MICHELLE MIDDLETON, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT LEE SILVERMAN, JORGE ALFRED PEREZ, STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1983-05-10
No. 82-1267
Before HENDRY, NESBITT, and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
430 So. 2d 981 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1983) Caution
Cited by 5 cases

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Synopsis

A plaintiff filed a civil complaint one day late due to the courthouse closing because of civil disorder during the statute of limitations deadline. The court reversed the dismissal, holding that a timely filing attempt frustrated by courthouse closure due to civil disturbance satisfies the statute of limitations requirement.


Holding

The court reversed the dismissal, holding that when a plaintiff makes a positive and identifiable attempt to commence an action within the statute of limitations and that attempt is frustrated by the court being closed due to civil disorder, the statute of limitations is satisfied. Additionally, the cause of action against derivative liability insurers does not accrue until entry of judgment against the tortfeasor.


Headnotes

[1] A statute of limitations is tolled when a plaintiff's timely attempt to file a complaint is frustrated by the closure of the courthouse due to civil disorder.

[2] A litigant is not required to locate and solicit a judge to accept filings when the courthouse is closed.

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Key Quotes

“Because it is undisputed that the plaintiff made a positive and identifiable attempt to commence the action within the applicable statute of limitations and because it is also undisputed that this attempt was frustrated due to the court being closed as a result of civil disorder, we reverse the order dismissing the plaintiff's complaint against defendants, Silverman and Perez.”

The court's primary holding that timely filing attempt frustrated by courthouse closure due to civil disorder satisfies the statute of limitations requirement.

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Facts & Procedural History

The plaintiff attempted to file a complaint against defendants Silverman and Perez on the last day of the statute of limitations, but after 2:00 p.m. …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Sometime after 2:00 p.m. on the last day for filing a civil action against the defendants, Silverman and Perez, the plaintiff attempted to file a complaint at the Dade County Courthouse. It is undisputed that the courthouse, which is normally open until 5:00 p.m. on a business day, was closed at 2:00 p.m. because of a civil disturbance in the City of Miami. The courthouse reopened the following day and the complaint was filed at that time. The plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of her complaint on statute of limitations grounds.

Because it is undisputed that the plaintiff made a positive and identifiable attempt to commence the action within the applicable statute of limitations and because it is also undisputed that this attempt was frustrated due to the court being closed as a result of civil disorder, we reverse the order dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint against defendants, Silverman and Perez. Wagner v. New York, Ontario and Western Ry., 146 F.Supp. 926 (M.D.Pa.1956), see also Davis v. Wilson, 349 F.Supp. 905 (E.D. Tenn.), aff’d, 471 F. 2d 653 (6th Cir.1972); Seamans v. Walgren, 82 Wash.2d 771, 514 P. 2d 166 (1973); 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitations of Actions § 140 (1970) and cases collected therein.

In an attempt to support the order appealed from, appellees argue that, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080(e), the appellant could have filed the complaint with a circuit court judge. We reject the notion that a party be required to ferret out a judge willing to accept papers filed by a litigant. The appellees have not told us nor would we want to determine how many judges a party would be required to contact before it could be said that the party has met its burden of showing that the papers could not be filed. Given the uncertainty of this procedure and the intolerable burden it would place upon the litigant who expects to have a definite means of compliance with the inflexible rules governing the statute of limitations, we decline to accept the appel-lees’ position. We also reverse the order dismissing the complaint against the remaining defendants, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. and Government Employees Insurance Co. The cause of action against an insurance carrier whose liability is purely derivative does not accrue, for limitation purposes, until the entry of judgment against the tortfeasor. Clemons v. Flagler Hospital, Inc., 385 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

Reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate the complaint.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …timely obtained the funds and timely arranged for delivery, only to have delivery frustrated (through no fault of the tenant) when the courier walked off the job. In analogous circumstances, this court has granted relief. In Middleton v. Silverman, 430 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), the plaintiff attempted to file a complaint at the Dade County Courthouse on the last day of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff arrived at the courthouse after 2 p.m., only to learn that the courthouse had closed at two o’…
  • Morales v. Sperry Rand Corp., 578 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
    …tmas season as an excuse for late service. He reasons that the delay was beyond his control and that in any event the appellees were not prejudiced. See Maler v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 532 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Middleton v. Silverman, 430 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The appellees assert that the prejudice issue was not specifically argued to the trial court, but argue that prejudice need not be addressed anyway where the plaintiff is not diligent and intentionally delays service. It is undi…
  • Williams v. Albertson's, Inc., 879 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
    …r asserting this doctrine would be that Williams was “in some extraordinary way prevented from asserting [her] rights.” An example of such an extraordinary circumstance preventing someone from asserting his rights occurred in Middleton v. Silverman, 430 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). In that case, the Dade County Courthouse closed due to a civil disturbance in Miami. The appellate court noted that the plaintiff attempted to file within the limitations period but was frustrated in his attempt by the courthouse…

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