JOHN T. HUBERT, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION, STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court addressed whether a post-judgment order on attorneys' fees and costs is a final order subject to a motion for rehearing that tolls the time for filing an appeal. The court held that post-judgment orders on attorneys' fees and costs are final orders, making motions for rehearing proper and timely appeals possible.
Post-judgment orders on attorneys' fees and costs are final orders, not interlocutory orders, and are therefore subject to motions for rehearing and full appeal. A timely motion for rehearing on such an order properly tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal.
[1] A post-judgment order that is dispositive of a question becomes a final post-decretal order.
[2] An order that completes judicial labor on a portion of a cause after judgment is final as to that portion and should be treated as a final judgment.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Post-decretal orders are not true interlocutory orders, and perhaps the term "interlocutory" is a misnomer. Where an order after judgment is dispositive of any question, it becomes a final post-decretal order. To the extent that it completes the judicial labor on that portion of the cause after judgment, it becomes final as to that portion and should be treated as a final judgment, and, therefore, a Petition for Rehearing could be properly directed to such a post-decretal order which constitutes a final and distinct adjudication of rights which have not been adjudicated in the original final judgment.”
Establishes the distinction between interlocutory and post-decretal orders, the key legal principle underlying the court's holding.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHubert filed an appeal of a post-judgment order regarding attorneys' fees and costs. The Division of Administration moved to dismiss the appeal as unt…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Post-Judgment Orders cases and more on FLexlaw
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND/OR CLARIFICATION
PER CURIAM.
This court previously denied a motion to dismiss the above-styled appeal without opinion. We deny rehearing but think that the issue raised merits this opinion.
The motion to dismiss this appeal alleged that the appeal was untimely because the notice was filed more than 30 days from the order appealed from. Although there was a timely motion for rehearing, appellee contended that the motion was not an authorized motion and, thus, did not toll the time for filing the appeal. See Rule 9.020(g), Fla.R.App.P. Appellee relies on the general rule that rehearings are not authorized as to interlocutory or nonfinal orders. Wagner v. Bieley, 263 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1972).
The order involved in this case was a post-judgment order on attorneys’ fees and costs. More specifically, appellee alleges conflict with Craft v. Clarembeaux, 162 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). Craft held that a cost order after final judgment was reviewable by interlocutory appeal. However, in Clearwater Federal Savings and Loan Assoc, v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla.1976), the Florida Supreme Court made the following distinction:
Post-decretal orders are not true interlocutory orders, and perhaps the term “interlocutory” is a misnomer. Where an order after judgment is dispositive of any question, it becomes a final post-decretal order. To the extent that it completes the judicial labor on that portion of the cause after judgment, it becomes final as to that portion and should be treated as a final judgment, and, therefore, a Petition for Rehearing could be properly directed to such a post-decretal order which constitutes a final and distinct adjudication of rights which have not been adjudicated in the original final judgment.
Additionally, eases more recent than Craft have squarely held that an attorneys’ fee order entered after final judgment is a final order sufficient to support a full appeal and subject to a motion for rehearing. Saul v. Basse, 399 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); State, Dept. of Citrus v. Griffin, 332 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Kucera v. Kucera, 330 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). We see no logical distinction between attorneys’ fees and costs in this context and orders entered on either or both after final judgment are final orders.1 Therefore, the motion for rehearing is denied.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and GRIMES and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur. . We have not overlooked our recent decision in Potucek v. Smeja, 419 So. 2d 1192 (Fla.2d DCA 1982). That case dealt with an order granting relief under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540. See, Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(1) & (5).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Deal v. Deal, 783 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…e Underwriters, Inc. v. Kelley, 702 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Forrest, 682 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Longo; Smith v. Weede, 433 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).1 Hubert v. Division of Admin., State Dep’t of Transp., 425 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Potucek. Here, the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days of the order being reviewed, but was filed within thirty days of rendition of the order denying the appellant’s motion for rehearing. Thus the notice of appeal…
-
Altamonte Hitch & Trailer Serv., Inc. v. U-Haul Co. OF E. Fla., 483 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)…agree. An order granting attorney’s fees and costs after entry of a final judgment is a final appealable order. Clearwater Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78 (Fla.1976); Hubert v. Div. of Admin., State of Florida D.O.T., 425 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Saul v. Basse, 399 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); State Department of Citrus v. Griffin, 332 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Kucera v. Kucera, 330 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). They are not technically “non-final” orders, since al…
-
Bernstein v. Berrin, 516 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…ers in the same case. It is now clear that not only is a judgment final without disposition of attorney’s fees, but the postjudgment attorney’s fee order is also a final order in itself for appeal purposes. See Hubert v. Division of Administration, 425 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). If the final judgment in the case and the subsequent attorney’s fee or [*1043] der are both appealable separately as final orders, an appeal of the former should not take away jurisdiction to rule on the latter. We agree with th…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wagner v. Bieley, 263 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972)
- Clearwater Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1976)
- Saul v. Basse, 399 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Potucek v. Smeja, 419 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Craft v. Marcel Clarembeaux, 162 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Kucera v. Kucera, 330 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- State v. Griffin, 332 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)