FRANK E. KUCERA, APPELLANT,
v.
JANE H. KUCERA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the appeal from the denial of a rehearing petition is treated as an appeal from the underlying final judgment, as the petition tolled the time for appeal.
Appellant's counsel withdrew, and the trial court ordered attorney's fees paid from funds held for appellant. Appellant petitioned for rehearing, whic…
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DOWNEY, Judge.
During the pendency of this dissolution proceeding in the trial court, original counsel for the appellant-husband withdrew. Thereafter, upon counsel’s motion the trial court on April 9, 1975, adjudicated the amount of attorney’s fees due counsel from appellant and directed that the fee be paid from funds held for appellant by another law firm.
Appellant filed a petition for rehearing directed to the order of April 9, 1975. The court denied the petition on May 28, 1975. Appellant then filed what was denominated an interlocutory appeal from the May 28, 1975 order. Since that time various motions have been filed to dismiss the appeal and to strike the appellant’s brief and appendix.
In order to return these appellate proceedings to their proper perspective we deem it appropriate to make the following observations.
The order of April 9, 1975 was a final judgment subject to a plenary appeal. Hastings v. Osius, Fla.1958, 104 So. 2d 21. Thus, the timely petition for rehearing tolled the time for appeal from said judgment. Although appellant’s notice of appeal designates this as an appeal from the order of May 28, 1975, denying the petition for rehearing, examination of the record on appeal demonstrates that appellant is seeking review of the action of the trial court set forth in the judgment of April 9, 1975. We therefore consider this appeal as if it were from the final judgment of April 9, 1975. State ex rel. Poe v. Allen, Fla. 1967, 196 So. 2d 745; DeLoache v. DeLoache, Fla.1973, 274 So. 2d 83; Shute v. Keystone State Bank, Fla.App.1963, 159 So. 2d 106.
Accordingly, the motions to dismiss and to relinquish jurisdiction, filed November 5, 1975, and November 10, 1975, respectively, are denied. The order of this court dated November 4, 1975, is vacated sua sponte, and appellee shall have 20 days from date hereof within which to file appellee’s brief.
It is so ordered.
CROSS and MAGER, JJ., concur.
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Altamonte Hitch & Trailer Serv., Inc. v. U-Haul Co. OF E. Fla., 483 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)…So. 2d 78 (Fla.1976); Hubert v. Div. of Admin., State of Florida D.O.T., 425 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Saul v. Basse, 399 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); State Department of Citrus v. Griffin, 332 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Kucera v. Kucera, 330 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). They are not technically “non-final” orders, since all judicial labor regarding their, entry has been completed. These awards pertain to attorney’s fees incurred at the trial level following a final decree. They are sufficient t…
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Ruppel v. Gulf Winds Apts., Inc., 508 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…able order, that issue has been decided by an earlier order of this court denying Condo Association’s motion to dismiss this appeal on those grounds. An attorney fee award is deemed final for purposes of appeal from that order. See Kucera v. Kucera, 330 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Developers also argue that their second motion to dismiss should have been granted. Condo Association responds that an order denying a motion to dismiss is not appealable. We agree and decline to address this issue on the groun…
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Hubert v. Division OF Administration, 425 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…after final judgment is a final order sufficient to support a full appeal and subject to a motion for rehearing. Saul v. Basse, 399 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); State, Dept. of Citrus v. Griffin, 332 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Kucera v. Kucera, 330 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). We see no logical distinction between attorneys’ fees and costs in this context and orders entered on either or both after final judgment are final orders.1 Therefore, the motion for rehearing is denied. SCHEB, A.C.J., and GRIM…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. Alfred Gordon POE & Doris v. Poe, 196 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1967)
- Lawrence v. Hastings, 104 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1958)
- Shute v. Keystone State Bank & Mrs. Edward J. Hutson, 159 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)