MARVIN DEWITT PURVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1982-10-13
No. 81-1255
DAUKSCH and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr. JJ., concur.
420 So. 2d 389 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1982) Positive Treatment
Cited by 25 cases

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Synopsis

Marvin Purvis appeals the revocation of his probation on double jeopardy grounds after his initial revocation was reversed for reliance on hearsay evidence. The court affirms the revocation order, holding that double jeopardy protections do not prevent retrial when a revocation is reversed for evidentiary defects rather than insufficient evidence.


Holding

A reversal of a probation revocation hearing for reliance on hearsay evidence does not create constitutional double jeopardy problems. The rule prohibiting retrial after reversal for insufficiency of evidence does not apply when a revocation is reversed for evidentiary defects rather than insufficient evidence.


Headnotes

[1] A probation revocation hearing is an informal proceeding where the rules of evidence are relaxed, and hearsay evidence may be admitted and considered.

[2] A probation revocation order may not be based solely on hearsay evidence.

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Key Quotes

“A reversal of a probation revocation hearing because only hearsay evidence has been presented does not present constitutional double jeopardy problems.”

Establishes the core holding that hearsay-based reversals do not trigger double jeopardy protections.

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant's probation revocation was originally reversed on appeal because the trial court had relied solely on hearsay evidence. Upon remand, the tri…

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Opinion of the Court
ORFINGER, Chief Judge.

ORFINGER, Chief Judge.

Appellant appeals from an order revoking his probation, contending that double jeopardy principles apply. We affirm.

On a previous appeal, we reversed an order revoking appellant’s conviction because only hearsay evidence had been introduced at the revocation hearing.1 Upon remand, appellant moved to dismiss the proceedings on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied the motion, conducted another hearing, and revoked appellant’s probation. He now contends that the charges should have been dismissed because “the defendant’s prior revocation of probation had been reversed on appeal for insufficiency of evidence and thus the second hearing subjected the defendant to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution.”

A reversal of a probation revocation hearing because only hearsay evidence has been presented does not present constitutional double jeopardy problems. A probation revocation hearing is informal and not like a regular trial; its purpose is to satisfy the conscience of the court as to whether a violation of probation has occurred. Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607 (1947). Thus, the rules of evidence are relaxed and hearsay evidence may be ad mitted and considered by the court. The only limitation imposed with reference to hearsay evidence is that it may not be the only type of evidence upon which the revocation order is based. Purvis v. State, supra.

Here, the reversal was not for insufficient evidence. There was sufficient admissible evidence, albeit hearsay, to sustain the revocation. We reversed because we applied the principle invoked by the other district courts that a revocation should not be based solely on hearsay. Thus, even if double jeopardy principles apply in probation revocation proceedings, a point we expressly do not decide here,2 the rule of law which prohibits retrial when a conviction is reversed for insufficiency of evidence (as opposed to the weight of the evidence) is not applicable here. See Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla.1981); aff’d Tibbs v. Florida, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982).

We find appellant’s remaining points to be without merit.

The order revoking appellant’s probation is AFFIRMED.

DAUKSCH and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr. JJ., concur. . Puvis v. State, 397 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

. While not expressly deciding the issue on double jeopardy grounds, all the other district courts have directly or impliedly held that another probation revocation proceeding may be held when a revocation order based only on hearsay testimony has been reversed. Reeves v. State, 366 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Robbins v. State, 318 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); White v. State, 301 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Hampton v. State, 276 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).


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Citator

Cited By (16 total)

  • Thomas v. State, 711 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
    …remand for the written order. Mitchell v. State, 681 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). STONE, C.J., and GROSS, J„ concur. . Durden v. State, 577 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Vezina v. State, 644 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Purvis v. State, 420 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).…
  • Brown v. State, 429 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
    …n officer regarding Brown’s employment situation. Evidence which would justify revocation of probation need only be evidence sufficient to satisfy the conscience of the court as to whether a condition of probation had been violated. Purvis v. State, 420 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); White v. State, 301 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607 (Fla.1947). The trial court could, therefore, have also recited the violation of condition 7 as support for the revocation of probat…
  • Corona v. State, 642 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
    …ter a drug treatment program where the only evidence presented at the revocation hearing was hearsay. We disagree. [*668] The record reveals that the state presented an acceptable combination of hearsay and non-hearsay evidence. See Purvis v. State, 420 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (hearsay evidence may be considered in probation revocation hearing as long as not only evidence upon which revocation is based). The probation officer stated that the defendant had failed to report to the drug treatment program…

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