THE FLORIDA COMPANIES, A CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
BFA CORPORATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND PONCE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, A PARTNERSHIP, APPELLEES
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The Florida Companies appealed an interlocutory order denying its motion for change of venue in a declaratory judgment action brought by BFA Corporation regarding rent escalation disputes. The appellate court reversed, holding that venue was improper in Dade County and should have been transferred to Duval County where the defendant's principal place of business is located and where the cause of action accrued.
Venue was improper in Dade County. Under Florida Statutes § 47.051, actions against domestic corporations must be brought where the corporation maintains an office for its customary business, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. The cause of action accrued in Duval County where the rent payments were to be made, not in Dade County where the property is located.
[1] Actions against domestic corporations must be brought in the county where the corporation has an office for business, where the cause of action accrued, or where the prop…
[2] The location of leased property does not establish venue for an in personam action if the property itself is not drawn into the litigation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Actions against domestic corporations shall be brought only in the county where such corporation has, or usually keeps, an office for transaction of its customary business, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.”
This quote sets forth the statutory provision governing venue for actions against domestic corporations under Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBFA Corporation, a lessee, sued The Florida Companies, its lessor, seeking declaratory relief to resolve a dispute over interpretation of a rent escal…
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NESBITT, Judge.
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order of the trial court denying the defendant’s motion for change of venue. We reverse.
The plaintiff, BFA Corporation, instituted a declaratory judgment action against its lessor, The Florida Companies, seeking to: (1) resolve a dispute over the interpretation of a rent escalation clause; and (2) in anticipation of a ruling favorable to plaintiff, to require the lessor to return to lessee over-payments of rent. Since the defendant is a domestic corporation, the controversy is essentially governed by Section 47.051, Florida Statutes (1981). That statute provides, in pertinent part:
Actions against domestic corporations shall be brought only in the county where such corporation has, or usually keeps, an office for transaction of its customary business, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.
Thus, the action may be brought only in those three locations. None of these alternatives for venue allow this action to be brought in Dade County.
The record clearly established that the defendant’s principal place of business is in Duval County; it does not even maintain an office in Dade County. Clearly, then, the first facet of the statute has not been activated.
We also reject the appellee’s contention that because the property, upon which the subject lease was held, is located in Dade County, that venue is properly in Dade County. The location of the property is not material because the suit is in person-am and the property is not drawn into the litigation. See Gates v. Stucco Corp., 112 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959); Coon v. Abner, 246 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971).
As to the third alternative for determination of venue, we find that the cause of action accrued in Duval County. A suit for declaratory relief does not of itself constitute a cause of action for the purpose of activating the venue statute. Rather, it is the underlying relief sought which determines venue. Windsor v. Migliaccio, 399 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The nature of the underlying action is to avoid the payments of disputed sums which would otherwise be payable in Duval County. Consequently, we adhere to the traditional view that the cause of action accrued where payment was to be received. Croker v. Powell, 115 Fla. 733, 156 So. 146 (1934); Windsor v. Migliaccio, supra; Davis v. Dempsey, 343 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).1 For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to transfer the action to Duval County.
Reversed with directions.
. We reject the appellee’s contention that venue was properly in Dade County because the lease was executed there. If there had been a breach of contract in Dade County, then, the appellee’s interpretation would be correct. See Windsor v. Migliaccio, supra.
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Soowal v. Marden, 452 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…action accrued here. Since a suit for declaratory relief does not of itself constitute a cause of action for the purpose of activating the venue statute, it is the underlying relief sought which determines venue. The Florida Companies v. BFA Corp., 424 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Windsor v. Migliaccio, 399 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). For venue purposes in a contract action, a cause of action accrues where the contract is breached. Orange Blossom Enterprises, Inc. v. Brumlik, 430 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 5th DCA…
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Jacobs & Goodman, P.A. v. McLIN, 582 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…e a cause of action for the purpose of activating the venue statute. Rather, the underlying relief sought determines venue. Royal Jones and Associates, Inc. v. Cigna Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); The Florida Companies v. B.F.A. Corp., 424 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The underlying relief sought in this case is the avoidance of an employment agreement between Jacobs & Goodman and Ramsey. The venue for such cause of action is where the cause of action accrued, or where the contract was entered…
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Lapuma v. King Bldg. Sys., Inc., 541 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See and compare Earl W. Shomber & Co., Inc. v. Florida Casino Associates, Inc., 469 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); The Florida Companies v. BFA Corporation, 424 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); E.J. Sales & Service, Inc. v. Southeast First National Bank of Miami, 415 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); American Fidelity Fire Insurance Company v. Allied General Contractors, Inc., 365 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Section 47.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Simmons v. State, 115 Fla. 733 (Fla. 1934)
- Jung H. Moon v. Ima-Park Place, LLC (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)
- Davis v. Dempsey, 343 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Windsor v. Crescent A. Migliaccio, 399 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Gates v. Stucco Corp., 112 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Sydney E. Coon and Norma S. Coon v. Abner, 246 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)