R.C. DIX, PETITIONER,
v.
EVERETT RICHARDSON, AS CIRCUIT JUDGE OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND SAMUEL SEYMOUR WEINSTEIN, RESPONDENTS
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R.C. Dix sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of a final judgment against him personally, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction because he was not a party to the original proceeding and was protected by bankruptcy stay provisions. The Florida appellate court granted the writ, finding that although the trial court's judgment was originally entered against R.C. Dix Enterprises, Inc., an amendment changed the judgment to name R.C. Dix personally, creating a void judgment against a non-party.
The court granted the writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the final judgment against R.C. Dix personally. Although the parties agreed that R.C. Dix was not a party to the proceedings and no judgment could be properly entered against him personally, the amended judgment clearly stated 'R.C. Dix is indebted' and thus created a void judgment against a non-party that lacked jurisdictional support.
[1] A writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent the enforcement of a judgment that is void for lack of jurisdiction.
[2] A judgment entered against an individual who was not a party to the proceeding and was not named in any pleadings cannot be enforced against that individual.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Since both petitioner and respondents agree that R.C. Dix was not a party to the proceedings in the trial court and that no judgment could be entered against him personally, the only question before this court is whether a judgment has, in fact, been entered against him.”
Establishes the narrow issue before the court: whether the amended judgment effectively created a judgment against a non-party despite the parties' agreement that no such judgment could be entered.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceR.C. Dix filed for bankruptcy protection. A trial court entered a final judgment in an action styled R.C. Dix Enterprises, Inc. v. William Birchfield …
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner seeks to prevent enforcement of a final judgment against him on the grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment against him because he was not a party to the proceeding below, was not named in any of the pleadings as a party, and did not voluntarily appear as a party. Further, petitioner points out that any proceeding brought against him would have been automatically stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 because he had filed a petition in bankruptcy.
Respondents argue that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter final judgment against R.C. Dix Enterprises, Inc.; that the complaint sought no judgment against R.C. Dix personally; that R.C. Dix was not a necessary party; and that the action was an in rem action. Further, respondent contends that the stay provisions of section 362 apply only to actions against the debtor or property of the estate and in this action no judgment was sought against the debtor, R.C. Dix.
Since both petitioner and respondents agree that R.C. Dix was not a party to the proceedings in the trial court and that no judgment could be entered against him personally, the only question before this court is whether a judgment has, in fact, been entered against him.
The final judgment entered in R.C. Dix Enterprises, Inc. v. William Birchfield and Samuel Seymour Weinstein, Case No. 81-5803-CA, contains 25 paragraphs of findings numbered A through Y followed by the statement “IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, IT IS ADJUDGED:” followed by nine numbered paragraphs. In the original final judgment entered on June 1,1982, the first numbered paragraph after “IT IS ADJUDGED” read:
1. Plaintiff, R.C. Dix Enterprises, Inc., is indebted to Intervenor, Samuel Seymour Weinstein, in the amount of $25,-000.00, together with the interest thereon at 6% from October 31, 1980, the costs of this action and a reasonable fee for his attorneys.
On June 10, 1982, the trial court entered an order amending, inter alia, paragraph one of the final judgment so that it now reads:
1. R.C. Dix is indebted to Intervenor, Samuel Seymour Weinstein, in the amount of $25,000.00, together with interest thereon at 6% from October 31, 1980, the costs of this action and a reasonable fee for his attorneys.
Respondents state that the references in paragraph 1 of the final judgment as amended merely recites the facts allowing foreclosure of the stock which secured the debt. However, petitioner contends that the adjudication is a final judgment entered against him personally, that appears valid on its face and that it could, therefore, be enforced against him at any time. We agree with petitioner. Prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent enforcement of a judgment that is void for lack of jurisdiction. See Colombo v. Legendre, 397 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Rehrer v. Weeks, 106 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958); cf. State ex rel. Pearson v. Johnson, 334 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Under the circumstances of this case, the petition for writ of prohibition is granted to prevent enforcement of the final judgment against R.C. Dix; however, this shall not be construed to affect any other action that may be properly taken in accordance with the final judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOANOS and WIGGINTON, JJ., and SHAW, Associate Judge, concur.
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Cole v. State, 714 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…t is more properly treated as a petition for writ of prohibition. See Town of Manatapan v. Rechler, 674 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA) (mandamus not for use to prevent threat of future harm), review denied, 684 So. 2d 1353 (Fla.1996); Disc v. Richardson, 427 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (prohibition issued to prevent enforcement of order that had already been entered). Insofar as Cole asks that we employ our mandamus power to direct the judges of the circuit generally to conform their future Marchman Act procee…
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Saint Mary & Saint George Coptic Orthodox Church, Inc. v. Bd. OF Cnty. Comm'rs, 743 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…appeal. Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B). . Even in the absence of this rationale for our holding, we would deny relief. Our certiorari [*619] jurisdiction was not timely invoked. Fla. R.App. P. 9.100(c)(1). Petitioner’s reliance on Dix v. Richardson, 427 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) in support of prohibition as a remedy is misplaced in light of the factual distinctions between that case and the instant matter.…
Authorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. Cynthia M. Pearson v. The Honorable W. Clayton Johnson, 334 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Appeal of Chrizzell E. Jordan. In re Estate of John C. Jordan, 106 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Columbo v. Legendre, 397 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)