ARCHIE JEROME JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1983-05-04
No. 82-369
GLICKSTEIN, J., and ANDREWS, ROBERT LANCE, Associate Judge, concur.
432 So. 2d 583 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1983) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Archie Johnson appeals his conviction for second-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. The appellate court found multiple errors in the trial, including inadmissible propensity evidence and prosecutorial misconduct, warranting reversal and remand for a new trial.


Holding

The court reversed and remanded because: (1) the prior eviction evidence was inadmissible propensity evidence with no material relevance to the case and could not be considered harmless error given the jury's instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter; (2) the court did not reach the self-defense instruction issue but noted that if the victim was a mere invitee rather than a co-occupant, the requested instruction should be given; (3) the prosecutor's references to prison fights lacked any record basis and constituted overkill tactics that should be avoided.


Headnotes

[1] Evidence of prior similar acts is inadmissible if its sole purpose is to show a defendant's propensity to commit crime or bad character.

[2] Admission of irrelevant evidence that suggests a defendant's propensity to commit crime or bad character is not harmless error if it may have influenced the jury's decisi…

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Key Quotes

“Evidence of similar facts is admissible if relevant to any material issue other than propensity to commit crime or bad character.”

Establishes the standard for admissibility of similar-fact evidence that the court applied to find the prior eviction evidence inadmissible.

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Facts & Procedural History

The victim had lived in Johnson's apartment for about a month. On the day of the incident, Johnson and the victim quarreled in the morning, and when t…

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Opinion of the Court
HERSEY, Judge.

HERSEY, Judge.

Archie Jerome Johnson appeals his conviction of murder in the second degree and possession of a firearm by a felon. Two of his points on appeal have merit and a third invites comment by this court in order to avoid repetition of the conduct of which he legitimately complains.

The murder victim had been living in a room in Johnson’s apartment for about a month. On the day of the criminal incident the two had a quarrel in the morning and that evening the victim came into Johnson’s bedroom to renew the discussion. There were harsh words and Johnson shot the victim four times.

At trial the prosecution introduced evidence that approximately two days before this shooting Johnson had evicted his stepfather from Johnson’s mother’s home at gunpoint, firing two shots in the process. The purpose of this evidence was said to be to show Johnson’s intent and “that this is his own bizarre form of evicting people from premises.”

Evidence of similar facts is admissible if relevant to any material issue other than propensity to commit crime or bad character. Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). See Mattera v. State, 409 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). There is no suggestion in this case that Johnson was attempting to evict the victim. Nor is any relationship shown between the victim and Johnson’s stepfather. The evidence was not material to any issue other than to show propensity or bad character. Its admission was therefore error. It is true that the evidence in question did not become a feature of the trial based merely on the volume of testimony. See Green v. State, 228 So. 2d 397 (Fla.2d DCA 1969). However, the jury was instructed on the crime charged and also on manslaughter. It is very possible that the jury might have returned a verdict of guilty to this lesser included offense but for the inadmissible evidence. Williams v. State, 117 So. 2d 473 (Fla.1960). We therefore conclude that, unlike in Clark v. State, 378 So. 2d 1315 (Fla.3d DCA 1980), the error could not be considered to have been harmless.

Johnson requested that the jury be instructed that he had no duty to retreat in his own home and that he was entitled to meet force with force. The request was denied. As we view the evidence, the parties were probably not legal co-occupants of the apartment (which would constitute a Conner v. State, 361 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), situation) but rather the parties’ status more nearly resembled that of lawful occupant and invitee as in Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824 (Fla.1965). Since the matter must be retried we come to no conclusion on this point but simply note that if the victim is a mere invitee the instruction should be given. See State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla.1982).

Finally, Johnson complains that the prosecutor in cross-examining him referred to fights in prison supposedly involving Johnson (who had spent time there). These inferences raised by the prosecutorial comments have no basis in the record. The relevance of an admission by Johnson that he engaged in fights while in prison is tenuous, to say the least. Such overkill tactics burden the appellate courts and often-times blemish an otherwise fair trial and successful prosecution. They are to be avoided.

We reverse the conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

GLICKSTEIN, J., and ANDREWS, ROBERT LANCE, Associate Judge, concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Snowden v. State, 537 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
    …vidence that spanned over 600 pages approached but did not reach outer boundary where prejudice begins to outweigh probative value); Talley v. State, 160 Fla. 593, 36 So. 2d 201 (1948) (same; eight other victims to prove one rape); Johnson v. State, 432 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (no feature merely from volume of testimony); Espey v. State, 407 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (same; score of sexual batteries committed on five other victims to prove one charged crime); Dean v. State, 277 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1973…
  • Billie v. State, 863 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
    …ng more, is inadmissible. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997); Heuring v. State, 513 So. 2d 122 (Fla.1987); see also Foburg v. State, 744 So. 2d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Snowden v. State, 537 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Johnson v. State, 432 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Similarly, where the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial value, the evidence is inadmissible. See Snowden v. State, 537 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); see also Bryan v. State, 533 So.…
  • Cora Cannon v. State, 464 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
    …ate, 361 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (mother and son who shared living quarters). In the case of an attack by a house guest or friend, however, there is no duty to retreat in the home. Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824 (Fla.1965); Johnson v. State, 432 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). In this case there was substantial evidence that the decedent and Cannon were not sharing the residence on an equal basis when the attack occurred. They were separated. When she was attacked, Cannon was sharing the home with he…

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