MARIA RUIZ, APPELLANT,
v.
JOSE MANUEL RUIZ AND LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY CO., APPELLEES
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Maria Ruiz sued her former husband Jose for injuries sustained in a car accident caused by their minor daughter's negligent driving. The trial court granted summary judgment for Jose based on Florida Statute 322.09(2), which imputes a minor driver's negligence to the person who signed the driver's license application. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the statute's language is plain and the legislature's policy is clear.
The court held that section 322.09(2) clearly and unambiguously imputes the negligence of a minor driver to the person who signed the driver's license application, making that person jointly and severally liable for damages. The signer cannot recover from other defendants for injuries caused by the minor's negligence.
[1] A person who signs a minor's application for a driver's license is jointly and severally liable for any damages caused by the minor's negligence or willful misconduct whi…
[2] Statutory provisions imputing a minor driver's negligence to the person who signed the license application are a clear expression of legislative policy.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“By its terms the statute imputes the negligence of a minor driver to the person who authorizes the license application. We find no basis for deviating from this clearly-announced legislative policy.”
Establishes the court's interpretation that section 322.09(2) unambiguously imputes minor driver negligence to the signer and the legislature's clear intent
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMaria Ruiz and Jose Ruiz were former spouses divorced in 1978. Their minor daughter Beatriz obtained a Florida driver's license with Maria signing the…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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JORGENSON, Judge.
The single issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court, in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, properly applied section 322.09, Florida Statutes (1979). We conclude that the trial court was correct and consequently affirm.
The essential facts are not in dispute. Maria Ruiz, the plaintiff below, was the former spouse of Jose Ruiz, the defendant below. Their marriage was dissolved in 1978. A minor child of the marriage, Beatriz Ruiz, obtained a driver’s license from the state of Florida, Maria signing the application in accordance with section 322.09, Florida Statutes (1979).1
In 1980, while Maria was a passenger in her former husband’s car, which was being operated by Beatriz,2 an accident occurred in which Maria was injured and it was alleged that Beatriz was negligent. Maria sued her former husband for injuries. Jose answered and raised section 322.09(2), Florida Statutes (1979), as an affirmative defense. Jose then moved for summary judgment, which was granted. This appeal followed.
Maria contends that, notwithstanding the plain language of section 322.09(2), a proper construction of the statute would permit her to recover from her former husband. As authority for that proposition she relies upon Grade v. Deming, 213 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), and Farrier v. Thompson, 234 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). While we agree with those cases, they are of no help to the appellant. The legislature fixed responsibility for otherwise judgment-proof minors when it enacted section 322.09(2). By its terms the statute imputes the negligence of a minor driver to the person who authorizes the license application. We find no basis for deviating from this clearly-announced legislative policy. Accord Smithson v. Dunham, 201 Kan. 455, 441 P. 2d 823 (1968) (under similar statutory provision, negligence of fifteen-year-old son imputed to passenger mother); see also Boker v. Luebbe, 198 Neb. 282, 252 N.W. 2d 297 (1977) (contributory negligence of minor driver imputed to passenger parent); Hoeft v. Friedel, 70 Wis.2d 1022, 235 N.W. 2d 918 (Wis.1975) (negligence of student driver imputed to passenger teacher). Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of Jose Ruiz and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company is affirmed.
. The pertinent portions of section 322.09, Florida Statutes (1979), are as follows:
(l)(a) The application of any person under the age of 18 years for an instruction permit or driver’s license shall be signed and verified before a person authorized to administer oaths by the father, mother, or guardian or, in the event there is no parent or guardian, by another responsible adult who is willing to assume the obligation imposed under this chapter upon a person signing the application of a minor. This section shall not apply to a person under the age of 18 years who is emancipated by marriage.
(2) Any negligence or willful misconduct of a minor under the age of 18 years when driving a motor vehicle upon a highway shall be imputed to the person who has signed the application of such minor for a permit or license, which person shall be jointly and severally liable with such minor for any damages caused by such negligence or willful misconduct.
. The minor daughter was not a party to the proceedings below.
. In the present case the minor collided with a parked car, and there is no issue of comparative negligence. If the minor’s negligence partially contributed to the injuries, the mother would be barred only to that extent. See Scheibe v. Town of Lincoln, 223 Wis. 425, 271 N.W. 47 (1937).
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Cited By
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Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ocha, 472 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…e' our research has not been exhaustive, the case of Bandy v. Duncan, 665 S.W. 2d 387 (Tenn.App.1983), appears to approve punitive damages under a similar statute. For some insight into the operation and purposes behind the statute see Ruiz v. Ruiz, 427 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Farrier v. Thompson, 234 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); and Gracie v. Deming, 213 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968). For these reasons I would reinstate Ocha’s claim for punitive damages.…
Authorities Cited
- Gracie v. Ingrid Freybe Deming, 213 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
- Farrier v. Thompson, 234 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)