CLIFFORD RAY JONES, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the statute allowing state attorneys discretion in charging 16- and 17-year-olds as adults does not violate due process or equal protection.
[1] A state attorney possesses total and absolute discretion in deciding whom to charge and prosecute, regardless of whether the accused is an adult or a child.
[2] The juvenile justice system is a statutory creation, not based on common law, and is therefore governed by legislative enactments.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant, a juvenile, was convicted of burglary and challenged the constitutionality of a statute that allows prosecutors discretion in charging 16- …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Prosecutorial Discretion cases and more on FLexlaw
DAUKSCH, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction in a burglary case. As his point on appeal, appellant challenges the constitutionality of Section 39.04(2)(e)(4), Florida Statutes (1981).
(e) The state attorney shall in all cases have the right to take action, regardless of the action or lack of action of the intake officer, and shall determine the action which is in the best interest of the public and the child. The state attorney may:
* * * * *
(4) With respect to any child who at the time of commission of the alleged offense was 16 or 17 years of age, file an information when in his judgment and discretion the public interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed. Upon motion of a child charged with a misdemeanor, the case shall be transferred for adjudicatory proceedings as a child pursuant to s. 39.09(1) if it is shown by the child that he had not previously been found to have committed two delinquent acts, one of which involved an offense classified under Florida law as a felony.
It is an equal protection issue appellant raises. He says the prosecutor “is able to indiscriminately extract sixteen and seventeen year old children from others in the juvenile system and, simply by charging a felony, cause those children to be tried as adults in the circuit court, which clearly deprives those children due process and equal protection of the law.”
We cannot agree with appellant and find no constitutional infirmity in the statute. Appellant’s argument ignores two basic premises. First, the prosecutor has total and absolute discretion as to whom to charge and prosecute on what charge, be the accused an adult or not. Second, the juvenile system is purely statutory, not based upon the common law, and is thus governed in substance only by the legislature. The legislature’s enactments establish the charging procedures a prosecutor may follow and the prosecutor makes his choice as to which procedures he will follow. The main complaint of appellant is that some children may be charged with felonies and sent to adult court where other children who commit the same crime may be charged only with a misdemeanor and left in the juvenile court. We would add that the prosecutor could also charge a child with a delinquency constituting a felony and not have him put into adult court. Our system of justice gives the executive branch, the state attorney, the authority to do that at his discretion. It is not unconstitutional. See State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla.1980) regarding the statute before it was amended. See also Hayes v. State, 425 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
AFFIRMED.
ORFINGER, C.J., and COBB, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Hernandez v. State, 117 So. 3d 778 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)…o absolute right to be processed and charged as a juvenile. Reyna v. State, 866 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Brazill v. State, 845 So. 2d 282, 287-89 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Grier v. State, 605 So. 2d 503, 504 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Jones v. State, 443 So. 2d 434, 435 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Competency to Stand Trial Finally, Hernandez maintains that he was incompetent to stand trial. “A trial court’s decision regarding competency will stand absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d…
-
Reyna v. State, 866 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…ositive and mandates rejection of the defendant’s claim. See also Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573, 576 (Fla.1975); Brazill v. State, 845 So. 2d 282, 286-89 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Grier v. State, 605 So. 2d 503, 504 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Jones v. State, 443 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Affirmed.2 . The crime date was March 20, 2002. . The defendant also argued that paragraph 985.227(l)(a), Florida Statutes was unconstitutional. That provision applies to a child who was fourteen or fifteen years of age at th…
-
C.S. v. Brown, 553 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…d. § 39.02(5)(c). See generally State v. King, 426 So. 2d 12 (Fla.1982). The “direct file” provision has withstood attacks on constitutional grounds, Lott v. State, 400 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1981); State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla.1980); Jones v. State, 443 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 451 So. 2d 849 (Fla.1984). The case authorities to which the respondent has directed us primarily concern the application of speedy trial rules to juveniles against whom informations are filed pursuant to section 39.0…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1980)
- Hayes v. State, 425 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)