DAVID LEE HAYES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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David Lee Hayes appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss an information charging him with escape from a juvenile detention center, challenging the constitutionality of a Florida statute. The court affirmed the denial, holding that juveniles have no inherent constitutional right to juvenile adjudication and that the legislature acted reasonably in amending the statute to prohibit 16- and 17-year-olds charged with felonies from having cases transferred to juvenile court.
The statute is constitutional. Juveniles have no inherent or constitutional right to treatment as juvenile delinquents instead of criminal offenders; such rights exist only to the extent provided by the legislature. The legislature acted reasonably in amending the statute to prevent 16- and 17-year-olds charged with felonies from obtaining a transfer to juvenile court.
[1] A juvenile does not possess an inherent or constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile delinquent rather than a criminal offender.
[2] A juvenile's right to treatment as a juvenile delinquent is limited to the extent provided by the legislature.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A juvenile does not have an inherent or constitutional right to treatment as a juvenile delinquent instead of a criminal offender.”
Establishes the foundational principle that juveniles lack a fundamental right to juvenile adjudication.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHayes was charged with escape from a juvenile detention center, a third-degree felony. He filed a motion to dismiss the information, attacking the con…
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HOBSON, Judge.
David Lee Hayes appeals the denial of a motion to dismiss an information. We affirm.
The state filed an information charging appellant with escape from a juvenile detention center, a third-degree felony. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the information, attacking the constitutionality of section 39.04(2)(e)4, Florida Statutes (1981). The trial court denied the motion. Appellant subsequently pled no contest but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion. The court thereupon adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him.
Our state supreme court held section 39.-04(2)(e)4, Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), constitutional in State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla.1980). The 1978 statute which the court dealt with in Cain allowed a child charged with a misdemeanor or a felony to have the case transferred for adjudicatory proceedings as a child if he had not previously committed two delinquent acts. Appellant contends that Cain is not controlling here since section 39.04(2)(e)4, as amended by section 6, chapter 81-218, Laws of Florida, no longer permits a child charged with a felony to have the case transferred to the juvenile court even though he has not previously committed two delinquent acts.
Section 39.04(2)(e)4, Florida Statutes (1981) provides in relevant part:
(e) The state attorney shall in all cases have the right to take action, regardless of the action or lack of action of the intake officer, and shall determine the action which is in the best interest of the public and the child. The state attorney may:
4.With respect to any child who at the time of commission of the alleged offense was 16 or 17 years of age, file an information when in his judgment and discretion the public interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed. Upon motion of a child charged with a misdemeanor, the case shall be transferred for adjudicatory proceedings as a child pursuant to s. 39.09(1) if it is shown by the child that he had not previously been found to have committed two delinquent acts, one of which involved an offense classified under Florida law as a felony;
.... (Emphasis added)
A juvenile does not have an inherent or constitutional right to treatment as a juvenile delinquent instead of as a criminal offender. Cain. A juvenile has the right to treatment as a juvenile delinquent only to the extent provided by our legislature. Id.; Art. I, § 15(b), Fla. Const. We believe that the legislature acted reasonably in amending section 39.04(2)(e)4 by eliminating the ability of a child charged with a felony to have his case transferred for adjudicatory proceedings as a child.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to dismiss the information.
AFFIRMED.
OTT, C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
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Jones v. State, 443 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…em of justice gives the executive branch, the state attorney, the authority to do that at his discretion. It is not unconstitutional. See State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla.1980) regarding the statute before it was amended. See also Hayes v. State, 425 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). AFFIRMED. ORFINGER, C.J., and COBB, J., concur.…
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J.R.S. v. State, 483 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…a child has the right to be treated as a juvenile delinquent only to the extent provided by our legislature.” Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1363. See also Lisak v. State, 433 So. 2d 487 (Fla.1983); State v. G.D.M., 394 So. 2d 1017 (Fla.1981); Hayes v. State, 425 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Recognizing that the legislature has the final word in this matter, appellant urges us to examine the history behind the statutes and find a legislative intent to protect juveniles convicted of criminal traffic offenses. We find…
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Tolbert v. State, 436 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. Hayes v. State, 425 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). HOBSON, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and LEHAN, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1980)