IN THE INTEREST OF A.P., A CHILD
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A juvenile petitioner sought prohibition to prevent retrial on conspiracy to commit first-degree murder charges after the trial court found his initial conviction unsupported by sufficient evidence and granted his motion for new trial. The appellate court held that where a conviction is vacated due to insufficient evidence, double jeopardy principles preclude retrial and require discharge of the defendant.
Double jeopardy principles require discharge of the defendant when a conviction is vacated based on insufficient evidence. Retrial is prohibited, and the juvenile court was instructed to discharge A.P. forthwith.
[1] Prohibition is an appropriate remedy to challenge a trial court's jurisdiction on the grounds of a violation of double jeopardy.
[2] A retrial is precluded under double jeopardy principles when a conviction is reversed on appeal for insufficient evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Prohibition is appropriate to challenge a trial court's jurisdiction on the grounds of violation of double jeopardy.”
Establishes the basis for using prohibition as the appropriate remedy to challenge retrial on double jeopardy grounds
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA.P., a juvenile, was initially found guilty of delinquency for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. After trial, the court vacated this finding …
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PER CURIAM.
We have before us a petition for prohibition seeking to prevent a retrial of A.P., a juvenile, on charges of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Prohibition is appropriate to challenge a trial court’s jurisdiction on the grounds of violation of double jeopardy. See, e.g., Strawn v. State ex rel. Anderberg, 332 So. 2d 601 (Fla.1976); Walker v. Cocalis, 434 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
In the trial court, at the conclusion of the state’s case, and at the conclusion of all of the evidence, petitioner moved for a directed verdict of not guilty. The court found him guilty of the delinquency offense, and withheld adjudication pending a disposition hearing. Petitioner then filed a motion for new trial, for rehearing, and a motion to vacate judgment, which included his claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the allegations of conspiracy to commit first degree murder and the court’s finding of guilt. Petitioner’s motion was heard on January 10, 1994, and the court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of conspiracy to commit murder. In its order granting the motion for new trial, the court said that “if [A.P.] did not agree with E.F. to murder Mark Pamer, he could not properly be convicted of this charge simply because he had agreed to commit a battery or aggravated battery against Pamer.” The trial court thereupon granted petitioner’s motion and vacated its finding of guilty. In the same order, it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal and ordered a new trial. That prompted the instant petition.
Petitioner argues that when a verdict is found to be contrary to the evidence, the trial court may not order a retrial, but rather must discharge the defendant. Petitioner cites as support the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla.1981), affirmed, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982), in which the court acknowledged the general principle that appellate reversals tantamount to an acquittal for insufficient evidence preclude retrial under the principles of double jeopardy. Petitioner argues that it is clear from respondent Judge Berman’s order in his case that his ruling was based on the finding that the evidence presented failed to prove the crime charged, and as such was a finding of insufficient evidence.
In Coyle v. State, 493 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), this court reversed a trial court’s denial of a judgment of acquittal, when this court found that there was insufficient evidence-to connect a stolen car to the appellant, who had been convicted of its theft. This court went on to state that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Consti tution compelled a remand to the trial court with instructions to discharge the appellant because the state had failed to present sufficient evidence at trial that the vehicle found in appellant’s possession was the vehicle taken from the victim of the theft. Id. at 551, citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978); Kimbler v. State, 360 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
In the Kimbler case, the First District reversed a defendant’s conviction for second degree murder and tampering with evidence, finding the evidence insufficient to permit findings of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and on rehearing, ordered the defendant discharged. The First District acknowledged as binding the authority of Burks v. United States, and Greene v. Massey, that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment bars retrial of a defendant whose conviction is reversed on appeal for insufficient evidence. Id. at 1271.
Based upon the foregoing authorities we grant the petition for writ of prohibition and remand to the juvenile court with instructions to discharge petitioner as to the charges in this case forthwith.
PROHIBITION GRANTED.
HERSEY, GLICKSTEIN and POLEN, JJ., concur.
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Santiago v. State, 874 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…of witnesses so as to act, in effect, as an additional juror.” Uprevert v. State, 507 So. 2d 162, 163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (quoting Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1123 n. 9 (Fla.1981)). 817 So. 2d at 1044 (footnote omitted). . In Interest of A.P., 636 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Webster v. State, 549 So. 2d 784, 784-85 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) ("[I]nasmuch as this court reversed appellant's conviction of second-degree felony murder of the driver of the getaway car, Lawrence Hargrett, because of an insufficie…
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Janos v. State, 763 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…f the misdemeanor DWLS bars later prosecution for felony DWLS under double jeopardy principles. Prohibition is the appropriate remedy when the accused is placed in double jeopardy. Strawn v. State, 332 So. 2d 601 (Fla.1976); In the Interest of A.P., 636 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Walker v. Cocalis, 434 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Accordingly, we grant the petition for prohibition. GUNTHER and KLEIN, JJ., concur. . Additionally, persons who have exceeded their limit by electing this procedure once…
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Miller v. State, 702 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…ficient evidence, double jeopardy principles will not be violated by retrial. See Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla.1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982); Grant v. State, 390 So. 2d 341, 344 n. 2 (Fla.1980); In re A.P., 636 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). . Now codified at subsection 39.052(3)(a)4.a., Florida Statutes (1995). . Now codified at subsection 39.052(3)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes (1995).…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1978)
- Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (U.S. 1982)
- Delbert Lee Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981)
- Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (U.S. 1978)
- Honorable David U. Strawn v. State of Fla. ex rel. Jon Anderberg, 332 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1976)
- Goldia Kimbler v. State, 360 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Coyle v. State, 493 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Walker v. Cocalis, 434 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)