STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
FRANK JAMES HOESLEY, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appeals a trial court's order discharging defendant Hoesley from a cocaine possession charge for failure to bring him to trial within the time required by Florida's speedy trial rule. The District Court of Appeal reverses, holding that the cocaine charge was not sufficiently related to the initial DUI arrest to warrant discharge.
The court reversed the discharge order, holding that Hoesley failed to demonstrate the requisite nexus between the cocaine possession charge and the original DUI arrest. The mere discovery of cocaine evidence during an inventory search following the initial arrest is insufficient to establish the nexus required under speedy trial rule jurisprudence.
[1] A defendant seeking discharge under a speedy trial rule based on a prior criminal episode must demonstrate a nexus between the subsequent charge and the conduct leading t…
[2] The discovery of evidence leading to a subsequent charge during an inventory search incident to an initial arrest does not, in itself, establish a sufficient nexus to a p…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a defendant, seeking discharge pursuant to rule 3.191, argues that the subsequent criminal charges arose out of an earlier criminal episode, he must show a nexus between that subsequent charge and the conduct which led to the initial arrest.”
Establishes the standard for discharging charges under speedy trial rule: requires nexus between subsequent charge and initial arrest.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHoesley was arrested on September 24, 1981, for DUI while driving. During an inventory search of his impounded car, police discovered a white powdery …
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
The state appeals from an order discharging appellee, Frank James Hoesley, from a charge of possession of cocaine for failure to bring him to trial within the time provided by the speedy trial rule, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. We reverse.
While driving alone at 10:15 p.m. on September 24, 1981, at Belleair Road and U.S. 19 in Pinellas County, appellee was stopped and arrested by a deputy sheriff for DUI (alcohol). He was transported to jail, and his car was impounded. After appellee was arrested and in jail, an inventory search incident to impoundment of his car revealed a white powdery substance in a shaving kit in the trunk of the car. The substance was sent to a chemical laboratory for testing where it was received on September 28, 1981. The Pinellas County Sheriffs Office received the report from the testing laboratory on January 28, 1982, indicating that the substance was cocaine. On March 2, 1982, an information was filed charging appellee with possession of cocaine, and a capias was issued. On April 2, 1982, appellee pled not guilty and on May 15,1982, filed a motion for discharge for failure to comply with rule 3.191. The trial court entered its order discharging appellee on June 18,1982, and this appeal followed.
Appellee principally relies on State v. Kelly, 407 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), and Crain v. State, 302 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), to support the trial court’s order of discharge. Each of those cases is factually distinguishable from the case at bar. In State v. Kelly, a trial court’s order of discharge for the offense of trafficking in a stolen .45 caliber pistol was affirmed. There, a search warrant executed on the residence of a third party had revealed jewelry, a .38 caliber pistol, and the .45 caliber pistol which the third party explained had been purchased from Kelly who had said that the guns were stolen. Kelly was originally charged with trafficking in the jewelry and the .38 caliber pistol. Because the owner of the .45 caliber pistol had not filed a sworn complaint of its theft, Kelly was not charged with the offense until more than 180 days after his initial arrest. Since the trafficking in the .45 caliber weapon was obviously a part of the same “criminal episode” that led to Kelly’s initial arrest, this court affirmed the discharge. In Crain, the appellant had been arrested at the scene of an accident for the offense of driving under the influence of a prohibited drug. During the accident investigation, a search of Crain’s vehicle produced suspected marijuana and other potential contraband. More than 180 days after the accident and Crain’s arrest for driving under the influence of a prohibited drug, he was charged with felony possession of marijuana which was the same marijuana found at the scene of the accident. Again, the charge of possession of marijuana was sufficiently related to the initial arrest and search to cause this court to affirm the trial court’s order of discharge.
In the case at bar, there is no relation between the original arrest for DUI (alcohol) and the subsequent charge for possession of cocaine, except that the cocaine was discovered during an inventory search of appellee’s car after his initial arrest and confinement in jail. When a defendant, seeking discharge pursuant to rule 3.191, argues that the subsequent criminal charges arose out of an earlier criminal episode, he must show a nexus between that subsequent charge and the conduct which led to the initial arrest. In showing that nexus, the defendant must show more than the mere fact that the evidence leading to the subsequent charge was first discovered as a result of the original arrest and charge for the initial offense.
We also do not concur with appel-lee’s argument that the state had some duty to file possession of cocaine charges against him prior to the time the state had suffi- dent facts to support a probable cause determination to file such a charge.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
HOBSON, A.C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
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State v. Lynch, 445 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…he cocaine possession charge began to run on July 24, 1982, the date of Lynch’s arrest for the charge of battery of a law enforce [*689] ment officer. Relying on the cases of Walker v. State, 390 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), and State v. Hoesley, 427 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), which it asserts are both analagous to the instant case, it maintains that the two charges occurred during separate criminal episodes. It therefore reasons that the speedy trial time period for the charge of possession of cocaine…
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Donnie Willis v. State, 640 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…nse until several months after the arrest for soliciting for prostitution. Floyd argued that the two offenses were connected and that the speedy trial time began to run when she was arrested for prostitution. This court, relying on State v. Hoesley, 427 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), concluded that the mere discovery of the cocaine pipe during the search incident to Floyd’s arrest was insufficient to show a connection between the two offenses. The facts leading to the charge for possession in this case are a…
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Rodriguez v. State, 453 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…uct. Walker v. State, 390 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident). It is not a situation where probable cause to charge the second crime did not arise until after the arrest for the first. State v. Hoesley, 427 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (cocaine discovered during inventory search of defendant’s car after his arrest and confinement for driving under the influence of alcohol). Significantly, in this case the accident victims were already dead when appellant was cit…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Crain v. State, 302 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- State v. Kelly, 407 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)