DONALD P. CHAMBERLAND, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Donald Chamberland was convicted of possession of a stolen air conditioner found in his jointly-occupied apartment. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the State failed to prove exclusive possession necessary to support the conviction.
The State failed to prove exclusive possession or any conscious assertion of possession by Chamberland over the property brought into joint premises by his brother. Without proof of exclusive possession, the inference of guilty knowledge under Florida Statute § 812.022 could not arise, and the evidence was insufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
[1] To secure a conviction for possession of stolen property, the State must prove the defendant's knowledge of the stolen character of the property.
[2] Knowledge of the stolen character of property may be inferred from proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Possession constitutes a conscious and substantial possession, as distinguished from a mere involuntary or superficial possession.”
Establishes the legal standard for what constitutes 'possession' in theft cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceChamberland occupied an apartment jointly with his brother and two others. Late one night, Chamberland's brother installed a stolen air conditioner in…
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DELL, Judge.
Donald P. Chamberland appeals his conviction for possession of a stolen air conditioner under Section 812.014(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1981).
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, appellant occupied an apartment jointly with his brother and two others. There was no air conditioner installed in this apartment before the night of the theft. On that night, appellant’s brother borrowed a car from one of the co-tenants. At about 3:00 a.m., the upstairs tenant heard noises, came down to investigate, and saw appellant’s brother installing an air conditioner in a window of the room the brothers shared. Appellant was sitting on the bed, watching his brother. The next day, a police officer executed a search warrant at the appellant’s apartment and discovered an air conditioner which bore the serial number of an air conditioner stolen from a nearby church on the previous night. The air conditioner weighed in excess of 100 pounds, and the officer could not carry it alone.
Appellant contends the State presented insufficient evidence to show that he had guilty knowledge of the stolen character of the air conditioner. To secure a conviction under Section 812.014(l)(b), the State must show that appellant “knowingly obtain[ed] or use[d] .. . the property of another .... ” That is, the State must demonstrate appellant’s knowledge of the stolen character of the air conditioner. The State may do so inferential-iy:
Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.
§ 812.022, Fla.Stat. (1981).
To take advantage of this inference, the State first must prove that appellant possessed the property.
Possession constitutes a conscious and substantial possession, as distinguished from a mere involuntary or superficial possession. Reynolds v. State, 92 Fla. 1038, 111 So. 285 (1927). It must be personal; that is, involve a distinct and conscious assertion of possession by the accused, and it must be exclusive. Walton v. State, 404 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), petition for review denied, 412 So. 2d 471 (Fla.1982).
In Walton, the presence of stolen property in an apartment shared by the defendant and three roommates, and in a shed shared by these tenants and the landlord, did not demonstrate exclusive possession. Therefore, the State could not rely upon the inference of guilty knowledge to support a conviction for possession of stolen property.
Sub judice, the State failed to demonstrate exclusive possession or any conscious assertion of possession by appellant over property brought into joint premises by another. Absent the inference of guilty knowledge which arises upon proof of possession, the State showed only that appellant was present when his brother installed an air conditioner. The State failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate possession of stolen property by appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse with directions-to discharge appellant. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978).
GLICKSTEIN and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
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Garcia v. State, 899 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…give rise to an inference of guilt of theft and burglary. See Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110 (Fla.2001). This inference applies, however, only when the state has proven that the defendant actually possessed the property. See Chamberland v. State, 429 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). As we explained in Chamberland: To take advantage of this inference, the state first must prove that appellant possessed the property. Possession constitutes a conscious and substantial possession, as distinguished from a mere…
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Boone v. State, 711 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…secution to show by inference the accused’s knowledge of the stolen nature of the property and the accused’s intent, which are essential elements of the offense of theft. See F.W.B. v. State, 538 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Chamberland v. State, 429 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). The trial court denied appellant’s objection to the instruction because the court found that possession was a factual question for the jury. This was error. The reasonableness of an accused’s explanation of his possession of re…
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Bozeman v. State, 931 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…s stolen. See Scobee v. State, 488 So. 2d 595, 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). However, before the prosecution can receive the benefit of this jury instruction, it must first produce evidence that the defendant possessed the property. Chamberland v. State, 429 So. 2d 842, 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Ridley v. State, 407 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The state must demonstrate that the possession was personal, i.e., involved a distinct and conscious assertion of possession by the accused, and that the possession was…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (U.S. 1978)
- Reynolds v. State, 111 So. 285 (Fla. 1926)
- Walton v. State, 404 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)