STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT JUAN DIAZ, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals the trial court's dismissal of bookmaking charges against Diaz. The court reverses, holding that the trial court impermissibly weighed evidence and failed to deny the motion to dismiss despite the state's traverse raising material disputed facts that would establish a prima facie case.
The trial court's order granting the motion to dismiss must be reversed and remanded. When material factual allegations in a Rule 3.190(c)(4) motion are denied or disputed in the traverse, the trial court must deny the motion to dismiss. The trial court impermissibly weighed evidence, which is not its function in this context. The additional facts in the traverse, construed favorably to the state, are sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
[1] A motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) must be denied when the traverse denies or disputes material factual allegations in the motion.
[2] A trial court must deny a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) if the traverse raises disputed facts.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When material factual allegations in a (c)(4) motion are denied or disputed in the traverse, the trial court must deny the motion to dismiss.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for Rule 3.190(c)(4) motions when state files a traverse with disputed facts.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDiaz was charged with bookmaking. He filed a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) based on depositions of the state'…
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RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.
The state seeks review of the trial court’s order granting Diaz’s motion to dismiss the bookmakmg charges against him. We reverse and remand to the trial court.
Diaz filed a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). His motion asserted that there were no disputed facts, and that the undisputed facts, elicited from the depositions of all the state’s witnesses, did not establish a prima facie case of guilt. The state filed a traverse1 denying that there were no disputed facts and asserting additional material facts. The traverse referred to facts that the motion did not address, specifically that the police had found items used by bookmakers in Diaz’s trash, that his fingerprints were on the items and that an F.B.I. expert was prepared to testify that the items indicated a bookmakmg operation.
When material factual allegations in a (c)(4) motion are denied or disputed in the traverse, the trial court must deny the motion to dismiss. State v. Lewis, 463 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(d). A (c)(4) motion should only be granted where the most favorable construction to the state would not establish a prima facie case of guilt. The proceeding is the equivalent of a civil summary judgment proceeding. State v. J.T.S., 373 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). It is not the trial court’s function to make factual determinations in this context. State v. Fry, 422 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
The trial court noted that it “saw one sentence in the transcript that might arguably lead a person to believe that Mr. Diaz ... may have been involved in some sort of bookmaking activity,” but then dismissed the charges. This observation indicates that the lower court impermissibly weighed the evidence. The additional facts stated in the traverse, when construed in a light most favorable to the state, are also sufficient to show a prima facie case of guilt.
Reversed and remanded.
PATTERSON, J., and COPE, CHARLES W., Associate Judge, concur. . Diaz asserts that the traverse was not timely filed and contends that the trial court ruled it was untimely. We do not agree. While the order on the motion to dismiss notes that Diaz filed a motion to set aside the traverse, it does not grant this motion. Additionally, the record of the hearing shows that the trial court considered the facts set out in the traverse.
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State v. Ferris Michele Paleveda, 745 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…dant’s rule 3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss, all questions and inferences from the facts must be resolved in favor of the State. Boler v. State, 678 So. 2d 319, 323 (Fla.1996); see also State v. Perry, 629 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); State v. Diaz, 627 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); State v. Hart, 677 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Even if the trial court doubts the sufficiency of the State’s evidence, it cannot grant a motion to dismiss criminal charges simply because it concludes that the case will not su…
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Dorelus v. State, 747 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1999)…iderations to this case, we first recognize that a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) is analogous to a motion for summary judgment. See State v. Jones, 642 So. 2d 804, 805 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); State v. Diaz, 627 So. 2d 1314, 1315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). In bringing a rule 3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss, the defendant must “demonstrate that the undisputed facts fail to establish a prima facie case.” State v. Pollock, 600 So. 2d 1313, 1314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (quoting Ellis v.…
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State v. Baldwin, 709 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…ma facie case of guilt. See State v. Anderson, 536 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). When deciding such a motion, the court must refrain from resolving fact disputes, and it must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. See State v. Diaz, 627 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1995), defines the offense of robbery as the taking of money or property from another with the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the person or owner of the money or property “when…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. J. T. S. and G. R. W., 373 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- State v. Clemon Lewis, 463 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- State v. FRY, 422 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)