JAMES SAWYER, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Sawyer, a juvenile transferred to adult court, was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence. The appellate court affirmed his convictions but vacated his sentence because the trial court failed to comply with mandatory juvenile sentencing procedures under Florida Statutes Section 39.111(6).
The trial court failed to comply with Section 39.111(6)'s mandatory sentencing procedures by not including specific reference to the six criteria dealing with the suitability of adult sanctions, requiring resentencing. However, the trial court properly imposed separate consecutive sentences under Section 775.021(4) because appellant was charged with two distinct offenses where the same conduct violated two separate statutes and one was not a lesser included offense of the other.
[1] A trial court must comply with mandatory juvenile sentencing procedures when jurisdiction of a juvenile defendant has been transferred to the Criminal Division of the Cir…
[2] Failure to include specific reference to the statutory criteria for suitability of adult sanctions requires resentencing of a juvenile defendant.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes (1979) prescribes the mandatory sentencing procedures to be followed by the trial court when jurisdiction of a juvenile defendant has been transferred from Juvenile Court to the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court.”
Establishes the legal requirement that trial courts must follow specific mandatory procedures when sentencing transferred juveniles.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant, a juvenile, was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer with violence to the person of a law enforcement of…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, a juvenile, was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer with violence to the person of a law enforcement officer, and battery. He asserts five points of error, only one of which, the trial court’s failure to comply with the juvenile sentencing procedures of Section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes (1979), has merit.
Section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes (1979) prescribes the mandatory sentencing procedures to be followed by the trial court when jurisdiction of a juvenile defendant has been transferred from Juvenile Court to the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court. See Leach v. State, 407 So. 2d 1066 (Fla.2d DCA 1981); Johnson v. State, 371 So. 2d 556 (Fla.2d DCA 1979). The trial court, in sentencing appellant, failed to include specific reference to the six criteria contained in the statute (which deal with the suitability of adult sanctions), thus requiring that appellant be resentenced. See Proctor v. State, 373 So. 2d 450 (Fla.2d DCA 1979).
We comment briefly on another of appellant’s points, i.e., that the trial court erred in sentencing him separately on two of the convictions. Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1981) permits separate sentences where the same conduct constitutes a violation of two or more statutes, except where one is a lesser included offense of the other. See Carpenter v. State, 394 So. 2d 144 (Fla.2d DCA 1981). In this ease appellant was charged with two separate offenses; to wit, battery of a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence to his person. The record reveals that appellant pushed the police officer, resulting in the officer’s placing him under arrest for battery of a police officer. When the officer then attempted to effectuate the arrest, appellant picked up the officer and threw him against the hood of a car, which conduct produced the second charge of resisting an officer with violence to his person. Thus, the trial court, following Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1979), separately sentenced Sawyer to five years in the State Penitentiary for each of the two counts, to run consecutively. See Borges v. State, 394 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
In accordance with the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, but the sentence is vacated and this cause re manded for resentencing pursuant to Section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes (1979).
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State v. Learnhart Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984)…acknowledged conflict with the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decisions in Burley v. State, 402 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), and Dunman v. State, 400 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The district court’s decision is supported by Sawyer v. State, 421 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Leach v. State, 407 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Batch v. State, 405 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Proctor v. State, 373 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); and Johnson v. State, 371 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The state cont…
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Pimentel v. State, 442 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…s and reasons. The trial court systematically considered each criterion and analyzed it in light of the facts of this case to reach its conclusion that the defendant should be sentenced as an adult. . We would also add to that list Sawyer v. State, 421 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) and Bunch v. State, 399 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). . Even if this distinction did not exist, we would reach today’s conclusion based on the supreme court opinion in Thompson v. State, supra.…
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Cooper v. State, 465 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…on the circumstances. See, e.g., Dixon v. State, 451 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Thus, recognizing appellant’s right to appeal, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing pursuant to section 39.-111(6), Florida Statutes. Sawyer v. State, 421 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). REVERSED AND REMANDED. LETTS and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Johnson v. State, 371 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Borges v. State, 394 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Proctor v. State, 373 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Carpenter v. State, 394 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Richmond Willie Green, Jr. v. State, 407 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Leach v. State, 407 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)