VALERIE FARRIER, A MINOR, THROUGH HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, ROBERT FARRIER, AND ROBERT FARRIER, INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS,
v.
ELIZABETH M. THOMPSON AND SHERRY JO HASSELL, A MINOR, AND SARAH HASSELL, DEFENDANTS

Fla. 4th DCA | 1970-04-10
No. 69-606
WALDEN and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
234 So. 2d 11 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1970) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court answered a certified question regarding the liability of a parent who signs a minor's driver's license application under Florida Statutes Section 322.09(3). The court held that a parent's liability for the minor's negligent driving does not terminate when the license expires, but continues as long as the minor remains under eighteen years of age.


Holding

A parent or guardian who signs a minor's driver's license application does not terminate their liability under F.S. Section 322.09(3) upon expiration of the license. The court declined to answer whether the obligation terminates when the minor reaches eighteen or upon filing a cancellation request, as those questions were not dispositive based on the facts presented.


Headnotes

[1] A person who signs a minor's driver's license application, thereby assuming statutory liability for the minor's negligence, remains liable even after the license expires,…

[2] The obligation of a person who signs a minor's driver's license application for damages caused by the minor's negligence does not terminate upon the expiration of the lic…

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Key Quotes

“The intent of the legislature in promulgating F.S. Sections 322.09(1) (a), 322.09(3) and 322.10, F.S.A., was to place responsibility on the person or head of the household for damages as a result of the negligence or willful misconduct of any person under the age of eighteen years while he or she is driving a motor vehicle.”

Establishes the foundational legislative intent underlying the statutory liability scheme.

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Facts & Procedural History

Sarah Hassell signed a driver's license application for her minor daughter, Sherry Jo Hassell, which was issued on October 20, 1966, and expired on Oc…

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Opinion of the Court
CROSS, Chief Judge.

CROSS, Chief Judge.

This case reaches us by way of a Certified Question from the Circuit Court, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, the Honorable Otis Far-rington, Judge, concerning liability of a person signing an application for a minor under eighteen years of age who obtained a driver’s license and subsequently was involved in an automobile accident after expiration of the license.

*12The certificate presents the following statement of facts:

“Suit was brought by the minor plaintiff through her father and next friend as well as by the father, individually, against the defendants, Sherry Jo Hassell, a minor, and Sarah Hassell and Elizabeth M. Thompson as a result of the minor defendant, Sherry Jo Hassell, driving a motor vehicle owned by the defendant, Elizabeth M. Thompson, which struck the minor Plaintiff who was a pedestrian. The accident occurred on April 10, 1968, in Broward County, Florida. The minor defendant, Sherry Jo Hassell, at all times material, was under the age of eighteen years. The defendant, Sarah Hassell, was the mother and natural guardian of Sherry Jo Hassell and admits signing the application for the driver’s license of the minor defendant, Sherry Jo Hassell, and that said driver’s license #RG60573 was issued on October 20, 1966, and said driver’s license expired on October 31, 1967. That at the time of the accident alleged in plaintiff’s complaint, the minor defendant, Sherry Jo Hassell, did not have a current valid driver’s license and the defendant, Sarah Hassell, had not signed any application form in behalf of the minor defendant, Sherry Jo Hassell, for the renewal of said license.”

The questions of law for answer as certified and set forth in the Certificate are as follows:

“Where a person signs the application for the driver’s license for a minor, pursuant to FS Section 322.09(1) (a), and such person thereby assumes the obligations imposed by FS Section 322.-09(3), and a driver’s license is duly issued to such minor, does the obligation assumed by such person who signed the application, terminate
“(a) with the expiration of said license regardless of whether such person who signed the application has actual knowledge of the expiration of said license or
“(b) when said minor reaches the age of eighteen (18) years, or
“(c) when such person who signed the application files a written request to cancel the license of said minor, pursuant to FS 322.10, even though said license had previously expired and had not been renewed and no application for renewal had been signed by such person who signed the original application for said minor’s license.”

Section 322.09(1) (a), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. requires that in order for a person under the age of eighteen to obtain a driver’s license, both parents must sign the application for the driver’s license and it must be notarized for both. If only one parent is alive and has custody of the child, that parent may sign alone. F.S. Subparagraph (3) of Section 322.09, F.S. A., imputes to the person or head of the family who has signed the application on behalf of the minor any negligence or willful misconduct of the minor when driving a motor vehicle, making the person or head of the family who signed the application on behalf of the minor, both jointly and severally liable with such minor for any damages. F.S. Section 322.10, F.S.A., allows any person or head of the family who has signed an application for a minor for a license to withdraw consent to allow the minor under eighteen years of age to drive by writing a letter to the department of public safety requesting the license to be withdrawn.

