CHRIS COLUMBO, PETITIONER,
v.
RONALD A. LEGENDRE, TEMPORARY CIRCUIT JUDGE, NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT; AND FLORIDA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, RESPONDENTS

Fla. 5th DCA | 1981-05-13
No. 81-485
DAUKSCH, C. J., and SHARP, concur.
397 So. 2d 1043 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1981) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

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Synopsis

A school principal sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of a juvenile court order requiring his school to admit a suspended student. The court held that the circuit judge lacked jurisdiction to override a valid school suspension and that the principal had no notice or opportunity to be heard before the order was entered.


Holding

The court held that the circuit judge lacked jurisdiction to enter such an order. The judge had no authority to set aside, overrule, or interfere with a school suspension except when the validity of that suspension has been raised and adjudicated in an appropriate proceeding.


Headnotes

[1] A court order directing a public school to admit a student is void for lack of jurisdiction when neither the school nor its principal were parties to the proceeding or pr…

[2] Prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent enforcement of a court order that is void for lack of jurisdiction.

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Key Quotes

“the court has no authority to set aside, overrule, or otherwise interfere with a public school suspension except when the issue of the validity of that suspension has been raised and adjudicated”

Establishes the principle that juvenile courts lack jurisdiction to override school suspensions without proper proceedings

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Facts & Procedural History

M.L.C., a 14-year-old minor, was adjudicated dependent in juvenile proceedings on April 13, 1981, and placed in the custody of the Florida Department …

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Opinion of the Court
COBB, Judge.

COBB, Judge.

The petitioner for prohibition, Chris Co-lumbo, is the principal of Denn John Middle School from which M.L.C., a fourteen-year-old minor, was suspended for ten days on April 14, 1981. The preceding day, in a juvenile dependency proceeding held under Chapter 39, the respondent Ronald A. Legendre, as “temporary” circuit judge, had adjudicated the minor to be dependent, placed him in the temporary custody of the Florida State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (H.R.S.), and included the following directive in the judgment:

Said child shall attend school starting April 14,1981, with no unexcused absences. DENN JOHN MIDDLE SCHOOL IS ORDERED TO ACCEPT THE SAID CHILD.

Neither Columbo nor the Osceola County School Board was a party to the dependency proceeding, nor was either notified of it prior to April 14, 1981. On that day, Co-lumbo was requested by H.R.S. to admit M.L.C. to the school based on the above order. On that same day, however, a ten-day school suspension order became effective against M.L.C.; therefore, Columbo refused the minor admission to school. Thereupon, H.R.S., the custodian of the child at that point, undertook to enforce the court’s order against the school. The respondents herein, however, do not challenge the procedural validity of the school suspension order. Immediately upon Columbo’s refusal of admission, he was served with a motion by the state attorney, acting on behalf of H.R.S., seeking to have him held in contempt for violating the terms of the court order. Columbo seeks prohibition, arguing that the sole and exclusive authority to operate the public schools has been granted to the district school board by the Legislature and the Constitution of Florida. Art. IX, Sec. 4, Fla.Const.; §§ 230.01, 230.03, 230.22(1) and (2), 230.23(6)(c) and (d), and 230.35, Fla.Stat. (1979).

He contends that the court order of April 13, insofar as it was directed to the school, was void for lack of jurisdiction “in that the court has no authority to set aside, overrule, or otherwise interfere with a pub-’ lie school suspension except when the issue of the validity of that suspension has been raised and adjudicated.” See Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, 231 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970); and State ex rel. Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Sepe, 291 So. 2d 108 (Fla.3d DCA 1974).

The respondents argue, inter alia, that the petitioner has an adequate remedy at law by direct appeal at such time as he may be actually adjudicated in contempt, which has not yet occurred. We do not agree. Here, the petitioner is threatened with contempt for failure to comply with a patently void order entered by the trial court without any vestige of jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Wainwright v. Booth, 291 So. 2d 74 (Fla.3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 300 So. 2d 257 (Fla.1974); Walters v. Blanton, 126 Fla. 428, 171 So. 230 (1936). Neither Columbo nor the school board had notice or opportunity to be heard. See State ex rel. O’Dare v. Kehoe, 189 So. 2d 268 (Fla.3d DCA 1966), cert. denied, 200 So. 2d 812 (Fla.1967).

We agree with the position asserted by the petitioner, although we do not find section 57.-105, Florida Statutes (1979), regarding assessment of attorney fees to be applicable to this cause.

Accordingly, the writ of prohibition is granted and the respondents, Ronald A. Le-Gendre, as Temporary Circuit Judge, Ninth Judicial Circuit, and the Florida State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, are hereby directed to refrain from any further attempt to enforce the provision of the court judgment of April 13, 1981, quoted above, against the petitioner, Chris Columbo.

GRANTED.

DAUKSCH, C. J., and SHARP, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • R.C. DIX v. Richardson, 427 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
    …valid on its face and that it could, therefore, be enforced against him at any time. We agree with petitioner. Prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent enforcement of a judgment that is void for lack of jurisdiction. See Colombo v. Legendre, 397 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Rehrer v. Weeks, 106 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958); cf. State ex rel. Pearson v. Johnson, 334 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Under the circumstances of this case, the petition for writ of prohibition is granted to prevent enforc…
  • Northland Ins. v. S&M Transp. (9th Cir. Ct. App. Div. 2016)
    …court from improperly exercising jurisdiction while an appeal is pending[,]” and granting writ of prohibition “to prevent the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over that part of the . . . injunction” that was on appeal); Columbo v. Legendre, 397 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (granting petition for writ of prohibition based on trial court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction and rejecting argument that there was adequate remedy by direct appeal if petitioner was eventually adjudged in contempt)…

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