LUCILLE WEASEL, APPELLANT,
v.
GEORGE E. WEASEL, JR., APPELLEE
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Appellant Lucille Weasel appealed the trial court's denial of her request for temporary alimony, suit money, and attorney's fees in this divorce case. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding that the trial judge improperly denied her a full hearing and failed to apply the correct legal standard for determining temporary alimony based on the standard of living to which the parties were accustomed.
The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for temporary relief. The proper measure of adequate temporary alimony is the historical need of the wife, the ability of the husband to pay, and the standard of living established during the marriage. The trial court must conduct a full hearing before making this determination and cannot rely solely on an appellant's total assets without considering whether those assets are liquid.
[1] The measure of adequate care in determining temporary alimony is the historical need of the party seeking support, the ability of the other party to pay, and their accust…
[2] A trial court abuses its discretion by prematurely terminating a hearing on temporary alimony, suit money, and attorney's fees before all evidence can be presented.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The measure of adequate care is the historical need of the wife, ability of the husband to pay and their standard of living”
Establishes the three-factor test for determining temporary alimony that the trial court failed to properly apply
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLucille Weasel sought temporary alimony, suit money, and attorney's fees in her divorce proceeding against George E. Weasel, Jr. Appellant's financial…
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GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
The trial court denied appellant’s motion for temporary relief, suit money and attorney’s fees. We reverse and remand on the authority of Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla.1972), which held with respect to the issue of “adequate care” in determining temporary alimony:
The measure of adequate care is the historical need of the wife, ability of the
husband to pay and their standard of living (footnote omitted).
See also Vickers v. Vickers, 413 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
Unfortunately, the trial judge never gave due consideration to the standard of living to which appellant was accustomed and short circuited the testimonial portion of the hearing before appellant was able to present all of her evidence upon the issue of temporary alimony or any evidence upon the issue of temporary attorney’s fees and suit money. He informed the parties that he had not reviewed appellant’s financial affidavit, referred to her “petition” as a waste of time, and remarked that there were other people with real problems waiting to be heard.
Appellant’s wealth was apparently the cause of her demise in the trial court, as her financial affidavit reflected assets in excess of $2,000,000, notwithstanding allusions to her husband’s excessive wealth in comparison. We use the word “allusions” because the trial judge stopped the testimony before there was any evidence of appellee’s wealth. Appellee neither filed a financial affidavit nor appeared at the hearing. His counsel informed the trial court that his client was financially able to provide support. The trial judge suddenly halted the testimony, apparently convinced that if appellant desired to maintain the standard of living set for her by appellee, she could sell her capital assets. The evidence in the brief testimonial portion of the transcript indicates appellant’s cash was less than $15,000 but her monthly expenses were in excess of $33,000. The trial judge appeared to equate bonds with the term “liquid assets,” indicating his reliance upon Grace v. Grace, 162 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964). As the liquid assets in Grace were bank accounts and not securities, we are hard pressed to see how the trial court determined Grace to be authority for the proposition that securities were liquid assets.
While appellant’s apparent life style may be overwhelming to most people, she was entitled to her day in court, and it was denied her. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand the cause with directions to order such amount of temporary alimony, nunc pro tune July 1, 1981, as the application of Belcher and Vickers to the relevant facts herein require and to award temporary attorney’s fees as requested on appeal and suit money in a reasonable amount as the testimony taken establishes.
DELL, J., concurs.
LETTS, C.J.,
concurs in conclusion only as to the opinion and dissents as to the award by this court of attorneys fees in response to appellant’s motion for same.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Wolfson v. Wolfson, 455 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…arate assets to maintain the style of living which she and appellant enjoyed. Lutgert v. Lutgert, 362 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 367 So. 2d 1125 (Fla.1979); De Cenzo v. De Cenzo, 433 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Weasel v. Weasel, 421 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Our review of the record satisfies us that a basis exists in the record for an award of temporary alimony. We find no merit in appellant’s challenge of the amount of temporary relief awarded appellee and the parties’ minor chil…
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Luskin v. Luskin, 492 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…eds as fixed by the parties’ standard of living, on the one hand, and ability to pay, on the other.” Vickers v. Vickers, 413 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (emphasis added). See also Herr v. Herr, 463 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Weasel v. Weasel, 421 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Where, as here, the husband has the ability to pay private school tuition and summer camp costs, and these expenses are in accordance with the family’s customary standard of living and are in the children’s best interests, they…
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Wenzel v. Wenzel, 512 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…rned by the wife’s needs as established by the parties’ standard of living during the marriage and the husband’s ability to pay. Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1972); Fitterman v. Fitterman, 502 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Weasel v. Weasel, 421 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). [*276] The record of the hearing for temporary relief in the instant case reveals that the amount of temporary alimony awarded by the trial court not only exceeds the amount requested by the wife but also appears to exceed the s…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Annabelle G. Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1972)
- Vickers v. Vickers, 413 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Vick, 162 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Donald (Don) W. Grace v. Grace, 162 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)