The intent of the legislature in promulgating F.S. Sections 322.09(1) (a), 322.09(3) and 322.10, F.S.A., was to place responsibility on the person or head of the household for damages as a result of the negligence or willful misconduct of any person under the age of eighteen years while he or she is driving a motor vehicle. The legislature sought to maintain that *13needed guidance of those persons under the age of eighteen years who seek to drive. The statute is in keeping with the legislature’s desire to protect persons who are injured or sustain property damage by reason of the negligence or willful misconduct of persons under the age of eighteen years who are driving by imputing their negligence or willful misconduct to the person or head of the family who has signed the application, who in reality is in the best position to control these minor drivers.

We cannot in good conscience and keeping in mind the intent of the legislature, terminate the obligation of the person who signs the application imposed by F.S. Section 322.09(3), F.S.A., upon the expiration of the license. This determination is strengthened by the fact that the machinery of renewal pursuant to F.S. Section 322.18 (4), F.S.A., (operative prior to July 1, 1970) allows any person holding an expired driver’s license to renew that license any time within eleven months after the expiration date by paying a delinquent fee as provided by F.S. Section 322.21(1), F.S.A. Nothing in the machinery of obtaining the renewal of an expired license pursuant to Section 322.18(4), F.S., requires that upon expiration of a license that issued to a person under the age of eighteen years pursuant to F.S. Section 322.09, F.S.A., the person or head of the family who signed the application on behalf of the minor must sign a renewed application in order for the holder to obtain a renewal.

F.S. Sections 322.09(1) (a) and (3), and Section 322.18(4) F.S.A., must be read in pari materia to best obtain the intent of the legislature. If the legislature saw fit to allow the person holding an expired driver’s license, whose license was issued pursuant to F.S. Section 322.09, F.S.A., to renew any time within eleven months after the expiration date by paying a delinquent fee pursuant to F.S. Section 322.18(4), F.S.A., without requiring the renewal to be accompanied by another application conforming with F.S. Section 322.09(1) (a), F.S.A., then it is obvious that the legislature has seen fit not to terminate the obligation of those persons whose liability is incurred by F.S. Section 322.09(3), F.S.A., upon the issuance of the license when that license expires, regardless of whether. the person who signed the application has actual knowledge of the expiration of the license.

The facts reveal that the accident occurred on April 10, 1968. The minor defendant’s driver’s license expired on October 31, 1967. In accordance with F.S. Section 322.18(4), F.S.A., the minor defendant could have renewed that license any time within eleven months after its expiration date, i. e., September 30, 1968, by paying the delinquent fee as provided by F.S, Section 322.21(1), F.S.A. Thus in theory she could have renewed her license up to' five months subsequent to the date of the accident merely by following the procedures as set forth in F.S. Section 322.18(4), F.S.A., further illustrating the folly of any determination relieving those parties whose liability is incurred by F.S. Section 322.09(3), F.S.A., when the license expires.

Accordingly, question (a) presented by the Certificate is answered in the negative. Answer to questions (b) and (c) of the Certificate is declined as the statement of facts presented with reference to these questions does not produce a single determinative question of law, the answer to which would be dispositive of the cause. Gordon v. Norris, Fla.1956, 90 So.2d 914.

Question answered as to (a) in the negative; answer declined as to questions (b) and (c).

WALDEN and McCAIN, JJ., concur.


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Cited By

  • Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ocha, 472 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
    …dy v. Duncan, 665 S.W. 2d 387 (Tenn.App.1983), appears to approve punitive damages under a similar statute. For some insight into the operation and purposes behind the statute see Ruiz v. Ruiz, 427 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Farrier v. Thompson, 234 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); and Gracie v. Deming, 213 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968). For these reasons I would reinstate Ocha’s claim for punitive damages.…
  • Allstate Ins. Co. v. Caronia, 395 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
    …is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded with directions. . See earlier opinion. . The question of the father’s liability for violation of restriction by son remains open. See and compare: Farrier v. Thompson, 234 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). . This was a non-appealable order and the appeal was dismissed. See: Shupack v. Allstate Insurance Company, 356 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Meyer, 385 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Let’s Help…
  • Ruiz v. Ruiz, 427 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
    …n language of section 322.09(2), a proper construction of the statute would permit her to recover from her former husband. As authority for that proposition she relies upon Grade v. Deming, 213 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), and Farrier v. Thompson, 234 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). While we agree with those cases, they are of no help to the appellant. The legislature fixed responsibility for otherwise judgment-proof minors when it enacted section 322.09(2). By its terms the statute imputes the negligence o…

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