DOUGLAS L. JAMES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Douglas L. James appealed his convictions and sentences, arguing he did not voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to counsel at trial or sentencing. The court affirmed the convictions, finding the trial court properly accepted his waiver of counsel at trial, but reversed and remanded the sentences because the trial court failed to renew the offer of counsel at sentencing.
The trial court properly accepted appellant's waiver of counsel at trial based on substantial evidence and proper inquiry into the voluntariness and intelligence of the waiver. However, the trial court erred by failing to renew the offer of counsel at sentencing, a critical stage of the criminal proceeding.
[1] A defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is voluntary and intelligent if the trial court informs the defendant of the dangers of self-representation and the defendant…
[2] Evidence of a defendant's written communications demonstrating familiarity with the legal process can support a finding that the defendant's waiver of counsel was intelli…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial court has a duty to inform a defendant of his right to counsel at each critical stage of the criminal proceeding, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.111(d)(5), which includes the sentencing stage, and it was error to fail to renew the offer of assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing.”
Establishes the legal duty to renew the offer of counsel at sentencing as a critical stage of criminal proceedings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAt a hearing held over two weeks before trial, the trial court informed appellant multiple times of the dangers of self-representation, but appellant …
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BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.
Douglas L. James appeals his convictions and sentences on the ground that he did not voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to counsel at his trial or at sentencing. We affirm the convictions but reverse the sentences.
Although appellant contends that the trial court’s inquiry as to his ability to adequately represent himself at trial was insufficient, we conclude that the substantial evidence before the trial court was sufficient to establish that appellant’s waiver of his right to counsel was voluntary and intelligent under Cappetta v. State, 204 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 4th DCA), reversed on other grounds, 216 So. 2d 749 (Fla.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1008, 89 S.Ct. 1610, 22 L.Ed.2d 787 (1969); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d). At the hearing on appellant’s motion to waive counsel, held over two weeks prior to the trial, the trial court informed appellant several times of the dangers of representing himself without an attorney.
However, appellant responded that he would rather represent himself despite the risks. Prior to the hearing, the trial court had received several handwritten letters and motions written by appellant which demonstrated that he was fairly intelligent and reflected his familiarity with the legal process.
We hold that the trial court acted properly in granting appellant’s motion to waive counsel. Baranko v. State, 406 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Appellant’s convictions are therefore affirmed.
The sentences, however, must be vacated since the trial court failed to inquire at sentencing whether appellant desired counsel at that point. A trial court has a duty to inform a defendant of his right to counsel at each critical stage of the criminal proceeding, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.111(d)(5), which includes the sentencing stage, and it was error to fail to renew the offer of assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing. Win-gard v. State, 200 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Billions v. State, 399 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Accordingly, appellant’s convictions are affirmed, but his sentences are remanded for resentencing, at which appellant is entitled to legal representation unless he affirmatively, voluntarily, and intelligently waives that right. Appellant must be present at resentencing.
GRIMES and DANAHY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Gurchick v. State, 439 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…appellant of his right to counsel at this critical stage of the criminal proceeding and failed to ascertain whether the implicit waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent. See Williams v. State, 427 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); James v. State, 428 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Mullins v. State, 438 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Morgano v. State, 439 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). The record discloses that the two' remaining allegations of error in appellant’s motion are without merit. Accordingly, we…
Authorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- State v. Cappetta, 216 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1968)
- Crummie v. State, 204 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Cappetta v. Florida, 394 U.S. 1008 (U.S. 1969)
- Tabor v. Virginia, 394 U.S. 1008 (U.S. 1969)
- Billions v. State, 399 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Baranko v. State, 406 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Wingard v. State, 200 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)