BEVERLY M. VERNER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, AND PINELLAS PARK NEWS, INC., APPELLEES
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The court held that the Unemployment Appeals Commission (UAC) improperly reweighed evidence and substituted its findings for those of the appeals referee, as the referee's determination was supported by substantial, competent evidence.
[1] Whether an unemployment compensation claimant voluntarily left employment is a question of fact.
[2] An unemployment compensation appeals commission may reverse or modify a referee's findings only if they are not based on substantial, competent evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn employee, Beverly Verner, became ill and missed work, subsequently writing a letter to her supervisor expressing dissatisfaction but not explicitly…
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SCHEB, Judge.
An unemployment compensation appeals referee held that appellant, Beverly M. Verner, did not voluntarily leave her position at Pinellas Park News, Inc., but was discharged. Upon review, the Unemployment Appeals Commission (UAC) reversed, holding that Ms. Verner voluntarily left her employment without good cause. Thus, the UAC determined that Ms. Verner was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits under section 443.-151(4)(e), Florida Statutes (1983). Ms. Ver-ner appeals the UAC decision. We reverse.
On July 23, 1984, Ms. Verner became ill and went home from work at midmorning. She advised her employer’s circulation manager of her illness and asked him to tell her immediate supervisor. The following day Ms. Verner, who still did not feel well, remained home. She asked her mother to call and so advise her employer. That same day, Ms. Verner wrote a letter to her supervisor, Mr. Bailey, publisher of the Pi-nellas Park News. In the letter she outlined what she perceived to be problems in the office. Her letter noted:
I am reluctant to resign a position I have worked hard for the past year.... Iam not complaining about working conditions during the past year ... I made a decision, I would handle it to the best of my ability.
Upon receiving the letter, Mr. Bailey replied by letter, dated July 25, and “accepted her resignation as final....” On July 26, Ms. Verner responded in writing to inform Mr. Bailey that he had misunderstood her letter of July 24, wherein she did not intend to resign. That same day, she applied for unemployment compensation benefits. When her application was denied by a claims examiner, Ms. Verner sought a hearing before an appeals referee.
The evidence before the appeals referee at the September 11 hearing included the letters mentioned as well as other correspondence between Ms. Verner and Mr. Bailey regarding Ms. Verner’s dissatisfaction at work. The referee also heard testimony from Ms. Verner, her mother, Mr. Bailey, and his circulation manager. Ms. Verner stated that her absence two days before her separation from work was strictly due to illness. Both she and her mother testified that her employer had been notified of the reason for her absence.
Mr. Bailey explained that Ms. Verner had voluntarily resigned on two previous occasions. She was rehired by the newspaper each time; however, Mr. Bailey stated that Ms. Verner continued to complain about coworkers and the duties of her position.
After the hearing the appeals referee entered a four-page decision revising the determination of the claims examiner. Specifically, the referee found that “the claimant did not voluntarily leave this employment, but was discharged.” He ruled that, although the letter submitted by Ms. Ver-ner was considered by Mr. Bailey to be a letter of resignation, such was not “a necessarily valid conclusion.” The referee noted that none of Ms. Verner’s acts in remaining off the job constituted abandonment. The difficulties experienced by her, he observed, did not constitute misconduct connected with her employment.
On appeal by the newspaper, the UAC found that the referee’s conclusion was not based on the evidence. It, therefore, reversed the decision of the appeals referee on the ground that Ms. Verner “voluntarily left her employment because she was dissatisfied with the conditions at work.” Here, the question before the referee was whether Ms. Verner voluntarily resigned her position at the newspaper. Section 443.101(1), Florida Statutes (1983), disqualifies' claimants from receiving unemployment benefits for voluntarily leaving their employment without good cause attributable to the employer. The UAC urges that the referee’s conclusion that Ms. Verner did not voluntarily resign her position was erroneous as a matter of law. It contends that, since a determination as to the legal effect of the evidence is a matter of interpretation and judgment within the province of the reviewing agency, its reversal of the appeals referee’s decision was proper. Microfile v. Williams, 425 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
We disagree. Case law suggests that questions of whether an unemployment benefits claimant left voluntarily are essentially questions of fact. See Flagler County Sheriff's Department v. Department of Labor and Employment Security, 421 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); David Clark & Associates, Inc. v. Kennedy, 390 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
The UAC may modify or reverse the findings and conclusions of the appeals referee under section 443.151(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1983), only where the referee’s findings and conclusions are not based on substantial, competent evidence. C.F. Chemicals, Inc. v. Department of Labor and Employment Security, 400 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Department of Commerce v. Dietz, 349 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). We find that the referee’s determination is supported by substantial, competent evidence. Therefore, it was improper for the UAC to reweigh the evidence and substitute its findings for those of the referee. Flagler County Sheriffs Department; Debus v. Hendry Correctional Institution, 406 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Bagwell Lumber Co. v. Department of Commerce, 353 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the UAC and reinstate the decision of the appeals referee.
RYDER, C.J., and HALL, J., concur.
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Ritenour v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 570 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…ssociates v. Kennedy, 390 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); McCray v. Dept. of H.R.S., 384 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980). The question of whether a claimant left work voluntarily is a question of fact. Verner v. State Unemployment Appeals Commission, 474 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Here there is no question the appellant left voluntarily. But the question is whether she voluntarily left for good cause. “Good cause” for voluntarily quitting are those circumstances which would impel the average, able bodied,…
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Dina J. Grossman v. Jewish Cmty. Ctr. OF Greater Fort Lauderdale Inc., 704 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…able to her employer. § 443.101(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). Whether that employee left her job voluntarily and without good cause is a question of fact within the province of the unemployment appeals referee. See Verner v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 474 So. 2d 909, 911 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). As trier of fact, thé referee is responsible for weighing and resolving conflicting evidence and judging credibility, having witnessed the demeanor of the parties, is deemed to be in the best position to make these credibili…
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Edmond A. Freddo v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n & Fla. Sheriff's Youth Ranches, Inc., 685 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…liberate or substantial disregard of his employer’s interest. See § 443.036(26), Fla. Stat. (1995). The UAC improperly reweighed the evidence and substituted its own findings for those of the referee. See Verner v. State Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 474 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Even if Freddo violated company policy by asking personal favors of other employees, the claimant had no knowledge that this caused the employer any concern until the date of his discharge. Thus, his behavior, even if deliberate,…
Previewing 3 of 27 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- David Clark & Assocs., Inc. v. Lowell E. Kennedy, Jr., 390 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Huggins v. State, 400 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- State of Fla. Dep't OF Commerce v. Dietz, 349 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Microfile, Inc. v. Williams, 425 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Williams v. State, 353 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Bagwell Lumber Co. v. Fla. Dep't OF Commerce, 353 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Flagler Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't v. Fla. Dep't OF Labor & Emp. Sec., 421 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Debus v. Hendry Corr. Inst. & Dep't of Labor & Emp. Sec., 406 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)