STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CARLOS BATEMAN, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a trial court's sentencing of a drug trafficking defendant to five years imprisonment despite a mandatory 15-year minimum and the state attorney's refusal to move for sentence reduction. The appellate court reverses, holding that without a state attorney motion under the statute's sentence-reduction provision, the trial court lacks authority to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum.
No. Absent a motion by the state attorney pursuant to section 893.135(3), the sentencing court lacks authority to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence for drug trafficking convictions, regardless of whether the defendant actually provided substantial assistance.
[1] A sentencing court lacks the authority to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence under section 893.135(3), Florida Statutes, absent a motion by the state attorney.
[2] A statute requiring a state attorney's motion to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is settled that, absent a motion by the state attorney pursuant to subsection (3) of section 893.135 for a reduction of sentence, the sentencing court lacks the authority under subsection (3) to reduce the sentence.”
Establishes the controlling legal rule that the state attorney's motion is a prerequisite to judicial sentence reduction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBateman was charged with trafficking in cocaine in excess of 400 grams. He pled guilty understanding he might receive the 15-year mandatory minimum se…
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HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge.
The State appeals an order which sentenced Carlos Bateman to less than the mandatory minimum for a conviction for drug trafficking in violation of section 893.-135(1), Florida Statutes (1981), despite the state attorney’s refusal to move for a reduction of the mandatory minimum pursuant to section 893.135(3). We reverse.
Appellee and several others were charged with trafficking in cocaine in excess of 400 grams, in violation of section 893.135(l)(b)3. Appellee pled not guilty but later voluntarily withdrew the plea and pled guilty with the understanding that he might receive the 15-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. See section 893.135(l)(b)3. The court then adjudicated him guilty of the charge but postponed imposition of a sentence pending completion of a presen-tence investigation.
Thereafter, appellee provided the state attorney with information regarding the identity of the cocaine supplier with the apparent expectation that he would receive lenient treatment at the time of sentencing pursuant to subsection (3) of section 893.-135. This subsection, which acts as an “escape valve” from the severe mandatory minima of subsection (1), reads in pertinent part:
(3) The state attorney may move the sentencing court to reduce or suspend the sentence of any person who is convicted of a violation of this section and who provides substantial assistance in the identification, arrest, or conviction of any of his accomplices, accessories, co-conspirators, or principals.... The judge hearing the motion may reduce or suspend the sentence if he finds that the defendant rendered such substantial assistance.
At the sentencing hearing the state attorney refused to move for a reduction of the 15-year mandatory minimum. He maintained that appellee had not provided him with “substantial assistance” within the meaning of subsection (3). Appellee contended that, notwithstanding the state attorney’s refusal to move for a reduction, the court had the discretion under subsection (3) to determine whether he had rendered “substantial assistance” and, if it so found, to sentence him to less than 15 years. The court apparently accepted appellee’s invalid argument since it found that he had furnished “substantial assistance” and imposed a sentence of only five years.
It is settled that, absent a motion by the state attorney pursuant to subsection (3) of section 893.135 for a reduction of sentence, the sentencing court lacks the authority under subsection (3) to reduce the sentence. See State v. Taylor, 411 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
Appellee raises two arguments: He asserts initially that subsection (3), so read, erodes the separation of powers doctrine by vesting the executive branch with powers allocated to the judicial branch. In State v. Benitez, 395 So. 2d 514 (Fla.1981), the court rejected this same constitutional argument. Id. at 519. Hence, we do not believe that the argument warrants further mention here.
Appellee next contends that subsection (3) violates his right to due process of law because of “prosecutorial abuse” in this case. In State v. Werner, 402 So. 2d 386 (Fla.1981), the court held subsection (3) constitutional on its face but indicated that prosecutorial overreaching in a particular factual scenario might render it unconstitutional as applied. Appellee, however, does not point to any action or inaction on the state attorney’s part which amounted to “overreaching” or “abuse.” Further, the sentencing court did not find that the state attorney acted in bad faith in refusing to move for a reduction. Regardless, a review of the record convinces us that the state attorney acted in good faith in refusing to move for a reduction. In fact, he affirmatively demonstrated to the sentencing court that appellee’s information was stale, cumulative, partially untrue, and insufficient.
Accordingly, we reverse the sentence and remand with directions that the court sentence appellee on the conviction to the mandatory minimum.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BOARDMAN and DANAHY, JJ., concur.
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Cited By (11 total)
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State v. Nester Samudio, 460 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…of $250,000 was required for each of those charges. §§ 893.135(l)(b)3 and 893.135(4), Fla.Stat. (1983). Because the trial court refused to impose the appropriate sentences and fines, we must reverse and remand for resentencing. See State v. Bateman, 423 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Martinez v. State, 417 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); State v. Taylor, 411 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). We, therefore, reverse the sentences entered herein and remand with directions that the trial court sentence appellee to…
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Sastre v. State, 487 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…under Section 893.135(l)(d)(3), Fla.Stat. (1983).1 This has been held to require the imposition of a fine unless the state requests otherwise (which did not occur in this cause). State v. Samudio, 460 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); State v. Bateman, 423 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); State v. Taylor, 411 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Therefore the matter will be returned to the trial court for resentencing by the assessing of the appropriate fines pursuant to Section 893.135(l)(d)(3), Fla.Stat. (1983). Th…
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State v. Cuesta, 490 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…t lacked the authority to reduce the defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence since the state did not file a motion for reduction of sentence based on the defendant’s providing substantial assistance to law enforcement. § 893.135(3); State v. Bateman, 423 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d [*240] DCA 1982), petition for review denied, 446 So. 2d 97 (Fla.1984). Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s conviction but vacate his sentence. On remand the trial court shall resentence defendant, such resentence to include a three-year m…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Benitez, 395 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. Werner, 402 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. Taylor, 411 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)