STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RONALD HOYT BURRIS, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed a trial court's order discharging a defendant charged with trafficking in cannabis based on violation of speedy trial rights. The appellate court affirmed the discharge, holding that the State failed to prove exceptional circumstances required to extend the 180-day speedy trial period under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191.
The court affirmed the discharge order, holding that the State has the burden of proving that exceptional circumstances exist to extend the speedy trial period, and such circumstances will not be presumed. Because the State failed to present evidence or law supporting its motion for extension at either hearing, and the trial court never found exceptional circumstances existed, the discharge was proper.
[1] A continuance granted for exceptional circumstances during the speedy trial period, with a rescheduled trial date, operates to extend the speedy trial period.
[2] Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(2) authorizes a court to extend the speedy trial period by a written or recorded order, without requiring specific language st…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the state has the burden of proving that the asserted exceptional circumstances exist and their existence 'will not be ... presumed from the circumstances.'”
Establishes the State's burden to affirmatively prove exceptional circumstances for extending speedy trial period
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBurris and co-defendants were arrested September 11, 1981, and charged with trafficking in cannabis. On December 10, 1981, a judge denied the state's …
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
The state appeals from an order granting appellee’s motion for discharge, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a). We affirm.
Appellee and several co-defendants were arrested on September 11, 1981, and charged with trafficking in cannabis. On December 10, 1981, a hearing was held on the state’s motion to continue, or in the alternative to extend, the limits of speedy trial requirements under the cited rule. Judge Willis denied the motion to extend but granted the motion for continuance and continued the case until February 4, 1982.1 On February 4, the parties appeared before Judge Cooksey, and the state again requested a continuance or extension of time under the rule.2 Judge Cooksey granted the continuance but stated “You [the prosecution] can present me some law relative to the matter of extending the speedy trial.” There was no order entered, oral or written, extending the time under the rule, although the case was continued until April 22, 1982. On March 22, 1982 appellee filed a motion to discharge alleging that the 180-day speedy trial time expired on February 9, 1982. The motion was argued before Judge Cooksey on April 16,1982 and was granted.
In Rogers v. Keating, 411 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), the court held that where a continuance is granted for exceptional circumstances during the speedy trial period and the court reschedules trial to a date certain, the speedy trial period is extended to the rescheduled trial date. Under these circumstances, the continuance satisfies Rule 3.191(d)(2). Id. at 232. Rogers does not hold that the existence of the requisite exceptional circumstances3 may be assumed when a trial is continued beyond the expiration of the speedy trial date. On the contrary, the state has the burden of proving that the asserted exceptional circumstances exist and their existence “will not be ... presumed from the circumstances.” Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla.1978).
In this case the state was given every opportunity to present evidence and law in support of its motion and consistently failed to do so. At no time did the circuit court find that exceptional circumstances existed for extending the speedy trial time; nor would such a finding have been supported by the instant record had it been made. The order discharging the defendant is therefore affirmed.
McCORD and BOOTH, JJ., concur. . The state did not present evidence in support of its motion for extension of the speedy trial time at the December 10, 1981 hearing, and the record does not reflect the existence of any exceptional circumstances which would have warranted granting the state’s motion at that time.
. At the February 4, 1982 hearing, the prosecutor argued, in support of the motion, that he was unable to locate one of his two key witnesses because he had “hidden himself or secluded himself.” However, no evidence was presented that the absence of the witness was “unforseeable and unavoidable.” Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(f).
. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(f).
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Citator
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State v. del Gaudio, 445 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…trial time limits, the court may properly continue the case to a date beyond those limits, charge the continuance to the State, and thereafter grant the defendant’s motion for discharge based on the speedy trial rule violation. See State v. Burris, 424 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (a continuance not qualifying as being caused by exceptional circumstances and not caused by the defendant is charged to the State and does not toll or extend the speedy trial time); State v. Lowe, 398 So. 2d at 963 (although dis…
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Lobik v. State, 506 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…period.” State v. Vukojevich, 392 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Also generally, a state continuance does not extend speedy trial time absent a finding of exceptional circumstances under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(f). State v. Burris, 424 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The determination of which party to charge with the continuance does not turn solely on which party moves for the continuance. To automatically charge the moving party with the continuance without further delving into the facts…
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Strickland v. State, 435 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…te moves for continuance. Here, the trial court neither specifically ordered an extension of the speedy trial period nor made any express finding that exceptional circumstances existed which would justify entry of such an order. See State v. Burris, 424 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Brunson v. State, 422 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for the entry of an order vacating judgment and sentence and discharging appellant. Reversed and remanded. ROBERT P.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Alphonso Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978)
- Donnell Rogers v. The Honorable Richard B. Keating, 411 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)