STANLEY WALKER, PETITIONER,
v.
PATRICIA COCALIS, AS JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, RESPONDENT
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The court held that trying the petitioner for armed robbery after he was convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, when both offenses arose from the same criminal episode, would constitute double jeopardy.
Petitioner was charged with grand theft of a motor vehicle and possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and was convicted of the latter. The state then s…
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PER CURIAM.
We determine that it would constitute double jeopardy to now try petitioner on the charge of armed robbery of a watch and wallet after petitioner had been charged with grand theft of a motor vehicle, and possession of a stolen motor vehicle. He was convicted on possession of a stolen motor vehicle. We base this upon the fact that the motor vehicle in question and the watch and wallet were all stolen at the same time, from the same victim, at the same place, and under the same circumstances with the same intent. This was a single offense which cannot be divided so as to obtain multiple convictions. McClendon v. State, 372 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Castleberry v. State, 402 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Sanford v. State, 75 Fla. 393, 78 So. 340 (1918).
Respondent should be prohibited from trying petitioner on the charge of armed robbery, as alleged in the Information contained in Case No. 81-10552, now pending in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County, Florida.
The issuance of any formal writ is withheld. We assume the trial judge will comply with this decision.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and DELL and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
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In the Interest of A.P., 636 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…onspiracy to commit first degree murder. Prohibition is appropriate to challenge a trial court’s jurisdiction on the grounds of violation of double jeopardy. See, e.g., Strawn v. State ex rel. Anderberg, 332 So. 2d 601 (Fla.1976); Walker v. Cocalis, 434 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). In the trial court, at the conclusion of the state’s case, and at the conclusion of all of the evidence, petitioner moved for a directed verdict of not guilty. The court found him guilty of the delinquency offense, and withheld…
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Janos v. State, 763 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…y DWLS under double jeopardy principles. Prohibition is the appropriate remedy when the accused is placed in double jeopardy. Strawn v. State, 332 So. 2d 601 (Fla.1976); In the Interest of A.P., 636 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Walker v. Cocalis, 434 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Accordingly, we grant the petition for prohibition. GUNTHER and KLEIN, JJ., concur. . Additionally, persons who have exceeded their limit by electing this procedure once during a 12-month period or three times in a lifetime c…
Authorities Cited
- Sanford v. State, 75 Fla. 393 (Fla. 1918)
- Castelberry v. State, 402 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- McCLENDON v. State, 372 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)