FLAGLER COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, AND KATHI LEE PARRISH, APPELLEES
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The Flagler County Sheriff's Office appeals an Unemployment Appeals Commission decision awarding benefits to Kathi Lee Parrish, who had requested a medical leave of absence that was approved by the outgoing sheriff but not communicated to the incoming sheriff. The court reversed the Commission, holding that Parrish voluntarily abandoned her employment without good cause attributable to the employer.
The court held that Parrish voluntarily abandoned her employment without good cause attributable to the employer and reversed the Appeals Commission's decision awarding her benefits. The referee's factual finding that Parrish had voluntarily left and effectively abandoned her position was amply supported by competent evidence and could not be substituted by the Commission.
[1] An unemployment benefits claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits if they voluntarily leave their employment without good cause attributable to the employer.
[2] An unemployment appeals commission cannot substitute its findings of fact for those of a referee when the referee's factual determination is supported by competent eviden…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Parrish, because of pregnancy, requested a medical leave of absence from the outgoing sheriff of Flagler County. The leave was to commence on January 5, 1981 (the last day in office of the defeated administration), and continue until May, 1981. This request, as well as its approval, was oral and unknown to the incoming sheriff, who took office on January 6, 1981.”
Establishes the critical fact that the leave approval was oral, unknown to the new administration, and Parrish failed to communicate it.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceParrish orally requested a medical leave of absence due to pregnancy from the outgoing sheriff in December 1980, to commence January 5, 1981 and conti…
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COBB, Judge.
This is an appeal by the employer, Flagler County Sheriff’s Office, from an adverse decision of the Unemployment Appeals Commission on a claim for benefits by Ka-thi Lee Parrish. The Commission reversed the decision of the referee, who had affirmed the determination of the claims examiner that the claimant was disqualified from benefits because of having voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable to the employer. See § 443.-101(1), Fla.Stat. (1981).
On December 9, 1980, Parrish, because of pregnancy, requested a medical leave of absence from the outgoing sheriff of Fla-gler County. The leave was to commence on January 5, 1981 (the last day in office of the defeated administration), and continue until May, 1981. This request, as well as its approval, was oral and unknown to the incoming sheriff, who took office on January 6, 1981. Parrish had ample opportunity to advise the incoming sheriff of her request and proposed absence, but failed to do so. She also knew of the hostility and lack of communication between the outgoing and incoming administrations. Claimant’s husband, a deputy sheriff, was not reappointed by the new sheriff. He accepted a new job in an adjacent county, and he and claimant relocated there. The job held by Parrish was being paid out of a private grant and not from regular county funds, hence a leave of absence was not in order, as it was required that the job be kept filled. Moreover, the grant money expired in April, 1981.
The new sheriff directed the claimant’s supervisor to write a letter to claimant on January 22,1981, informing her of the expiration date of the grant in April and that it was assumed, in view of her relocation to another county, that she was not planning to return to her job. In February, there was a chance encounter between claimant and her supervisor, and from the “joking” conversation between them, claimant testified that she “could only assume that he (the supervisor) took it all as a light matter and knew that I intended to return.” She felt that she had “indicated” to him that she planned to return to her job, but she did not reply to the January 22nd letter. She also failed to respond to a subsequent letter dated March 9,1981, whereby the new sheriff again informed her that the grant expired in April, and that she was being replaced in order to continue the grant.
The referee’s factual determination that the claimant had voluntarily left her employment and had effectively abandoned her position is amply supported by competent evidence. Therefore, the Commission cannot substitute its findings of fact for those of the referee. David Clark & Assoc., Inc. v. Kennedy, 390 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Perez v. State Dept. of Labor & Employment Security, Appeals Commission, 377 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Unemployment Appeals Commission.
REVERSED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and SHARP, JJ., concur.
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Verner v. State, 474 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…la. 2d DCA 1983). We disagree. Case law suggests that questions of whether an unemployment benefits claimant left voluntarily are essentially questions of fact. See Flagler County Sheriff's Department v. Department of Labor and Employment Security, 421 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); David Clark & Associates, Inc. v. Kennedy, 390 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The UAC may modify or reverse the findings and conclusions of the appeals referee under section 443.151(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1983), only where t…
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Glover v. Sanford Child Care, Inc., 429 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)…laim special insight. McDonaid, 346 So. 2d at 579. See also: Brevard County Sheriffs Dept. v. Fla. Commission on Human Relations, 429 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Flagler County Sheriff’s Dept. v. Florida Dept. of Labor and Employment Security, 421 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); City of Umatilla v. Public Employers Relations Commission, 422 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In the instant case, the parties presented conflicting testimony on a factual matter over which the Commission cannot claim expertis…
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Dorel Campeanu v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n & Jack Eckerd Corp., 629 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…left his job voluntarily is essentially a question of fact within the appeals referee’s province. See Verner v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 474 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Flagler County Sheriff’s Dept. v. Dept. of Labor and Employment Security, 421 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); David Clark & Assoc, v. Kennedy, 390 So .2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Thus, although the Unemployment Appeals Commission possesses the authority to reverse an appeals referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, the commiss…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- David Clark & Assocs., Inc. v. Lowell E. Kennedy, Jr., 390 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Perez v. State, 377 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)