JOSE MARIN-VERANCE, APPELLANT,

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Shea v. Cent. Diagnostic Servs., Inc., 552 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
  …ust look to the injunction bond as the sole source of recovery of any damages resulting from the wrongful issuance of the injunction. See Parker Tampa Two v. Somerset Development Corp., 544 So. 2d 1018 (Fla.1989); Calder Race Course, Inc. v. Gaitan, 430 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). See also Collins v. Horten, 112 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). As to plaintiff’s cross-appeal, rule 1.610 does not in its present form specify who has the burden of initially going forward on a motion to dissolve or modify a te…
• de Leon v. Aerochago, S.A., 593 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
  …junction. However, the law is clear that appellants are “required to institute a separate action at law on the injunction bond before damages may be assessed for the wrongful issuance of the temporary injunction.” Calder Race Course, Inc. v. Gaitan, 430 So. 2d 975, 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (citations omitted). Since the issue of attorney’s fees has not been presented to the trial court, it is not properly preserved for appellate review. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion…
• In re Est. OF Goldie Simon. Bernard Gastel v. Levin & Fishman, P.A., 549 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
  …ry or equity actions, the well-settled rule is that “costs follow the judgment unless there are circumstances that render application of this rule unjust.” Burnett v. Brito, 478 So. 2d 845, 848 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Calder Race Course, Inc. v. Gaitan, 430 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); see Dayton v. Conger, 448 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Gastel suggests that this, in essence, is a “prevailing party” provision. Gastel argues that appellees are not entitled to attorney’s fees under this statute because appel…

Authorities Cited

• Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983)
• Carron v. State, 427 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1983)