JUDSON DICKSON, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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Judson Dickson was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor based on an indictment that contained an impossible date (December 10, 1884, when the indictment was found in April 1884). The Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the State's Attorney lacked authority to unilaterally amend the indictment without proper court authorization and application by the defendant.
The State's Attorney lacked authority to amend the indictment without proper court authorization and application by the defendant as required by law. The motion to arrest judgment should have been granted because the indictment as originally found by the grand jury was defective with an impossible date, and the unauthorized amendment could not cure this fatal defect.
“We cannot see that thé State's Attorney, of his own free will, has any authority to amend in this way an indictment duly found by a grand jury.”
Establishes that the State's Attorney lacked independent authority to unilaterally amend the indictment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn April 1884, Judson Dickson was indicted by the Madison County grand jury for breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a misdemeanor. …
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Mr. Justice VanValkenburgh
delivered the opinion of the court.
In the month of April, A. D. 1884, Judson Dickson, the plaintiff in error, was indicted by the grand jury of Madison county for breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a misdemeanor. He was tried and convict" ed of the offence. His counsel then moved the court to arrest the judgment upon several grounds, among which is the following, viz: The indictment laid the offence December 10, 1884, and the court erred in allowing the State’s Attorney to amend it to December 10, 1883.
The court overruled the motion and the counsel for the defendant excepted to the judgment and brings his writ of error. The indictment charges that “Judson Dickson, late of said county, laborer, on the 10th day of December, A. D. 1884, with force and arms,” &c. The remainder of the indictment is in good form. At the foot of the indictment appears the following entry in the record:
“ The date upon which the State relies is the tenth day of December, A. D. 1883, and not the tenth day of December, A. D. 1884 B. B. Blackwell,”
“ State’s Attorney.”
It nowhere appears in the record that any motion was made to amend the indictment, or that any order to that effect was made by the court. The endorsement seems to have been made by the State’s Attorney without authority, and can be considered in no wise the act of.the grand jury. It was not done on the application of the accused, as provided for in Chapter 1107, Laws 1860. The indictment was found in April, 1884, and charges the offence to have been committed in December, 1884, more than seven months subsequent to the action of the grand jury, an impossible date. We cannot see that thé State’s Attorney, of his own free will, has any authority to amend in this way an indictment duly found by a grand jury. The only authority for such a proceeding is found in chapter 1107 of the laws above cited, and that law does not cover an amendment of this character. Serpentine vs. State, 1 Howard, (Miss.,) 256; Drummond vs. State, 4 Texas, App., 150.
The motion in arrest of judgment should have been granted. The judgment is reversed and the defendant will be discharged from confinement under his conviction in this case.
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Ralph Pickeron alias Ralph Pickern v. State, 94 Fla. 268 (Fla. 1927)…committed. [*270] The allegation of the time or date of the commission of an offense is one of substance and not of form. Where the date alleged is an impossible date, the indictment is bad and judgment thereon should be arrested. Dickson v. State, 20 Fla. 800; Straughter v. State, 83 Fla. 683, 92 South. Rep. 569. The rule just stated is undoubtedly applicable when the defectively alleged date involves a matter of substance. But where the defect complained of is á matter of form only, consisting of a cler…
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Tingley v. State, 549 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1989)…e, by a bill of particulars, could change the time period in which an alleged sexual battery occurred to a period prior to the time stated in the indictment. We find conflict with Pickeron v. State, 94 Fla. 268, 113 So. 707 (1927); Dickson v. State, 20 Fla. 800 (1884); Phelan v. State, 448 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Perez v. State, 371 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); and Russell v. State, 349 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). We have jurisdiction. Art V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed…1 / 3
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Sparks v. State, 273 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1973)…Fla. 683, 92 So. 569 (1922); Pickeron v. State, 94 Fla. 268, 113 So. 707 (1927); and Skipper v. State, 114 Fla. 312, 153 So. 853 (1934)), and that the allegation of the time of the offense is a matter of substance, and not of form. Dickson v. State, 20 Fla. 800 (1884); Pickeron v. State, supra, and Skipper v. State, supra. The reason for requiring a definite date is to show that the prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations. Morgan v. State, 51 Fla. 76, 40 So. 828 (1906). However, it is not…
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