THOMAS HASTINGS, APPELLANT,
v.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CREDIT AUTO LEASE, INC., APPELLEE
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A guarantor of a motor vehicle leasing agreement was sued in Marion County, Florida on the guaranty agreement. The court held that venue provisions in the underlying leasing agreement do not apply to an action on the guaranty agreement itself, and absent a venue clause in the guaranty, Florida's general venue statute controls, requiring suit in the county where the defendant resides.
The venue provision in the underlying lease does not control because it addresses obligations not guaranteed, and New York law (governing the guaranty) contains no provision applying the lease's venue clause to guaranty actions. Therefore, Florida's general venue statute applies, requiring suit only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where property in litigation is located.
[1] A venue provision in an underlying agreement does not govern venue for an action on a separate guaranty agreement absent a specific contractual provision to that effect.
[2] In the absence of a contractual provision specifying venue for an action on a guaranty agreement, the general venue statute applies.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The venue provision in the underlying automobile lease is not an obligation or indebtedness which was guaranteed by appellant.”
Establishes that venue clauses in an underlying contract do not automatically apply to separate guaranty agreements
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHastings, a Hillsborough County resident, executed a guaranty agreement guaranteeing payment under an automobile leasing agreement. The guaranty conta…
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COWART, Judge.
This case involves venue of a suit on a guaranty agreement.
Appellant, as guarantor, executed an agreement guaranteeing to appellee, as lessor, payment and performance of the indebtedness and obligations of the lessee under an open end motor vehicle leasing agreement. The guaranty agreement contained no clause governing the venue of any action on the guaranty agreement but it did provide that it was to be interpreted under New York law. The underlying automobile leasing agreement provided that it would be construed under Illinois law and that venue on any action thereunder or related thereto would be in Cook County, Illinois, or such other venue selected by the lessor having jurisdiction over the parties. Appellant, a resident of Hillsborough County, Florida, was sued in Marion County, Florida, by appellee on the guaranty agreement and appeals an order denying his motion for change of venue.
The venue provision in the underlying automobile lease is not an obligation or indebtedness which was guaranteed by appellant. We have been referred to no provision of New York law to the effect that venue on an action on a guaranty agreement is governed by a venue provision in the agreement guaranteed. Because this action is on the guaranty agreement and not on the automobile leasing agreement and there is no contract provision relating to venue on the guaranty agreement, the general venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1981), applies. That statute provides that “actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” No property is involved in this action. Appellant’s affidavit that the cause of action did not accrue in Marion County, Florida, while conclusory, is uncontradicted. Appellee presented no facts demonstrating that the cause of action for breach of the guaranty agreement accrued in Marion County, Florida. Accordingly, the order denying appellant’s motion to dismiss or for a change of venue is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions that this cause be transferred to the county where the defendant resides.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ORFINGER, C.J., and COBB, J., concur.
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Se. Concrete Constructors v. W. Sur. Co., 331 So. 3d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)…contained a choice of venue provision, that provision did not apply to a separate agreement guaranteeing performance under the subcontract where the separate guaranty did not specify choice of venue); Hastings v. Gen. Elec. Credit Auto Lease, Inc., 434 So. 2d 1020, 1020 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) ("Because this action is on the guaranty agreement and not on the automobile leasing agreement and there is no contract provision relating to venue on the guaranty agreement, the general venue statute, section 47.011, Flori…
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Cason v. Fla. Favorite Fertilizer, Inc., 547 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…n other than that which arises out of the stock purchase agreement. Appellants’ lawsuit arises out of the employment agreements, which are entirely separate from the stock purchase agreement. See Hastings v. General Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc., 434 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). The second reason for our reversal is that the Polk County action does not arise out of the same “transaction or occurrence” as the Hillsborough County suit, and therefore appellants could not be required to plead their claims…
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Chapman v. Sovran Constr. Co., Inc., 709 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…ing subcontract agreement, the Chapmans’ motion to change venue to either Collier County, where they reside, or Charlotte County, where the action may have accrued,1 should have been granted. See Hastings v. General Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc., 434 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (because action was on guarantee agreement, and not on the underlying automobile leasing agreement, and there was no contract provision relating to venue in the guaranty agreement, the general venue statute, section 47.011, Flori…