STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DONALD HOWARD REED, APPELLEE
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The State appealed the trial court's order suppressing a confession in a sexual battery case. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing a continuance and granting the suppression motion without giving the State a fair opportunity to present evidence of the confession's voluntariness.
The trial court abused its discretion by refusing the continuance and suppressing the confession without affording the State fair opportunity to be heard. A motion to suppress a confession is an extremely important matter with severe consequences to either party, requiring both sides to have fair opportunity to present evidence. Absent clear prejudice to the accused, the suppression remedy should not be granted for simple neglect or procedural error.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by denying a continuance for a motion to suppress a confession when the state is unprepared due to lack of notice and no prejudice to…
[2] A motion to suppress a confession requires a fair opportunity for both sides to be heard.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A motion for the suppression of a confession, however, is an extremely important matter having severe repercussions to the losing party, whether the state or the accused. For that reason it is imperative that both sides be given fair opportunity to be heard.”
Establishes the fundamental requirement of due process fairness in suppression hearings and the significance of the remedy.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe State sought a continuance of the suppression hearing on the ground that it was unprepared to present witnesses due to not anticipating the motion…
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HERSEY, Judge.
The state appeals from an order granting a defense motion to suppress a confession in a sexual battery case. We reverse.
The defense filed two motions on October 13, 1981: a motion to compel examination of the scene and a motion to suppress. At the hearing on November 9, 1981 the trial court called both motions to be heard. Apparently the state had not anticipated that the motion to suppress was to be heard at that time. The witnesses were unavailable and the state was otherwise unprepared to sustain its affirmative burden of showing that the confession had been made voluntarily. The state requested a continuance representing to the court that defense counsel had agreed to have a hearing on the motion immediately before trial which was scheduled for the following week. The trial court refused to continue the hearing and, when the state was unable to produce its witnesses, granted the motion to suppress.
The record indicates that the complaining witness had been less than cooperative. It is understandable that the trial court wanted to move his docket along and perhaps became a little more impatient with the situation than he otherwise might have.
The presumption of correctness ordinarily attributed to the findings of the trial court does not apply here because there were no findings of fact. Ponder v. State, 323 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Herzog v. Herzog, 346 So. 2d 56 (Fla.1977). This case involves an exercise of discretion and the issue is whether there was an abuse of that discretion.
‘Judicial discretion’ does not imply that a court may act, or fail to act, according to the mere whim or caprice of the presiding judge, but it means a discretion exercised within the limits of the applicable principles of law and equity, and the exercise of which, if clearly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unjust, when tested in the light of such principles, amounting to an abuse of such discretion, may be set aside on appeal. This is ‘a government of laws and not of men.’
Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Baumgartner, 99 Fla. 987, 128 So. 241, 247 (1930). And see Matire v. State, 232 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970).
It is always easier to assess a course of action in retrospect and at leisure rather than during the fray, and we therefore do not fault the trial court for responding to the situation in a manner designed to remedy delay. A motion for the suppression of a confession, however, is an extremely important matter having severe repercussions to the losing party, whether the state or the accused. For that reason it is imperative that both sides be given fair opportunity to be heard. Only where prejudice will result to the accused should simple neglect or attorney error be sanctioned with the extreme remedy of granting a motion to suppress a confession. No such prejudice appears on this record; accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., (Retired) Associate Judge, concurs.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with opinion.
ANSTEAD, Judge,
dissenting:
I would sustain the trial court’s ruling since the record reflects that the hearing on the motion to suppress had been scheduled for several weeks and the state had been on notice of the hearing for that same period of time. In essence, we are reversing the trial court’s decision to deny the state’s request for a continuance of the hearing and I do not believe there is any basis in the record for concluding that this constituted an abuse of discretion.
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State v. Humphreys, 867 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…fanny pack. As such, the trial court’s refusal to continue the hearing was tantamount to a dismissal of the charges. We review under the abuse of discretion standard the trial court’s refusal to continue the evidentiary hearing. See State v. Reed, 421 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). A party seeking a continuance due to witness unavailability must establish four factors: “(1) prior due diligence to obtain the witness’s presence; (2) that substantially favorable testimony would have been forthcoming; (3) that…
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State v. R.M., 696 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…ferences in a light most favorable to sustaining these conclusions.” State v. Wright, 662 So. 2d 975, 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207 (Fla.1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 855, 111 S.Ct. 152, 112 L.Ed.2d 118 (1990); State v. Reed, 421 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). As the second district also said in Wright, however: “In this case ... we must reverse because there is no basis in the record for sustaining the ruling even after affording the trial court the presumption of correctness.” 662…
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State v. Doyle Lawrence, 560 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…d have been granted. Denying a motion for continuance is within a trial judge’s discretion and his or her ruling will be disturbed only when that discretion has been abused. Bouie v. State, 559 So. 2d 1113 (Fla.1990). We distinguish State v. Reed, 421 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). In Reed the state and the defense had agreed to hear a motion to suppress a confession immediately before trial. A week before trial, the trial judge called a pending motion to compel for hearing and insisted that the suppressio…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Herzog v. Herzog, 346 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1977)
- Storey Mountain, LLC v. Freestone Enter., LLC (Fla. 1st DCA 2023)
- Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Baumgartner, 99 Fla. 987 (Fla. 1930)
- Lovon Ponder v. State, 323 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Matire v. State, 232 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)