DAVID A. DANCU, APPELLANT,
v.
JUDY A. ALEXANDER, APPELLEE
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Husband entitled to special equity in marital home based on his premarital contributions and post-separation payments, reversing trial court's equal division order.
A spouse who contributes premarital assets to the down payment and closing costs of a marital residence and makes post-separation mortgage and tax payments is entitled to special equity recognition beyond an equal one-half division.
[1] A spouse who contributes premarital assets to the down payment and closing costs of a marital residence and makes post-separation mortgage and tax payments is entitled to…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The husband did not contest the wife's one-half interest in the home but merely requested recognition of his contribution of funds from a source unconnected with the marriage.”
Explaining that husband sought only special equity for premarital contributions, not elimination of wife's marital interest.
Husband and wife were married for one year. Husband used approximately $38,000 from the sale of his premarital properties (townhouse, boat, and second…
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BERANEK, Judge.
This appeal stems from a final judgment dissolving the parties’ one-year marriage. In its order the trial court found that each party was entitled to a one-half interest in the marital home and ordered the sale of the residence following an independent appraisal of its value. The husband’s request for special equity in the marital residence was denied and he appeals.
We reverse. The uncontradicted evidence elicited at trial was that the funds used to purchase the marital residence came solely from the husband’s sale of his own previously acquired properties. Prior to the marriage, the husband owned a townhouse in Fort Lauderdale, a boat, and a second mortgage, all with an approximate value of $40,000. From the proceeds of the sale of these three items, the husband used approximately $38,000 for the down payment and closing costs of the marital home. Furthermore, after the wife left the marital residence, the husband made improvements on the property, continued to pay the mortgage and taxes, and generally maintained the home. The husband did not contest the wife’s one-half interest in the home but merely requested recognition of his contribution of funds from a source unconnected with the marriage. The trial court erred in not awarding the husband a special equity giving due consideration to the husband's contribution to the purchase of the home and his payment after separation of more than his one-half share of the monthly mortgage payments and the taxes. See, Weiss v. Weiss, 390 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla.1980).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HERSEY and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
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McCLUNG v. McCLUNG, 427 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)…nakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1981), we affirm the trial court’s award to the wife of rehabilitative alimony rather than permanent periodic alimony. AFFIRMED. FRANK D. UPCHURCH and SHARP, JJ., concur. . See, e.g., Dancu v. Alexander, 421 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Braddock v. Braddock, 405 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Lewis v. Lewis, 402 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Landay v. Landay, 400 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Evers v. Evers, 374 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Tichenor v. T…1 / 2
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Vandegrift v. Vandegrift, 477 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…ee Abbe v. Abbe, 475 So. 206 (Fla.1985). . Compare Smith v. Smith, 428 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA1982). . In an analogous situation where one spouse pays another’s mortgage payments, credit for such payments is generally allowed. Dancu v. Alexander, 421 So. 2d 819 (Fla.4th DCA1982); Heinemann v. Heinemann, 314 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 106 (Fla.1976); Parker v. Parker, 405 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.3d DCA1981), dismissed, 412 So. 2d 468 (Fla.1982); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 448 So. 2d 1227 (Fla…
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Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…to credit for mortgage payments made from the time of separation until the date of the final hearing. We agree and reverse on this issue. Parker v. Parker, 405 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), dismissed 412 So. 2d 468 (Fla.1982); Dancu v. Alexander, 421 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Guthrie v. Guthrie, 315 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). The husband’s second contention is that the trial court improperly granted the wife lump sum alimony based on the future value of the husband’s college degrees earned duri…
Authorities Cited
- Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980)
- Weiss v. Weiss, 390 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)