JOSEPH THEODORE JENKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Joseph Theodore Jenkins appeals his convictions on four counts (kidnapping, armed robbery, sexual battery with a firearm, and possession of a firearm during felony commission) following jury verdicts. He challenges the trial court's denial of his motions to suppress fingerprint evidence from the impounded vehicle and his post-Miranda statement acknowledging sexual intercourse with the victim. The appellate court affirmed all convictions, finding no reversible error.
The trial court did not err in denying the motions to suppress. The fingerprints were properly obtained from the vehicle as an instrumentality of the crime, and the statement was properly admitted as it was made after Jenkins received Miranda warnings. Both rulings were in accord with controlling legal principles.
[1] An appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that trial proceedings were infected with prejudicial error compelling reversal.
[2] A trial court's rulings on motions to suppress evidence are reviewed in light of controlling legal principles.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court's rulings on the motions to suppress the fingerprints taken from the properly impounded vehicle, searched as an instrumentality of the crime...and appellant's statement acknowledging sexual intercourse with the victim...were in accord with the controlling principles of law.”
Establishes that both suppressions were properly denied under controlling law regarding search of instrumentalities and post-Miranda statements.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJenkins and co-defendant Lorenzo Marshall were charged with kidnapping, armed robbery, sexual battery with a firearm, and possession of a firearm duri…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Joseph Theodore Jenkins, and co-defendant, Lorenzo Marshall,1 were charged in a four count information with: kidnapping; armed robbery; sexual battery with the use of a firearm; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony-
Appellant was convicted and sentenced upon all counts pursuant to guilty verdicts by the jury.
Appellant urges reversal of his convictions on the grounds that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress the victim’s fingerprints which were lifted from the trunk of the impounded automobile used by appellant in the commission of the crimes charged. The other ground urged is that the trial court erred in failing to suppress a statement made by appellant which acknowledged that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim.2
Appellant, in the instant case, has the burden of showing that the trial proceedings were so infected with prejudicial error as to compel a reversal of the judgment appealed. Such error must be clearly demonstrated by the appellant.
We have carefully considered the entire record, all points raised in the briefs, and argument of counsel, in the light of the controlling principles of law and have concluded that no reversible error has been demonstrated. The jury was fully supported in its verdicts by ample evidence, and the trial court’s rulings on the motions to suppress the fingerprints taken from the properly impounded vehicle, searched as an instrumentality of the crime, State v. Pacitti, 383 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State v. Jenkins, 319 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), and appellant’s statement acknowledging sexual intercourse with the victim, see Barnason v. State, 371 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 764 (Fla.1980); DeCastro v. State, 359 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), were in accord with the controlling principles of law.
No error has been demonstrated which injuriously affected any substantial or constitutional rights of the appellant. Therefore, we affirm. Section 924.33, Florida Statutes (1981); Olsen v. State, 338 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); State v. Sanders, 266 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 269 So. 2d 370 (Fla.1972).
Affirmed.
. Marshall is not a party to this appeal.
. The statement was made after he had been given his “Miranda rights.”
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Citator
Cited By
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Peri v. State, 426 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…nce of the judgment. When lead footed justice reaches the end of its long and tedious journey, it should not be caused to falter upon an imagined barricade and required to repeat the trip. Section 924.33, Florida Statutes (1981); Jenkins v. State, 423 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 3 DCA 1982).…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Jenkins, 319 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Bernardo DeCASTRO v. State, 359 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Barnason v. State, 371 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Olsen v. State, 338 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- State v. Sanders, 266 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Giddings v. Seibels, 269 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1972)
- Mouchon v. Motor Club OF Iowa Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1972)
- State v. Pacitti, 383 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)