentence imposed in an informal proceeding where defendant was not represented by counsel. We agree with appellant that this case is controlled by Scott v. State, 419 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) where we held, on similar facts, that enhancement of a negotiated sentence for failure to perform according to a condition subsequent constituted a double jeopardy violation.1 The policy reasons advanced by the State for affirming…
Authorities Cited
- Baggett v. Louie L. Wainwright, 229 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1969)
- Flazell Troupe v. The Honorable Ellen Morphonios Rowe & the Honorable Paul Baker, 283 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1973)
- Knoblock v. Paree W. Knoblock, 351 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Royal v. State, 389 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Fuse v. State, 384 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Buckbee v. State, 378 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)