CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND UNDERWRITERS ADJUSTING COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
INDUSTRIAL FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY AND JOSEPH BRANNEN, APPELLEES
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Continental Insurance sought damages against Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance for failing to recognize and protect its subrogation rights as a workers' compensation carrier. The court affirmed dismissal of the complaint, holding that subrogation rights arise only by statute, not common law, and that Continental failed to comply with statutory requirements including recording a lien.
No common law cause of action exists for failure to recognize subrogation rights of a workers' compensation carrier; subrogation is solely a creature of statute. Additionally, Continental's complaint was insufficient because it failed to allege that the lien was recorded as specifically required by statute.
[1] There is no common law cause of action for failure to recognize and protect the subrogation rights of a workmen's compensation carrier.
[2] Subrogation for an employer's workmen's compensation carrier is solely a creature of statute.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“there is no common law cause of action for failure to recognize and protect subrogation rights of a workmen's compensation carrier; subrogation on the part of an employer's carrier in a workmen's compensation case is solely a creature of statute”
Establishes the fundamental legal principle that subrogation rights arise only by statute, not common law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceContinental, a workers' compensation insurance carrier, filed suit against Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance and Joseph Brannen, alleging failure t…
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PER CURIAM.
The final judgment entered by the trial court dismissing Continental’s complaint is affirmed. We conclude that the complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action upon a holding that: (1) there is no common law cause of action for failure to recognize and protect subrogation rights of a workmen’s compensation carrier; subrogation on the part of an employer’s carrier in a workmen’s compensation case is solely a creature of statute, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Smith, 272 So. 2d 517 (Fla.1973); Brinson v. Southeastern Utilities Service Co., 72 So. 2d 37 (Fla.1954); Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York v. Bedingfield, 60 So. 2d 489, 495 (Fla.1952); Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. Miller, 274 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), and, in order to avail itself of the benefits conferred by statute, the insurer must comply with the rules and conditions stated therein, Cook Motor Co. v. Vaughn, 189 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966); Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Grice, 172 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); and (2) assuming, for the sake of argument, that Continental had elected to proceed under the statute for equitable distribution, the complaint was insufficient for failing to allege that the lien was recorded as specifically required by Section 440.39(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1975).1 Cotton Belt Insurance Co., Inc. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 402 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Right v. Capeletti Brothers, 384 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Alfar Creamery Co. v. Williams, 366 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 98 (Fla.1979); cf. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Harper, 379 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). See Dunnell v. Malone and Hyde, Inc., 425 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The other issues raised present no basis for reversal.
Affirmed.
. Section 440.39(3)(a) has since been amended to delete the recording requirement. See Ch. 79-40, § 30, Laws of Fla., effective July 1, 1979.
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Shaw v. Cambridge Integrated Servs. Grp., Inc., 888 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…s important to not lose sight of the fact that the compensation insurer has no common law right of subrogation, and that subrogation in a workers’ compensation case is solely a creature of statute. See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Indus. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 427 So. 2d 792, 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The statute provides that an insurance carrier is entitled to limited sub-rogation, but only under the terms and conditions set forth therein. Under the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, an insurer’s statutory sub…
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Summit Claims Mgmt., Inc. v. Lawyers Express Trucking, Inc., 913 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…o. of N.Y. v. Bedingfield, 60 So. 2d 489, 495 (Fla.1952). As such, “in order to avail itself of the benefits conferred by statute, the insurer must comply with the rules and conditions stated therein.” Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Indus. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 427 So. 2d 792, 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Appellant relies on C & L Trucking, 546 So. 2d at 1185, wherein the court imposed an “equitable lien” on settlement proceeds. We disagree- with the Fifth District’s opinion, because section 440.39 does not provide for equit…
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Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Batch AIR Universal Inc., 559 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…ed third party tortfeasor, some two years after the third party had settled a cause of action that was timely instituted by the deceased employee’s estate, came too late. Continental Insurance Company v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, 427 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Cook Motor Company v. Vaughn, 189 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). The carrier could have intervened in the estate proceedings to protect its interest. If it could not have intervened in the estate proceedings, then it was not a…
Authorities Cited (12 total)
- Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Bedingfield, 60 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1952)
- Brinson v. Se. Utils. Serv. Co., 72 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1954)
- Cook Motor Co. v. Vaughn, 189 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)
- Alfar Creamery Co. & U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Williams, 366 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Sec. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Grice, 172 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Luddy Gene Kight and Sandra M. Kight v. Capeletti Bros., 384 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Rappaport v. Finesod, 425 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Dunnell v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 425 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Md. Cas. Co. v. Smith, 272 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1973)
- Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Miller, 274 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)