STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES ROGER FRY, APPELLEE
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The Florida appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of grand theft charges against Fry, holding that the trial court improperly made factual findings and assessed the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence when ruling on a motion to dismiss. The court clarified that on such motions, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the state, and the question of whether evidence excludes reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the finder of fact.
The court held that the trial court erred in making factual determinations and assessing whether the state's evidence excluded all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. On a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), the trial court must view facts in the light most favorable to the state, and questions about whether evidence excludes reasonable hypotheses of innocence are for the finder of fact to determine.
[1] A trial court errs by making factual findings when ruling on a motion to dismiss filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4).
[2] In considering a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), a trial court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the state.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is not the trial court's function to make factual determinations in this context”
Establishes the core error: trial courts cannot assess facts when ruling on motions to dismiss under Rule 3.190(c)(4)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFry and his codefendant Bouvier worked for the same company; Bouvier, as head of security, had access to a vault containing gold paste vials. Bouvier …
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SCHEB, Judge.
The state charged Charles Roger Fry with grand theft of his employer’s gold. Fry moved to dismiss the charges. The state demurred with specific denials of allegations it regarded as conclusory and added allegations which tended to implicate Fry in the offense charged. The trial court granted the motion and discharged Fry. We reverse.
The pleadings disclosed that Fry and his codefendant, James Bouvier, were close friends and worked for the same company. Bouvier, as head of security, had access to a vault where their employer stored vials of gold paste. Bouvier allegedly removed sixteen such vials and substituted lead slugs for the gold paste. Fry’s gold coated thumbprint was discovered on the bottom of one of the sixteen lead slugs.
Fry’s motion to dismiss alleged that the case against him was wholly circumstantial. He alleged he had no access to the vault where the gold vials were stored and contended the state was unable to prove that his fingerprint had been impressed under any incriminating circumstances.
The state’s demurrer acknowledged that Fry did not have access to the vials of gold paste. Nevertheless, the state pointed out that it could establish that Fry’s fingerprint was impressed in gold of the type stolen, that the impression was on the bottom of a lead slug, and that it had been placed there before the lead slug had been substituted for one of the stolen vials of gold paste.
The trial court proceeded to make factual findings and concluded that there was “no evidence whatever ... that the Defendant was a knowing participant in the removal of the gold from the vault by the co-defendant ... or for that matter that he ... was present at the time the crime was committed.” Furthermore, “[t]he state’s case fails to negate the reasonable hypothesis of innocence that the Defendant touched the lead slug ... innocently while the gold was in possession of the co-defendant
We hold the trial court erred in making findings of fact. Fry’s motion was filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), and it is not the trial court’s function to make factual determinations in this context. State v. J.T.S., 373 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v. Rogers, 386 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 392 So. 2d 1378 (Fla.1980). More over, it is not the function of the trial cour-t to determine whether the state’s evidence excludes all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. State v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Rather, in considering the motion, the trial court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the state. State v. Green, 400 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
Construed in the light most favorable to the state, Fry’s thumbprint is evidence from which the finder of fact could infer that he had some involvement with the stolen gold. The question of whether the state’s evidence excludes any reasonable hypothesis of Fry’s innocence is for the finder of fact to determine.
We vacate the order which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and which discharged him from further prosecution. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HOBSON, A.C.J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
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State v. Diaz, 627 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…rima facie case of guilt. The proceeding is the equivalent of a civil summary judgment proceeding. State v. J.T.S., 373 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). It is not the trial court’s function to make factual determinations in this context. State v. Fry, 422 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). The trial court noted that it “saw one sentence in the transcript that might arguably lead a person to believe that Mr. Diaz ... may have been involved in some sort of bookmaking activity,” but then dismissed the charges. This o…
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State v. Manfredo Ortiz, 504 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…ocketknife did not define what constitutes such a knife. Therefore, whether a knife is a “common pocketknife” ordinarily involves a factual determination which may not be made by a trial court in proceedings under rule 3.190(c)(4). See State v. Fry, 422 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Indeed, it is not clear whether the knife in question is a common pocketknife because when fully extended and locked the knife measures almost nine inches. If this knife had a fixed blade instead of a folding blade, it may well…
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State v. Boom, 490 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…ty, the motion must be denied.” State v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013, 1015 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (emphasis added.) It is not the trial court’s function to determine whether the state’s evidence excluded all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. State v. Fry, 422 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). As long as the state shows the barest prima facie case, it should not be prevented from prosecuting it. State v. Hunwick, 446 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). All inferences must be resolved against the defendant and in f…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- State v. J. T. S. and G. R. W., 373 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- State v. Rogers, 386 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- State v. Benny Lee Green, 400 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)