DENVER JESSE HUTCHINSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant's probation was revoked based on violations of directives issued by his probation officer rather than court-imposed conditions. The court held that probation officers cannot create new conditions of probation or impose directives beyond implementing the court's established conditions, and reversed the revocation.
Probation may only be revoked for violation of conditions imposed by the court, not directives created by the probation officer. While probation officers may issue routine supervisory directions to implement court-imposed conditions, they cannot prescribe new conditions of probation. The probation officer's directives requiring enrollment in a rehabilitation program and total abstention from alcohol were beyond the officer's authority and did not constitute enforceable probation conditions.
[1] A probation officer may impose routine supervisory directions to implement court-imposed conditions of probation, and disobedience of such directions can constitute a pro…
[2] A probation officer cannot prescribe new conditions of probation; that authority rests solely with the court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Probation may only be revoked for violation of a condition which is imposed by the court, not the probation officer.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that only court-imposed conditions can form the basis for probation revocation, not probation officer directives.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was placed on concurrent five-year probation terms. Two months later, he was charged with violating several probation conditions, including …
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SCHEB, Judge.
Appellant was placed on concurrent five-year terms of probation in these consolidated eases. About two months later appellant was charged with violating condition (3), which required that he not change employment without consent of his probation officer; condition (8), which directed him to comply with all instructions of his probation officer; and condition (9), which prohibited him from visiting any bars.
The trial judge found that appellant violated condition (8) by failing to follow the directions of his probation officer to immediately contact Alcohol Community Treatment Services (ACTS) for counselling and therapy if deemed necessary by that agency. Further, the court found that appellant failed to follow his probation officer’s order that he refrain totally from consuming alcoholic beverages. Appellant denied violating conditions (3) and (9). No evidence was presented as to those alleged violations, and the court made no adjudication in respect to those charges.
Appellant was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to consecutive terms of five years for grand theft and fifteen years for burglary. This appeal followed.
Probation may only be revoked for violation of a condition which is imposed by the court, not the probation officer. Holterhaus v. State, 417 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Chatman v. State, 365 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Page v. State, 363 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Barber v. State, 344 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
There are certain directions which a probation officer may impose to implement the conditions of probation established by the court. As Judge Campbell noted in Holterhaus, a probation officer may validly give routine supervisory directions. It is not necessary for the court to specifically approve those directions for disobedience of them to constitute a violation of probation. Holterhaus, 417 So. 2d at 292. However, a probation officer cannot prescribe new conditions of probation. That prerogative lies with the court. Here, the probation officer’s directive that appellant report to a rehabilitation program for therapy was not encompassed by condition (8) requiring the probationer to comply with all instructions given by his officer. Likewise, the order that appellant totally refrain from use of alcoholic beverages was beyond the probation officer’s authority.
Accordingly, we vacate the order of revocation of probation without prejudice to the state’s pursuing the alleged violation of conditions (3) and (9) by filing a new affidavit.
BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and RYDER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (18 total)
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Odom v. State, 15 So. 3d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…rt late or else had left a message with someone else at the probation officer. Appellant was not sure whether he had informed Officer Snowden about leaving messages for her. He “figured” that she had gotten the messages. Citing Hutchinson v. State, 428 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), and Morales v. State, 518 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), Appellant contends that the requirement for him to report to his probation office sometime between the first and fifth day of each month is a new, special condition that hi…
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Eladio Morales v. State, 518 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…— that Morales set up an appointment for alcohol and drug counseling — cannot be considered one imposed by the court by virtue of the court’s general admonition that Morales comply with all instructions of the probation officer, Hutchinson v. State, 428 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Holterhaus v. State, 417 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), and such condition being therefore imposed by the probation officer only, the violation of it cannot serve as a basis for the revocation of probation. Hutchinson v. State, 4…1 / 2
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Waldon v. State, 670 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…., Kiess v. State, 642 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Voudry v. State, 641 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); and Ashrafi v. State, 534 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); see also Morales v. State, 518 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Hutchinson v. State, 428 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) and Holterhaus v. State, 417 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Although her original sentencing order in 1989 required that she “undergo a Substance Abuse Evaluation and complete any treatment/education program recommended by the Ev…
Previewing 3 of 18 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Page v. State, 363 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Chatman v. State, 365 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Holterhaus v. State, 417 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Barber v. State, 344 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)