LEARNHART RHODEN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Learnhart Rhoden was convicted as an adult of discharging a destructive device and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. The appellate court held that mandatory juvenile disposition procedures under Florida statute section 39.111(6) must be followed when sentencing a juvenile tried as an adult, regardless of whether the defendant raised the issue at trial, and remanded for compliance with those procedures.
The disposition procedures under section 39.111(6) are mandatory and must be followed when sentencing a juvenile tried as an adult, regardless of whether the defendant raised an objection in the trial court. The court must make written findings addressing six criteria regarding suitability of adult sanctions before imposing such sanctions.
[1] A trial court must follow mandatory juvenile disposition procedures when sentencing a juvenile tried as an adult.
[2] The requirement for a written decision and specific findings of fact when imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile is mandatory.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 39.111(6)(d) states that "[a]ny decision to impose adult sanctions shall be in writing, and it shall be in conformity with each of the above criteria. The court shall render a specific finding of fact and the reasons for the decision to impose adult sanctions."”
Establishes the mandatory written findings requirement for imposing adult sanctions on juveniles
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Learnhart Rhoden was initially charged as a juvenile for discharging a destructive device. He was subsequently tried as an adult and found g…
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SCHEB, Judge.
Appellant, Learnhart Rhoden, was initially charged as a juvenile for the offense of discharging a destructive device. He was subsequently tried as an adult and was found guilty as charged. The court sentenced him to a mandatory term of imprisonment of ten years pursuant to section 790.161(3), Florida Statutes (1981). This appeal ensued.
Appellant has raised four arguments on appeal, but we find merit only to his contention that the trial court erred in sentencing him without following the juvenile disposition procedures set out in section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes (1981). Appellant correctly points out that the court failed to make reference to the six criteria as to suitability or nonsuitability of adult sanctions contained in section 39.111(6), and failed to put in writing its decision to imprison appellant.
The state argues that since appellant did not request disposition pursuant to section 39.111(6), and did not object to the trial court’s failure to proceed under that statute, the issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. As authority for this argument, the state cites to Dunman v. State, 400 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) and Burley v. State, 402 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Indeed, the cited cases stand for the proposition argued for by the state. However, we disagree with our sister court on this issue.
Section 39.111(6)(d) states that “[a]ny decision to impose adult sanctions shall be in writing, and it shall be in conformity with each of the above criteria. The court shall render a specific finding of fact and the reasons for the decision to impose adult sanctions.” [Emphasis supplied.] Furthermore, section 39.111(6)(j) states that “[i]t is the intent of the Legislature that the foregoing criteria and guidelines shall be deemed mandatory and that a determination of disposition pursuant to this subsection is subject to the right of the child to appellate review pursuant to s. 39.14.”
In commenting on sentencing a juvenile who, as here, had been transferred for trial as an adult, the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1367 (Fla.1980), stated that “even when a juvenile is convicted in adult court he is still given special treatment as a juvenile .... The court must follow the procedure provided in subsection 39.111(6) .... ” [Emphasis supplied.]
We hold that the disposition procedures under section 39.111(6) are mandatory and necessitate a reversal regardless of whether appellant raised an objection in the trial court. See Proctor v. State, 373 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Johnson v. State, 371 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Our decision, of course, expressly conflicts with the Dun-man and Burley cases.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, but remand for disposition pursuant to the provisions of section 39.111(6). Appellant shall be entitled to be present at the proceedings.
OTT, C.J., and SPICOLA, GUY W., Associate Judge, concur.
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State v. Learnhart Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984)…OVERTON, Justice. This is a petition to review a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal reported as Rhoden v. State, 421 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), which directly conflicts with Glenn v. State, 411 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Burley v. State, 402 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); and Dunman v. State, 400 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). We have jurisdiction, article V, sect…
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Pimentel v. State, 442 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…e year minimum mandatory sentence); McClain v. State, 356 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (habitual offender); Eastwood v. Hall, 258 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972) (waiver of speedy trial rule). The cases relied upon by the defendant, Rhoden v. State, 421 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), Proctor v. State, 373 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), Johnson v. State, 371 So. 2d [*229] 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)2 are distinguishable in that the record in those cases failed to contain an indication that the requisite criteria ha…
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In the Interest of T.S.J. v. State, 439 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…t compliance with the provisions of Section 39.09(3) is mandatory and failure to comply will result in reversible error. W.Y. v. State, 414 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); see also, D.C. v. State, 436 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Rhoden v. State, 421 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Similarly, Section 39.11 must be read in pari materia with Section 39.09, and failure to strictly comply with the requirements of that section may also result in reversible error. We note that T.S.J. admitted “technical violatio…1 / 2
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1980)
- Johnson v. State, 371 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Dunman v. State, 400 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Proctor v. State, 373 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Burley v. State, 402 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)